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This thesis addresses the great lengths to which Vladimir Putin and the Russian 
Federation have gone to foster “controlled instability” in the former Soviet Union.  It is said 
that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it, and with Western policy 
makers who appear unwilling to act on intelligence regarding Russian actions as well as 
incontrovertible evidence of Putin’s aggressive strategy, this Western failure to learn has 
contributed significantly to a repeat of various Russian behaviors during past conflicts.  
Russian actions pose a clear and present danger to the stability of the global community.  
Because many of the current events are not yet published in texts or are classified, the author 
has had to depend heavily upon open-source references from the internet to provide key 
events as they chronologically happened, particularly when analyzing the crisis in Ukraine.  
In writing the thesis, my observations have been validated by Russia’s recent incursion into 
Syria to fortify the Russian leadership’s interests as a result of the continued inaction of 
Western policy makers.  As a result, we will see significant additional instances of controlled 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: A SHARED BUT DIFFICULT HISTORY 
In any attempt to assess current Russian behavior toward Ukraine, we must 
understand the history and symptoms of the patient.  Russians have had certain tendencies in 
the past that arguably could have been anticipated and utilized by Ukraine and Western 
leaders to calculate what to do next in Ukraine.  While it is important to treat each individual 
strategic case as unique, history has shown us a multitude of cases in which certain patterns 
have repeated themselves in the realm of Russian strategy and geopolitics.  The more 
thoroughly policy makers and strategists understand the history, rationalities, and reasoning 
behind a crisis, the more likely they will be to counter the adversary’s efforts and thus 
succeed in achieving their policy objectives.  When dealing with a country like Russia, 
thinking a few moves ahead is vital to any strategic posture that has an opportunity to 
succeed.  To summarize the whole of Russian and Ukrainian history in great detail would 
detract from the primary topic at hand, so this paper will address only the most important 
historical events of relevance to the present crisis. 
The Third Rome 
We must first address the “brotherly relationship” shared between Ukraine and 
Russia.  Russia and Ukraine have been intimately involved historically long before the 
borders of both countries were drawn as they are at present.  Like other areas of Europe, 
there were no nation-states before the modern period (roughly 1500 A.D.), and loyalty was 
focused around bands and tribes that quarreled with each other and occasionally allied 
themselves against Viking, Turk, and Arab invaders.  The first Slavic nation-state emerged in 
882 and was known as Kievan Rus, a historical event celebrated by both Ukraine and Russia.  
2 
 
This Slavic state covered a swath of territory that encompassed a sizable portion of modern 
Ukraine and European Russia and included present St. Petersburg, Moscow, and most 
importantly Kiev, which was the capital and was declared by Prince Oleg to be “The Mother 
of All Rus.”
1
  Because of this, the city of Kiev will always hold an element of prestige even 
in the hearts and minds of not just Ukrainians, but Russians as well.  It was to be a short-
lived period however, and upon the death of Yaroslav the Wise there was internal strife 
primarily related to who was the rightful successor to the throne.
2
  Combined with turmoil 
created in the region by the Fourth Crusade, this caused the empire to crumble even further.  
The conclusive demise of the Kievan Rus Empire was the result of Mongol invasions from 
the east.  This period was critical in Russian psychology by developing the mindset that 
Ukraine’s fate should be tied to Russia’s for cultural and historical reasons, and also for the 
purposes of security from invasion, but it was also exactly the point at which some 
Ukrainians say their relationship with Russia ended.  The Kievan Rus Empire is thus a focal 
point in the current crisis regarding questions of history and thus political legitimacy and 
sovereignty.   
Russia and Moscow emerged separately from Kiev, which was becoming less 
prestigious and influential as time wore on.  Moscow was beginning to emerge as a trading 
hub in 1283.  By the 14
th
 century, a prominent regional duke named Ivan III (historically 
remembered as Ivan the Great) was able to establish the foundations of the Russian state 
through carefully calculated alliances and invasions of neighboring territories.  Ivan III 
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modelled his absolute rule to that of Western Europe, establishing a feudal system of lords 
and peasants.  Mutual experiences in establishing identity were also shared at this time, with 
arguably the most important being the conversion to Christianity and its evolution toward 
Russian Orthodoxy.  Russian Orthodoxy would be vital to the philosophy and decision-
making process of Russia’s rulers up until the establishment of the Soviet Union.  Moscow 
became the center of Russian Orthodoxy during this tumultuous period, and a prophet-monk 
named Filofei wrote a letter to Ivan the Great stating that he had a vision that Moscow would 
be the city that would be the “Third Rome.”  This prophecy would be a rallying point for 
multiple eras of Russian rulers to the present day.
3
  Following the Ottoman Turk capture of 
Constantinople in 1453, Ivan III proclaimed that “two Romes have fallen, but one still stands, 
and a fourth there shall not be.”
4
  The driving notion for all of these leaders was that Russia 
was destined for greatness.  Ivan the Great used this as a rallying cry to push back the 
crumbling Tartar Golden Horde and conquer much of its land given the threat it posed to 
Russia.  By the end of Ivan the Great’s life, he established absolute power over most of his 
territory and began what would become the tsarist lineage and the foundations of a true 
Russian state.  While the establishment of a state is of obvious importance, just as important 
was the establishment of the ideal of Moscow being a “Third Rome”, which plays a critical 
role in determining current Russian diplomatic and strategic behavior to this day.
5
   
It was not until the period of Romanov expansion that the fates of Russia and Ukraine 
would be shared once again on a significant level.  Prior to the Russian National Assembly 
electing the Romanovs as the new line of Tsars, there was a long dark period where the 
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Russians faced constant invasions from Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden, which were 
considerably larger in territory, population, and influence than their modern borders suggest.  
It was a time dedicated to self-preservation and taking advantage of any opportunities for 
enhanced security.  Once Poland and Lithuania became engaged in a war with Sweden, the 
tsars capitalized on this respite of invasion to focus on consolidation of what they had as well 
as taking advantage of any new treaties for security.
6
 
It is also important to discuss the historical role that Crimea plays in the current crisis.  
The central issue is that historically the Crimean peninsula was not primarily an ancestral 
homeland to either the Russian or Ukrainian ethnicities.  The Tartars were the initial 
inhabitants of this peninsula.  Crimea is a location of strategic importance that has been 
fought over for centuries and has changed hands multiple times over the past millennia.   It 
was once a Khanate of the Golden Horde, a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, and was 
under Russian influence until 1783, when Catherine the Great annexed the peninsula during a 
period when the Ottoman Empire was experiencing internal strife and was less able to exert 
control over areas far away from their capital.
7
 
Given its ideal location as a naval port, the town of Sevastopol was established as a 
strategic defensive position in Crimea to consolidate Russian influence in the region.  This 
city became ingrained in the Russian national ethos.  In October of 1853, the Crimea War 
started as the result of Russian expansionism under the guise of protecting Christians from 
persecution of Ottoman Muslims, and the French and British soon stepped in to prevent 
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further Russian encroachment on territory controlled by the Ottoman Empire.  The most 
famous battles of the war took place in Sevastopol.  Facing impossible odds during the 
Crimean War, the Russians lost the city. The siege lasted over a year.  This effort was the 
Russian equivalent to the Alamo in the United States in the sense that the Russians stood 
their ground and fought to the end even in an impossible situation, and it is historically 
relevant because it gave the Russians a concrete sense that Crimea belonged to them.
8
   
World War I and Revolution:  Military and Intelligence Lessons 
Like the Crimean War, World War I also had significant effects on Ukrainian-
Russian relations and on Russia as a whole.  A nation’s military and intelligence practices are 
shaped by its historical experiences.  This is especially true of Russia, which among all other 
nations involved in either World War I or World War II suffered the most in terms of loss of 
life and destruction or expenditure of material.  The military was set up to fail because of an 
economy that was still feudal and not as industrialized as the majority of its European peers.  
The Russian army could not put enough guns and ammunition into the hands of their 
military, let alone harness new communication technology that their German rivals had so 
masterfully learned. This was clear during the Battle of Tannenberg, where a combination of 
German SIGINT prowess and equal Russian ineptitude led to a comprehensive and 
incapacitating defeat of the Russian military. Tannenberg was the first battle in history where 
the interception of enemy traffic played a decisive role in the outcome.
9
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Russian General Yuri Danilov spoke of “unpardonable negligence in the Russian 
radio service.  Imperfect communication service had been the chief reason for the 
catastrophic outcome of the battle.”
10
 Inadequate training on a new technology crucial to 
modern warfare proved costly.  It was a humiliating lesson that forced changes in intelligence 
and OPSEC, and it was a lesson well-learned by the Bolshevik Red Army.  There would be 
intelligence successes and failures from the beginning of the Soviet Union until its demise, 
but it was the battle of Tannenberg that was the first and perhaps the biggest agent of change 
in Tsarist and then Soviet military and intelligence thinking.
11
   
There were pivotal moments during this era that would bring Russians and Ukrainians 
closer together in their united suffering, but there were also events that set the stage for 
accusations and conflict.  A massive wave of internal strife was taking Russia by storm in the 
form of Communist revolutionaries, and the war was proceeding very poorly for the 
Russians.  The economy in Russia was floundering and on the verge of collapse, and a 
shortage of food brought on by German territorial conquests and the requirement to feed the 
Russian army first created resentment toward the ruling class.  It was the perfect storm for 
the Communist movement to set up foundations amongst the bitter and angry masses.  The 
tsarist regime had presided over the loss of millions of lives and immense amounts of capital, 
and the Russian people hit a breaking point once they perceived that their toil and sacrifice 
were only benefiting the elite.  Factions were drawn, and sides were being chosen for yet 
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another long, drawn-out conflict that would affect the core of identity in both Russia and 
Ukraine.   
The most important players during the Russian Revolution were the Bolsheviks  
(“Reds”) and the Loyalists (“Whites”).  The Bolsheviks wanted to end their involvement in 
World War I, which was immensely unpopular with the Russian people.  The ideas and 
concepts of the Bolsheviks became very popular among the fighting soldiers on the front 
lines and their families at home, especially Lenin’s simple but powerful call for “Peace, 
Land, and Bread”.  The already low morale of the Russian military was reduced to tatters as a 
result of Bolshevik infiltration, which, according to historians, the Germans aided and 
abetted in order to speed their victory on the Eastern Front).  Many internal skirmishes in 
Petrograd, most notably the October Revolution and the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, 
continued the spiral toward a civil war.  Russia could no longer participate in World War I 
due to the more pressing internal crisis between the gathering Red and White armies.  The 
Russians signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany on March 3, 1918, formally 
ending their involvement in World War I. The treaty established new borders and new 
countries, which in turn caused an increased sense of separatism and nationalism in these 
new countries, including Ukraine.
12
 
Ukraine’s Struggle For and With Brief Independence 
On November 20
th
, 1917, the Rada declared Ukraine to be an autonomous region of 
the Russian Empire followed a few months later by full independence on January 22, 1918.
13
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It would be the first time that Ukraine would be recognized as a state in the Westphalian 
sense.  Not all Ukrainians were in favor of such a move, nor were the Bolsheviks in Russia in 
any mood to cede any influence in Ukraine.   The Bolsheviks felt it necessary to intervene 
quickly against the newly established Central Rada to quell any separatist attempts in 
Ukraine, and would take action on the perceived threat in due time.    This series of historical 
events is worth mentioning because it was the first time in hundreds of years the Ukrainians 
had decided to push away from their Russian big brother, hoping to follow their own 
destiny.
14
   
The Rada’s forces were considerably outnumbered and were not well prepared for 
armed conflict with the Bolsheviks.  Kiev’s defenses were comprised mostly of university 
students.  Once Bolsheviks from Russia arrived as reinforcements, the situation looked 
increasingly dire for the city’s defenders.  The Rada forces in Kiev were defeated on 
February 9
 
by the combined Soviet Ukrainian and Russian forces, but as fate would have it, 
the representatives of the Rada were able to sign the previously discussed Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk on the exact same day.  This was extremely fortuitous and significant because if we 
recall the earlier discussion, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by Russia signaling the 
end of their involvement in World War I.  This also meant that the alliance of nations to 
which Russia surrendered was able to draw up terms of peace favorable to Germany, 
Bulgaria, the Austrian-Hungary Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, and this involved the fate 
of Ukraine as well.  A blanket security arrangement was provided with a combined force of 
450,000 German, Austrian, and Hungarian troops to keep any Bolshevik influence at bay.  
Unfortunately for the Tsentralna Rada, there was an additional consequence of signing the 
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Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and that meant the dissolution of the Tsentralna Rada through a 
coup d’état executed under the watchful eye of the approving Central Powers.
15
   
It became evident after the period of bitter civil conflict between 1917 and 1922 that 
Ukraine’s fate would lie with Russia once again, and despite occasional instances of 
insurgency and uprising, the momentum of rebellion in Ukraine ended.  Ukraine had only a 
fleeting moment of independence from 1918-1922, and even during that time it knew nothing 
but turmoil and instability.  Ukraine joined the Soviet Union on December 29, 1922 and its 
fate was once again tied to Russia’s.
16
   The Ukrainians would know nothing but suffering 
during Stalin’s tenure as the man in charge of the Soviet Union.  The emerging Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, which would be a beacon of communism and pan-Slavism for the 
world, was greatly feared by Western Europeans and the United States.  The Soviet Union’s 
first leader, Vladimir Lenin, died two years after seeing his dream come to fruition.   After 
some dramatic jostling for power behind the scenes, the iron-fisted Josef Stalin emerged as 
General Secretary of the Communist Party.   
Soviet Development and the Torment Of Ukraine 
One of the biggest reasons the Reds were able to beat the Whites was propaganda, 
information warfare, and intelligence.  Bolshevik officers were generally of poor quality, and 
they were for the most part disorganized on the field of battle.  However, the Whites 
continued to shoot themselves in the foot because of the poor way in which they treated their 
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Once Communism took hold and the Soviet Union was firmly established as a 
geopolitical entity, the next political objective was to expand communism beyond the USSR.  
While there were fifteen Soviet republics, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(the modern Russian Federation) was unquestionably the centerpiece of the organization.  
Russians of this new political ideal felt it was Russia’s burden in to spread communism 
throughout the world to defeat capitalism.  Energetic and passionate communists came from 
Spain, Germany, Italy, China, and other countries to do their part in, and the Soviets 
welcomed them into the fold to train them to operate abroad.  Lenin, Stalin, and Leon 
Trotsky recognized the need for intelligence during the revolution, and the Cheka (political 
intelligence) and GRU (military intelligence) continued to operate after the revolution.  
According to Marcel Van Herpen, “the Chekists are characterized by almost unlimited 
commitment, similar to that of monks in religious orders.  However, their loyalty is not to a 
heavenly God, but to the earthly hierarchy of their organization and to what they consider to 
be their country’s interests.”
18
  Following their successful revolution, the Bolsheviks stood up 
an agitation and propaganda department (AGITPROP) to wage an information warfare 
campaign against the Russian people.  Van Herpen continues: “The Bolsheviks were firm 
believers in the communist cause, and they thought that all means, including censorship, lies, 
deception of others, and production of fake realities were permissible to force their ideas on 
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  Under the threat of purges, the Cheka (which would later become the 
NKVD political police that hunted for enemies of the revolution) and GRU were constantly 
at each other’s throats.  Intelligence analysts with incorrect assessments were executed, and a 
major purge of the GRU took place in November of 1920. According to Suvorov, “on 
Lenin’s orders, hundreds of intelligence officers who had failed to evaluate intelligence 
correctly were shot.”
20
  Many foreign zealots filled the void from all over the world and were 
excellent agents because they were already accustomed to the cultures in which they were 
operating and did not need years of training for cultural assimilation.  The Soviets were also 
experts at forging documents and passports.
21
   
Stalin was a key figure during the revolution, and saw it as absolutely necessary to 
start modernizing the Soviet Union’s industry, agriculture, and military to prepare for another 
attack by Germany.  This was done out of a combination of hoping to spread their communist 
ideal as well as for the Russians’ own protection and prosperity as a nation.  Stalin carried 
out this effort with an extremely brutal no-nonsense attitude through the first of several Five 
Year Plans from 1928 to 1932 to transform a largely technologically backward state into a 
world power in a short period of time.  Everything produced within the country was owned 
by the state and distributed to its people equally, at least in theory, and the collective farm 
was one of the premier examples of how things were done in the Soviet Union.  The farms 
were required to meet a government-mandated production quota each year, and if that 
production baseline was not met it likely meant prison in the vast gulag network that was 
built in Siberia.  Forty percent of all political prisoners in the Soviet gulag system came from 
                                                          
19
 Ibid p.2-3. 
20
 Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (London, UK: Macmillan Pub Co, 1984), p. 15. 
21
 Ibid p.18. 
12 
 
Ukraine.  The Ukrainians received disproportionately harsh sentences for their “crimes” 
compared to other Soviets.  Ukrainian political prisoners averaged twelve-year sentences in 
the gulags compared to Baltic, Armenian, or Georgian political prisoners who received three 
to four on average for similar infractions.
22
  Stalin also became extremely paranoid of a 
potential “fifth column”, which had been a hallmark of Russian rulers regarding internal 
opposition working to bring down the government.  Soviet citizens were arrested on a 
massive scale for political crimes against the Soviet Union.  Millions of these political 
prisoners died in the gulags or were executed outright.  The courts were mere rubber stamps, 
and all it took was a neighbor or someone with a grudge to prompt an accusation of political 
crimes that often brought a conviction.   
The party established a political security apparatus that bordered on obsession at best 
and insanity at worst, and an infamous political entity known as the NKVD (People's 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was charged with identifying any enemies of the state.  If 
a citizen was found guilty in one of the rubber-stamp courts for some trivial “crime,” the 
result would more often than not be imprisonment in Siberia. It is widely estimated that 
between 25 and 30 million people died in the gulag apparatus.  There was virtually no 
accountability, and it was common for innocent people to be thrown in prison.
23
 
During the period of rapid Soviet industrialization, the Ukrainian people suffered 
terribly at the hands of Stalin, who many believe had a personal score to settle with the 
Ukrainian people after causing such a nuisance for the Red Army for so many years. Stalin 
was generally an equal-opportunity ruler when it came to inflicting suffering on his people, 
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but Ukraine bore the brunt of Stalin’s wrath.  In his most paranoid moments (and there were 
many), Stalin wanted to deport all Ukrainians from Ukraine, but Khrushchev and other party 
members cautioned him that they could not do that “because there were too many of them 
and there was no place in which to deport them.  Otherwise he would have deported them 
too.”
24
  Over 100,000 Ukrainians were sent to political prison camps.  The Soviets then 
sought to stifle any remaining Ukrainian nationalistic feelings, first by restricting the 
teaching of the Ukrainian language and culture in schools.  Russian would be implemented as 
the official language throughout the Soviet Union, which upset many Ukrainians.  Their 
second action was to end the reluctance among many Ukrainians to comply with the 
collective farm practice, which they felt redistributed an unfair share of the fruits of their 
hard work.  Ukraine was an agricultural breadbasket, and some Ukrainians were beginning to 




In fact, the coming decade witnessed one of the most shocking episodes in Soviet and 
Ukrainian history.  In the transition from privatized property to collectivization, a worst-case 
scenario reared its head in the form of a famine which, while it affected the greater Soviet 
Union, unquestionably brought the greatest amount of suffering to the people of Ukraine.  
This famine was known as the Holodomor, which means to “kill by starvation.”   The land 
was being cultivated to the point that the soil was losing its nutrients that are essential for 
plant growth.  Farmers became suspicious as early as 1930 when the soil was replicating the 
consistency of dust found in the United States during the Dust Bowl.  Crop yields suffered as 
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a result, and the output of 1931 was an alarming foreshadowing of things to come for farmers 
across Ukraine.  By 1932, the famine struck in full force and continued in 1933.  Stalin, who 
still harbored resentment toward Ukrainians for their counterrevolutionary rebellion against 
the USSR, made sure that food distribution would not be favorable to them.  He had his 
vengeance as some ten million Ukrainians starved to death. While there is some debate that 
the Holodomor fits the criteria of genocide (particularly among historians with Soviet-
leaning sympathies), most historians now assess that it indeed fits all of the qualifiers with 
incontrovertible evidence that Stalin specifically targeted the Ukrainian people during the 
famine.  The scale of death of the Holodomor is actually greater than the equally deplorable 
Holocaust, which is much more prevalent in history books.  Ukrainians hold such strong 
contempt for what happened that they enacted a law in 2008 to make Holomodor-denial a 
crime.
26
   
Stalin’s paranoia would expand even further to his political, military, and intelligence 
officials. The NKVD carried out massive internal purges from 1937-1939.  Many political 
and military functionaries accused one another of various crimes to gain Stalin’s favor, 
creating what in military slang are called “circular firing squads,” in which they only ended 
up hurting and incriminating themselves.  Stalin would come to rue the day that he 
eliminated so many intelligence analysts and military professionals.  Tens of thousands were 
eliminated from these crucial positions, which created a brain drain and negated priceless 
experience and years of hard work in building up the Red Army.  Two years following the 
purge, when hostilities began with Finland, the Red Army’s four million men needed four 
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months to break a superb Finnish army of 28,000, which used a highly effective mix of 
conventional and guerrilla tactics.  Soviet historians blamed the lack of intelligence as a 
primary reason for their defeat.
27
   
While building the strength of the Soviet Union, Stalin desperately wanted to avoid 
further conflict, at least until the Red Army was ready, but when the opportunity came for 
expansion of the Soviet Union’s current territory and peace with Hitler, Stalin jumped at the 
chance.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in August 1939, partitioned Eastern Europe 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. They met in the middle in Poland.  To Stalin, there 
seemed to be no downside because it appeared to bring better relations with Germany.  Stalin 
disdained Hitler and the Nazis nearly as much as the Germans reciprocated that hatred, but 
Stalin also recognized the strategic value of peace and the expansion of the Soviet empire.  
The GRU did not share Stalin’s judgement when signing the pact, and for that the GRU head 
and cabinet were executed.
28
   
The Great Patriotic War 
In the buildup to World War II, the Soviet Union made another notable intelligence 
blunder in failing to anticipate Germany’s intentions leading up to Operation Barbarossa.  
This was primarily Stalin’s fault.  He refused to accept alternative assessments from his 
intelligence community and thus ignored the advice provided to him by the GRU, which 
gave clear indications that Germany was planning an invasion.  Stalin reacted to these 
alternative assessments by purging the entire GRU and dismantling its intelligence apparatus 
just when Russia needed it most.  Extremely valuable human intellectual capital and 
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manpower were lost as a result of Stalin’s paranoia.  The Soviet Union thus had to rebuild its 
intelligence community nearly from scratch during wartime, which was an incredible feat 
given the internal and external obstacles that it faced.
29
   
World War II, when the Soviet Union fought desperately to defeat Axis forces, 
magnified Russian perceptions of brotherhood with Ukraine.  Both the Russians and 
Ukrainians suffered more than their fair share during what they call the Great Patriotic War.  
The Nazi blitzkrieg charged through the entire Ukraine with speed and efficiency, and 
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were either killed or captured by German and 
Romanian forces.  The Red Army instituted a “scorched earth” policy, and while they 
retreated they burned crops and barns and slaughtered livestock so the Nazis could not use 
them.  With the Holodomor fresh in the minds of Ukrainians, the “scorched earth” policy was 
another instance of deprivation of food that would linger in their memories.  The loss of 
Odessa and Kiev were massive defeats for Soviet Forces, who could not seem to stop the 
Fascist tide.  Both of these Ukrainian cities were recognized as Hero cities of the Soviet 
Union after the war ended, reinforcing foundations of the brotherhood Ukraine and Russia 
shared.  The Crimean Peninsula came under fire again as a strategic point for the Soviet 
Union during World War II when German forces attacked Sevastopol on October 30, 1941.  
The Black Sea port withstood another long siege but finally fell to the Nazis in June of 1942 
after more than eight months under a naval blockade that included relentless bombardment 
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by the German navy and Luftwaffe.  Sevastopol’s Russian lineage become even further 
engrained as it was designated a Hero City of the Soviet Union as well.
30
   
In February 1945, as the Allies and the Red Army closed in on the Reich, the Yalta 
Conference brought together Stalin, President Franklin Roosevelt, and Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill.  After nearly a week of painstaking negotiations, borders and conditions 
were drawn up to prepare for the aftermath of the Great Patriotic War (known by the Western 
Powers as World War II).  The Soviet Union also entered the United Nations and was 
granted veto power on the U.N. Security Council.  Stalin insisted that the Red Army be 
allowed to take Berlin based on the millions of lives the Soviets had lost. Churchill and 
Roosevelt agreed.  The fact that Yalta is located in the Crimea further enhanced the prestige 
of the Crimean Peninsula in the hearts of Russians and Ukrainians.  On May 2, 1945, Berlin 
fell to the Red Army.  On May 8, 1945, the Allied Powers received the unconditional 
surrender of Germany.  Not to be outdone, the Soviet Union said that the Americans and 
British had no authority to sign that treaty because it was the Soviets who defeated the 
Germans.   The Germans surrendered to the Soviets formally on May 9, 1945, and this is the 
day that the Soviet Union celebrates the end of the Great Patriotic War.  In reference to the 
Red Army fighters, Anthony Beevor states, “Their collective sacrifice, both forced and 
willing at the same time, represented a terrifyingly impressive achievement.”
31
  The Russians 
viewed Ukraine as the “little brother”, and in their mind they helped their little brother out of 
a tight spot: something for which the Ukrainians should be grateful. 
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 Despite the brotherhood during the Great Patriotic War, festering wounds lingered. 
The historical complications and complexities that took place before the war drew the lines 
of war in a more skewed fashion than the Soviet official history of the war would have us 
believe.  A sizable demographic of Ukrainians threw their lot in with the invading Nazis.  
Russia’s particular fixation on Ukrainian association with the Nazis during this timeframe is 
of utmost importance, and we will discuss further in subsequent chapters how Russian 
talking heads link this association between Ukrainians and Nazi sympathizers to the current 
conflict.  First, however, we will focus strictly on the historical conflict that allows the 
Russian policy makers and media to construct this obtuse narrative.   
 With the Holodomor still fresh in the minds of Ukrainians, many saw the Nazis as 
liberators.  These feelings became stronger when the Red Army executed many Ukrainian 
political prisoners during the retreat from the initial Nazi invasion.  Also, many who still 
secretly practiced Orthodox Christianity believed they had a divine call to fight the Soviet 
antichrist, and that the Nazis would make communists pay for their sins.  Priests and nuns 
greeted the Nazis with crosses thanking them.  There was also deep disdain toward the 




Some Ukrainians simply joined the Nazis out of sheer hatred for the Soviet Union and 
its harsh brand of government.  One of these dissidents was the extremely controversial 
Stepan Bandera, who was hoping to revive Ukrainian independence and often led campaigns 
into southeastern Poland to take back Ukrainian territory that had been taken away centuries 
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earlier.  This was done initially with Nazi backing, and Bandera’s militant separatist 
organization, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, declared Ukrainian independence 
soon after the Germans moved through Poland.  Once the Nazis had no further use for 
Bandera and his insurgency, they imprisoned him until 1944, judging Bandera and his 
organization to be more of a liability than an asset.
33
   
One Man’s Terrorist Is Another Man’s Freedom Fighter 
When the tide turned against Germany and its allies, the Nazis released Bandera and 
his troops to fight with them.  A Ukrainian insurgent army called the UPA (Ukrainian 
People’s Army) was formed and was particularly politically active in what is now Western 
Ukraine in areas like Lviv and the Carpathian mountains where 200,000 men were willing to 
fight for this cause.  One of the side effects of this fervent nationalism was a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing of Poles.  Between 60,000 and 100,000 were killed.  The UPA was arguably 
just as paranoid against betrayal and traitors as the Soviets were, and those they accused were 
punished in such vile ways as having their eyes poked out or even being hacked to death by 
an axe.  When the gruesome tactics began to backfire, the UPA quickly ended them, realizing 
that they were losing the favorable opinion of their own populace.  The Soviets suffered a 
very high casualty rate against Bandera’s Ukrainian insurgency force in the Carpathians, 
including many of the Soviet Union’s best NKVD battalions.  Even after World War II 
ended, the UPA insurgency remained strong in Western Ukraine.  Becoming frustrated with 
the guerrilla tactics, the NKVD began a concentrated campaign of espionage that eventually 
worked its way into the highest levels of the UPA.  According to declassified Soviet 
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documents, KGB and NKVD members, posing as UPA partisans, committed massacres to 
turn the populace against the actual UPA.
34
  This clever change of tactics broke the UPA’s 
back, and collective farming became a common practice again by 1947.  Bandera himself 
fled into Western Germany in exile, where he was assassinated in 1959 by KGB operatives.   
He remains a divisive figure in history books—a rallying point for Ukraine nationalists, 




It is also important to know that the number of Ukrainians who fought for the Red 
Army during the Great Patriotic War still vastly outnumbers those who served with the Nazis 
and Bandera’s UPA.  Some of the Red Army’s most brilliant generals were also Ukrainian 
including Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Andrei Yeremenko, who was a 
stalwart commander during Stalingrad and who, following the Great Patriotic War, was 
assigned to combat Bandera’s UPA.  Yeremenko put it best when he said, “Russian and 
Ukrainian friendship is sealed in blood shed in the common cause on the field of battle.”
36
 
This example once again shows how foolish it is to shoehorn such a vast swath of territory 
and people into a predetermined narrative that fits one’s arguments like the Russian 
Federation does today in regards to Ukraine, yet they continue to preach it as the truth.   
Following World War II, it became abundantly clear that Ukraine’s fate would be 
with the Soviet Union for some time.  For the first time in the twentieth century, Ukraine was 
under an umbrella of stability fostered by the perceived brotherhood developed during the 
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war (and with the other battlefield bonds over the course of half of a century that certainly 
struck a resounding note).   However, Ukraine suffered as much at the hands of Stalin as of 
Hitler, a fact not lost on ethnic Ukrainians.  According to Taras Kuzio, “during the years both 
Stalin and Hitler were in power, more people were killed in Ukraine than anywhere else in 
the “bloodlands” of eastern Europe.  Ukrainians died by the millions in the greatest artificial 
famine in the history of the world.”
37
  Following the death of Josef Stalin, a passing 
celebrated by Russians and Ukrainians alike, Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev 
sought to strengthen the foundations of Russo-Ukrainian brotherhood.  Some partially credit 
Khrushchev’s wife, who herself was Ukrainian, and he absolutely adored her.  It was now 
time for the Soviet Union to consolidate their alliance, to foster the spread of the communist 
ideal, and to combat their former capitalist adversaries diplomatically and through military 
buildup.  There was a shortage of manpower in Ukraine following World War II to work 
industry in the Donbas.  One estimate for population decline shows that Ukraine lost half of 
its male population and a quarter of its female population.  Russians were brought in to 
rebuild the towns destroyed by the Nazis and found jobs in the Donbass region working on 
collective farms and in the coal mines
38
.  Political prisoners in the gulags of the Donbas 
region were released and their sentences forgiven, and many simply settled in the region 
rather than move back.  Many of these political prisoners, who were likely not violent before 
their incarceration, became intimately involved with prison codes and the vory-v-zakone 
(thieves in law), organized criminal elements, and established underground black markets 
and racketeering schemes in Donetsk and Luhansk.  It is that prison culture that made the 
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Donbas a hotbed for corruption even in the Soviet Union, and it is crucial for understanding 
the political-criminal nexus there today.
39
   
The Cold War 
In 1954, this integration was furthered, and the notion of brotherhood even more 
deeply romanticized when Khrushchev formally granted Crimea to Ukraine as a gift despite 
the population residing there being overwhelmingly Russian given that the Tartars had been 
forcibly removed under Stalin’s regime
40
.  This was symbolically done on the 300
th
 
anniversary of signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, which had unified Ukraine with Russia.
41
  
Nobody in the Communist Party objected to giving Crimea to Ukraine.  Crimea’s Black Sea 
Fleet became more strategically important to the Soviet naval forces and experienced a 
sizable influx of Soviet Union servicemen.  Hand in hand, the two most powerful entities in 
the USSR, Russia and Ukraine, developed into a fearsome superpower.   
This period from 1945 to 1991 revolved around the Soviet Union’s role in the world 
as a superpower pitted against its adversary, the United States of America.  It was a 
protracted conflict of fundamental differences in ideological beliefs and government and 
economic processes known as the Cold War.  It was a “cold war” because both the Soviet 
Union and the United States engaged each other through proxy wars like Korea, Vietnam, 
Afghanistan, Central America, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Cuba, among other 
locations.  The Intelligence agencies of each respective nation, the United States’ CIA, and 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ KGB and GRU, engaged in the most complex game of 
cat and mouse between two adversaries in the modern era to gain advantage over each other, 
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and each side experienced accomplishment of mission objectives and humiliating defeats.  It 
was the KGB’s job to protect against foreign intelligence (First Directorate); suppress 
internal strife and conduct counterespionage (Second Directorate); protect VIPs and carry out 
censorship and disinformation (Fifth Directorate), and suppress dissent.
42
   The GRU focused 
primarily on missions abroad.  According to Suvorov, many KGB and GRU members 
actually hated communism, especially after being assigned to Western locations as “illegals” 
(agents posing as citizens in adversary countries) and experiencing the many perquisites of 
free societies and capitalism.  A few were turned, including Oleg Penkovsky, who many 
credit with providing vital information to the United States when making decisions during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.  However, most stayed loyal to the Soviet Union.   
The KGB and reformed GRU were formidable than their predecessors primarily 
because after Stalin’s reign and the purges that took place under paranoia, leaders recognized 
the necessity of objective and unbiased analysis.  In spite of this, if party leadership was bent 
on a particular slant in a given assessment, senior intelligence officials would not dare break 
ranks with that judgement.  Both organizations were rivals as well, as the USSR intentionally 
kept two intelligence entities as checks-and-balances to make sure one did not become too 
powerful.  Advances in technology were vast and encouraged the evolution of intelligence 
analysts and operatives.   Intelligence played critical roles for both the CIA and KGB in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the multitudes of Israeli-Arab conflicts, and the Iran-
Contra scandal.   For the Soviets, their greatest disaster after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was the ill-advised engagement in Afghanistan, where they only got involved 
after the communist government was on the verge of collapse.  The CIA turned the tide 
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largely by arming the Afghan Mujahedeen (“holy warriors” resisting the Soviets) with 
Stinger missiles via a third party.  These turned the tide against the Soviet Hip and Hind 
helicopters that were the beating back the Mujahedeen.  These missiles, combined with the 
tactical ingenuity of the local resistance, condemned the Soviet Union to defeat.
43
   
With this defeat, the first domino fell in what would become a rapid decay of the 
communist superpower.    Gorbachev’s establishment of the reform practices of glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (reform) only sped up the internal decay of a broken system.  The 
communist economy remained stagnant and the people were tired of food lines with lack of 
variety or quantity.  The military had just endured a humiliating defeat.  Soviet citizens could 
now see on television the difference between their system and that of the capitalists of 
Europe and North America.  Dissent was emerging in the smaller Soviet republics.  The 
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UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN HISTORY AFTER THE SOVIET UNION 
For many politicians in the pro-Russia hemisphere, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was a humiliating disaster.  The Russians, being the primary pallbearers for and ethnic group 
within the Soviet Union, felt as if they had lost vast swaths of their empire.   After the 
Russians shook off the period of focusing on what they viewed as their loss of strategic depth 
and what they viewed as the concurrent threat to their survival, the psychological trauma set 
in at a cultural and political level.   Russian citizens began pointing the finger of blame at 
people they felt were responsible for the dissolution of the USSR.  People saw the final 
president, Mikhail Gorbachev, as a traitor and the orchestrator of the USSR’s collapse, and 
thought his successor Boris Yeltsin to be a politically weak, corrupt alcoholic who 
exacerbated Russia’s decline.  The trauma was too deep even to worry about any prospects of 
diplomatic and political humiliation by the United States and its Western allies.  The new 
Russian Federation needed to secure its very existence and prevent any further fracturing 
from Tartarstan, the Russian Far East, Siberia, Karelia, and other regions.
44
  In the minds of 
Russians, the stakes could not be any higher. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union transpired a quicker rate than even formerly 
adversarial governments would have preferred.  The collapse of one of the only two 
superpowers in the world left a power vacuum in which former Soviet states became their 
own countries.  Diplomats and politicians worked overtime to make sure that events in the 
vast swath of territory formerly comprising the USSR did not spiral out of control.  
Communism was a failed philosophy at least from an economic and social perspective.  We 
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can see that there were sincere steps by the Soviet Union to bridge racial and ethnic divisions 
for the benefit of communism, which in Soviet doctrine they viewed as a natural and 
necessary step.  But like many utopian objectives in communism, it is impossible to erase 
history.   The philosophical and ideological battle that consumed much of the twentieth 
century had come to an end.  With all variables taken into account regarding what could have 
been, the dissolution of the USSR was remarkably stable not just for Russia and Ukraine, but 
other former Soviet countries that went on to form the Commonwealth of Independent States 
while declaring their independence.   Former Soviet states held ballot referendums to break 
with the USSR and then formed new governments.  Following this dissolution, 23.5 million 
ethnic Russians were left outside the borders of the Russian Federation.
45
  This would 
become an issue that shapes Russian grand strategy to this day.  For the first time in decades, 
the Russian and Ukrainian governments would be operating as separate entities.  Ukraine 
declared its independence on August 24, 1991with a vote in the Rada of 364 in favor, one 
against, and three absent.
46
  Full sovereignty was assured with the formal dissolution of the 
Soviet Union a few months later on December 26, 1991.  Yeltsin made a last-minute effort to 
form a union with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, but it came to nothing.
47
  Ukrainian 
president Leonid Kravchuk even made sure that the CIS was a “commonwealth” and not a 
“Union of Independent States” because he did not want the word “union” in any agreement.
48
  
The dream of an independent Ukraine had finally come to pass.  Ukraine would go through 
some difficult growing pains, as was to be expected.  It was a country that had many of the 
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same problems that emerging capitalist democracies had during this periods of 
transformation, including widespread corruption and economic volatility.  Nonetheless, 
Ukraine would have the greatest degree of sovereignty in its history.  All Ukrainian Oblasts, 
even the Donbass, voted over fifty percent in favor of independence.
49
 The Ukrainians were 
finally free and independent as a nation, and their future was not tied to Russia’s—or so they 
thought.   
Ukraine: Independence After The Soviet Union 
There were also territories in Ukraine with sizable populations of ethnic Russians 
who felt more loyalty to Russia than Ukraine, most notably Crimea and the industrial Donbas 
region.  Crimea and Donbas were always more conservative in their politics, and much less 
vocal than Lviv or Kiev for independence, and their economy was highly dependent on 
Russia in the defense and raw-materials sectors.  Protests began in the Donbas in 1993 and 
1994 as coal workers went on strike and then grew into a push for more autonomy and even a 
mild-tempered separatist push.  They were successful in achieving an important objective of 
making Russian a second official language of Ukraine.  If there were two territories that 
would have the capacity to cause a sovereign Ukraine trouble, it would be Crimea and the 
Donbas region.   
The Kremlin made a concerted effort to ensure Party of Regions candidate Viktor 
Yanukovich would become president of Ukraine, and financed his campaign for six months 
leading up to the election.  The media blitz against his rival, Viktor Yuschenko, was 
unrelenting.  Yanukovich was used to dirty politics and corruption behind the scenes, and 
served two prison terms during his younger years in the Soviet Union.  Eastern Ukrainians 
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would say “Yanukovich is a bandit, but he is our bandit.”
50
  Yushchenko was vilified on pro-
Russian news networks financed by Ukrainian oligarchs and the Russian government. Even 
more sinister is the fact that Yuschenko was poisoned in the run-up to elections, which left 
his face permanently disfigured.   On Election Day, some of the polling booths were found to 
have pens with disappearing ink.
51
  University students were threatened with eviction if they 
voted for a candidate other than Yanukovich.  Russia and the Party of Regions threw 
everything at running a dirty campaign to win the election.  Kremlin technologists plugged 
for Yanukovich, and propaganda images of “Novorossiya” appeared in Donetsk as early as 
the 2004 elections.
52
  They also said that the push to recognize Soviet atrocities like the 
Holomodor and expanding Ukrainian language increased the threat of a fascist state, and that 
the CIA was funding Yushchenko.  Many Party of Regions voters, the pro-Russian-leaning 
political bloc of Yanukovich, remembered the Soviet Union fondly and believed Yushchenko 
was trying to institute dangerous cultural and historical revisionism.  The heroes and villains 
of East and West Ukraine were quite different.  In Lviv and the West, there were statues of 
Bandera in town squares.  In the eastern portion of the country, they were statues of Lenin.   
No city in Ukraine had statues celebrating both.  In all, Putin and the Kremlin spent several 
hundred million dollars for the Yanukovich campaign.
53
   
Despite this, Ukraine continued its westward trajectory during the Orange Revolution, 
a massive series of rallies starting on November 22, 2004 staged by the people distraught 
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with the levels of corruption in their government and demanding change.  Yulia 
Tymoshenko, one of the most vocal and prominent voices wanting to bring about change and 
reform against graft and corruption, emerged as a prominent heroin of the Orange 
Revolution.  People gathered in every major city in Western Ukraine by using social media 
and the power of mass mobility organized by the internet.  Tymoshenko and Yushchenko 
would become bitter political rivals following the protests, but for now they were on the 
same side.  They also claimed that they won the election in 2004 between them Russia-
friendly Viktor Yanukovich, leveraging the belief among many Ukrainians that 
Yanukovich’s victory was the result of stuffing of ballot boxes and engaging in other 
electoral fraud.  Yushchenko found an unlikely ally in the Ukrainian intelligence service 
(SBU), which charged Yanukovich with election fraud.  The SBU was also crucial in making 
sure strong-arm counter-protest law-enforcement tactics were not used on the protestors.  
Seven pounds of plastic explosives belonging to Russian criminal elements were also found 
by the SBU following Election Day.  The Ukrainian Supreme Court ordered new elections 
because of these inconsistencies, international observers were brought in, and Yushchenko 
was the convincing victor in a fair election.  Ukrainian politicians and administrators under 
Yushchenko worked feverishly toward their goal of joining the European Union, and all of 
the perceived incentives that it would bring.  Ukraine was tilting precariously away from 
Russian influence.   
Unfortunately for Yushchenko, the economy stagnated, and when election time came 
in 2010, Yanukovich emerged as the victor with a vote along ethnically partisan lines.  
Yanukovich portrayed himself as a moderate this time, which played to his favor.  When 
looking at the electoral map of 2010, one can easily identify historical patterns previously 
30 
 
discussed that made Yanukovich’s victory possible.  Ethnic Russians came out in force, and 
Yanukovich would proceed to take his country back on a path toward Russian influence.  
One of the most significant moves Yanukovich implemented was the lease extension on the 
Black Sea Fleet’s rights to the ports of Crimea, which many in the central and Western 
Ukrainian political blocs bitterly opposed.  In return for the lease extension, Yanukovich was 
able to get very favorable terms for Ukraine for Russian fuel, upon which Ukraine is heavily 
dependent.  Yanukovich continued to consolidate his power and imprisoned political 
dissidents, including the popular Orange Revolution heroine Yulia Tymoshenko.  
Tymoshenko’s sentence of seven years (she served five) caused firm international 
condemnation and a nationalist outcry.  Laws benefiting ethnic Russians were pushed, 
particularly letting cities that voted more with a ten percent “yes” vote choose Russian as the 
official language of an oblast.  This angered Ukrainian nationalists to the core.  The Rada 
also voted for a nonaligned military status, which snuffed out any hopes of joining NATO in 
the near future.  It became abundantly clear that with Yanukovich in power the Russians had 
a valuable ally who was easy to manipulate.   
Diplomatically, for both Russia and Ukraine, some dangerous loose ends needed to be 
addressed.  Of primary concern to the international community were bases with heavy 
munitions and weapons of mass destruction in bases throughout the former USSR and 
especially Ukraine.  To the international community this displacement of nuclear weapons 
was of the highest level of concern.  At the point of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine had five thousand nuclear weapons, making it for a brief time the country with the 
third most nuclear missiles in the world.  The Russian Federation, United States, and United 
Kingdom worked diplomatically to secure these weapons and drew up the Budapest 
31 
 
Memorandums in order to assure the security of and non-aggression against Ukraine.  The 
two most binding security pacts were the second and third memoranda, in which all 
participants guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state so long 
as the nuclear weapons stored there would be removed in their entirety and relinquished to 
the Russian Federation.
54
  The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, 
and that none of their nuclear weapons would ever be used against Ukraine except in self-
defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  Second, the 
parties reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion against 
Ukraine that would tend to undermine its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any 
kind.  Russia attempted to declare Crimea’s transfer null and void in 1992, but their own 
internal strife was a much higher priority than retaining any former territories lost before or 
during the Soviet Union’s breakup.
55
  Negotiations made the Crimean Peninsula an 
autonomous territory of Ukraine, and the strategic peninsula’s fate was safe for now. 
The Budapest Memorandums were arguably the most important elements of the code 
of conduct between the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom that 
assured the security of Ukraine. No one wanted to risk the possibility of Ukraine’s nuclear 
weapons falling into the hands of rogue elements, so the agreement created a collective sigh 
of relief for all parties involved.  There was also the business of what to do about the Black 
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Sea Fleet on the Crimean peninsula, which was not on Russian territory.  An arrangement 
was made in 1997 called the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea 
Fleet. Negotiations established a joint base for the Russian and Ukrainian naval forces at 
Sevastopol.  The Russian Federation was authorized to utilize the facilities with a rent of $98 
million a year.  A status of forces agreement was also put into place authorizing a maximum 
of 25,000 Russian soldiers at one time.  The lease would terminate in 2017, and Yushchenko 
told the Russians that the lease would not be renewed.  In a drastic change of course once 
elected in 2010, one of the first things Yanukovich did was pass legislation in 2010 known as 
the Kharkiv Accords extending the lease until 2042, which was so volatile there were riots in 
parliament during its passing.  In return, Ukraine would receive gas discounts of $100 per 
100 cubic meters, which was significant because Ukraine receives 80 percent of its energy 
from Russia.
56
  Crimea would remain a touchy subject.  To the Ukrainian people in the 
Western and central areas of the country it was becoming more and more apparent that 
Yanukovich was nothing more than a Kremlin stooge.  
Wider Impacts of the Soviet Collapse 
Even beyond the Ukraine problem, Russian Federation leaders remained devastated 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union.  To many Russian nationalists, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union felt as if they had lost appendages.  Warsaw Pact nations quickly applied for 
NATO membership and integration with the European Union, and the most painful for the 
Russian nationalists was the Western integration of the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia into NATO.  As important as the former Soviet states were geopolitically, the 
Russian Federation itself was the priority for recovery.  Everything that generations of 
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Russians had been told about how to live and how their government worked was turned 
upside down.  The ruble collapsed, and pensions disappeared overnight.  Stability was much 
more of a priority than national prestige and any perceived humiliation that might have been 
suffered.  The first priority was to establish a government that could effectively project 
power and would make sure that the Russian Federation would not decay any further.   That 
first test would come with when the volatile Caucasus territory of Chechnya declared 
independence from Russia on September 6, 1991.   
The massive military structure of the Soviet Union was decimated in number and 
quality of troops.  The military of the Russian Federation had much better equipment than the 
Chechen separatists but was a demoralized and a poorly trained force.  Many of the soldiers 
were conscripts and were afraid of being deployed to fight such a formidable foe.  The 
Chechen militants themselves were very well trained in guerrilla tactics and knowledge of 
the mountainous terrain, and many Jihadis who had previously fought in Afghanistan made 
the trek to Chechnya to fight the Russians yet again.  Both the Russians and the Chechens 
have also been culturally predisposed to dispense with Geneva Conventions niceties.  Cluster 
munitions were widely used and pounded the Chechen capital of Grozny to rubble, and 
approximately 100,000 Chechens were killed by the relentless bombing campaign, which 
was the most deadly in Europe since World War II.
57
   
There were multiple instances of war crimes, with the obvious use of cluster 
munitions and the fact that Russians regularly refused humanitarian corridors for those 
wishing to leave the zones of conflict.  Chechen fighters often took hostages and tortured 
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their own kin who they thought were collaborators.  The Chechens also used child soldiers in 
battle.  Both sides are reported to have used human shields in tactical engagements.  Perhaps 
the most notorious crime of all was the mass murder of 103 civilians in the Chechen town of 
Samashki by Russian forces, with many more tortured or beaten.  The war was a grizzly 
affair that lasted from December 1994 to September of 1996, and the brutality was widely 
reported by the Russian media.  The official number of Russian soldiers killed in the fighting 
is 5,362.
58
  The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia estimates it much higher with a 
figure of approximately 14,000.
59
  Given how notorious the Russian military is about 
misreporting their war dead and wounded, the latter number is probably more accurate.  
International observers had known of war crimes, but European nations were silent for fear 
of angering the Russians.  Nonetheless, the Kasav-Yurt Accord, signed on August 31, 1996, 
was a humiliation for the Russian army in what is widely considered to be a defeat in a war 
fought at best to a stalemate.   The bad blood between the two sides remained because of the 
scale of atrocities on both sides.  President Boris Yeltsin was in open panic following the 
Chechen war for his re-election hopes.  At first he intended to delay elections, and asked 
Washington to “hold your nose and support us.”
60
  The war was wildly unpopular in Russia 
and a primary factor in Yeltsin’s plummeting approval rating.  Without electoral fraud on a 
massive scale Yeltsin would have never been elected to a second term.  Washington believed 
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a victory for Zyvganov’s Communist Party would have been morally worse than a rigged 
ballot, so they reluctantly agreed to recognize the elections.
61
 
The intelligence community in Russia also suffered a crisis in identity following the 
collapse.  The KGB felt angst, betrayal, and a lack of purpose following the collapse.  The 
biggest blow to their pride was the feeling that they had failed their mission, but the impetus 
remained to stand up and reorganize their new intelligence community.  All the geopolitical 
gains they felt they had fought so hard for had evaporated so rapidly.  The KGB split into 
three separate entities: the FSB (Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii), in 
charge of internal affairs; the SVR (Sluzhba vneshney Razvedki), in charge of overseas 
assignments; and the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye), which would be the military 
intelligence unit operating primarily in locations in immediate proximity to the Russian 
Federation.
62
   With the economic collapse, many former KGB operatives sold classified 
materials to the highest bidder not just for personal gain but in some cases simply to feed 
their families.  However, not all KGB operatives were so unfortunate.  The KGB was 
entrusted with the few privatized entities that existed in the Soviet Union and thus whatever 
capital was put into these highly secret accounts.  These state-run businesses of the Soviet 
Union were primarily in fossil fuels, which were a critical node for state funding.  The 
Central Bank of the Soviet Union gave the KGB these powers because they felt they were the 
only trustworthy entity for these foreign accounts.  KGB agents were some of the few in the 
communist regime who had the knowhow to transfer these lucrative state businesses into 
their private accounts, which were fed into overseas bank accounts.  It is no coincidence that 
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many of these former KGB members are now part of the Russian Federation’s oligarchic 
community.   Many of these former KGB officers affectionately refer to one another as 
Chekists, in reference to the Cheka (the forerunner of the KGB), which was so feared during 
the early days of the Soviet Union.   Lowenthal illustrates how strong this bond is by saying 
“there is no such thing as a former Chekist.”
63
  They have watched out for each other from 
the collapse of the Soviet Union to now, and it appears that they will continue to depend 
heavily upon one another. 
The Wild 90s 
In the “wild 90s”, it was difficult to tell where the Russian mob ended and where 
local government began, as they developed a mutual dependency.  Organized crime 
elements, like the Tambov and Malyshev families, tended to prefer operating in the shadows.  
The Chekists did not care because they knew they were untouchable.  They quickly rose to 
power in Russia’s most influential cities. It was not possible to operate a business in either 
Moscow or St. Petersburg without giving “favors” to these intelligence operatives-turned 
local government politicians with their mafia connections.  Many of these businesses were 
Chekist financial havens, and some of the most notorious are Gazprom, Bank Rossiya, 
Norilsk Nickel, and Baltik Eskort, all of which are still in operation today.   Some of these 
people, who have skimmed profits from infrastructure and construction ventures; vanity 
projects; and public-to-private government transitions are still influential and in power.  
Despite taking part in their country’s economic and administrative collapse, these oligarchs 
and “siloviki” (military and intelligence elite from the former KGB) disdain the Wild 90’s 
yet have no remorse for stealing state funds on a grand scale from their own countrymen, 
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keeping the economy in shackles, and preventing optimal economic growth in part by failing 




It was also a period when Western intelligence agencies could pick apart the Russian 
intelligence community carcass and learn KGB methods that it had tried to keep secret for 
decades.  The British were particularly active in this game.  Russians were especially bitter 
about the Baltic nations, which were all too willing to work against Russian interests.  
Informants were lining up to offer their services so they could be paid and provide for their 
families, and the remnants of the KGB could not take any effective countermeasures.  What 
Western powers likely cultivated from the former KGB is classified but no doubt has been 
instrumental for intelligence analysts who want better to understand the way things worked 
in the Soviet Union, and what the current Russian Federation’s intelligence playbook will 
look like in the future.   
When Boris Yeltsin as the first post-Soviet president of the new Russian Federation 
came to power, the initial struggle of the Russian Federation focused on self-preservation.  
The fundamental change from a communist to a capitalist system went through inevitable 
growing pains.  Immediate concerns included dealing with volatile and unpredictable swings 
in the ruble and how to sustain the people.  Organized criminal elements infiltrated 
practically all basic elements of everyday survival, and black markets with racketeer 
enforcers were commonplace.  Everyone from former politicians to regular citizens was 
caught up in the uptick in violence that was known as the “wild nineties”.  Those in positions 
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of advantage, such as KGB officers, became millionaires overnight, aided by corrupt political 
offices.   
Yeltsin and his immediate allies capitalized on this.  He was so unpopular in Russia 
that if not for corruption and electoral fraud, he would have never stayed in power for two 
terms.   By most accounts, Russia was in a tailspin, and Yeltsin’s credibility was so poor that 
it became imperative for him to prepare for a replacement as soon as summer of 1999.  For 
Yeltsin, it was just as important to find a strong figurehead that would return Russia to 
greatness as it would be to find someone trustworthy enough to give Yeltsin his word that he, 
his family, and his allies would not be brought up on corruption charges once handing over 
power.  Yeltsin stated “I have decided to name the person, in my opinion, who is able to 
consolidate society and, drawing support from the broadest political forces, to ensure 
continuation of reforms for Russia.  He will be able to unite himself with those who are to 
renew Great Russia into the twenty first century.  He is the secretary of the Security Council 
and Director of the FSB of Russia; Vladimir Putin.”
65
 
Chechnya II: Crowning Putin 
The preparation for a transition of power took place six months prior to the turn of the 
millennium.  Yeltsin had already picked his man; a former KGB Lieutenant Colonel with a 
pedestrian career.   He rose quietly through the ranks starting in St. Petersburg and then as 
director of the FSB in Moscow.  Yeltsin saw in Putin a professionalism, discipline, and 
toughness required to carry Russia forward.  Few outsiders knew much about Putin, but he 
seemed to be a breath of fresh air from Yeltsin’s lack of strength.  Putin believed that a 
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strong hand was (and is) the best thing to save Russians from any return to the Wild 90’s 
instability or any further international humiliation.  The first immediate obstacle to this 
smooth transfer of power was a significant one; the re-emergence of Chechnya as a hot spot 
in 1999 after a series of purported terrorist attacks that caught Russia completely off-guard.  
The war started when Chechen turmoil spilled over into neighboring Dagestan, and 
several Russian servicemen were killed in the exchange.  This was a known hotspot for 
hostilities, and these events were only slightly above the ordinary level of violence.  Soon 
after the Dagestan engagement, without any warning, Russia experienced a sequence of 
apartment bombings that caught the nation completely off-guard.  Hundreds of Russians lost 
their lives in the cities of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk.  Apparently out of sheer 
luck, suspicious activity was reported outside of an apartment in the town of Ryazan a few 
weeks later and reported to local authorities immediately.   This was perceived to be an 
attack not just on Yeltsin, but on Putin as well.  It also brought into question the strength of 
Yeltsin and Putin and whether they were willing to lay siege to Chechnya again.  Putin 
vowed to “Follow terrorists everywhere. We will corner the bandits in the toilet and wipe 
them out.”
66
  The bluntness of the terminology was appreciated by pundits and the public 
alike but they were anxious to see actions rather than words.  Vladimir Putin was 
experiencing his first critical test in the national spotlight, and he knew he had to succeed.   
The second Chechen War started Sept 22, 1999, and Russia designated it a terrorist 
operation (which Ukraine would snidely use to describe Russian separatist activity over a 
decade later).  With the Second Chechen War, which ended in a clear Russian victory 
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because of clever wheeling and dealing with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov for much 
greater autonomy and a massive financial windfall, Putin passed an important test with the 
Russian people. Putin was not the bumbling, shaky, elder, drunk weakling that Yeltsin was. 
Looking back at the engagement, Putin argued that “My evaluation of the situation in August 
when the bandits attacked Dagestan was that if we did not stop it immediately, Russia as a 
state in its current form was finished.  We were threatened by the Yugoslavization of 
Russia.”
67
 This may seem dramatic, but Russian politicians were deathly afraid of the 
disintegration of their country, and they believed only strong leadership could prevent it from 
happening.   Putin enjoyed a high popularity rating.  Buoyed by the sharp rise in energy 
prices, he was able to do what Yeltsin had not.  He won enormous popular support by paying 
salaries and pensions, eliminating budget deficits, and creating a growing urban middle class.  
It was hardly a secret that Putin had created his own oligarchy with his old Leningrad pals 
and colleagues from the security forces now running, and robbing, the state’s vast energy 
enterprises.   It did not matter.  Capitalism was treating Russia very well, and Moscow 
became the most expensive city in the world.  The catalyst for the rapid transformation and 
quick wealth accumulation was the result of investment in fossil fuels that energy-hungry 
Europe needed.  Hydrocarbons accounted for two-thirds of Russian exports
68
.  With oil, 
natural gas, and petroleum at sky-high prices, the Kremlin reaped the benefits.  With the 
Arctic Ocean and East Siberian oilfields having the potential capacity of fossil fuel reserves 
greater than the Persian Gulf, it appeared to be smooth sailing and a path to rebuild Russia to 
its former glory.  The Kremlin was able to pay off its debt to creditors and establish a 
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strategic reserve of approximately $450 billion for emergencies.  Russians were able to travel 
abroad, get foreign cars and flat-screen televisions, and sign off on home mortgages.  For the 
most part, Russians were (and still are) aware of and upset by the corruption, but they have 
always felt that the stability provided is worth it, and that it is not worth upsetting that order 
for fear of returning to the Wild 90’s. 
Despite heavy losses in the Second Chechen War, Putin’s reputation as a no-nonsense 
leader who would do whatever was necessary to protect his country grew in stature.  Putin 
made it seem that the Kremlin had the upper hand against the Chechen militants while 
reminding Russians constantly to be on their guard for terrorists within Russia.  Militarily, 
Russia become relatively more prepared, and Putin enlisted the aid of contract soldiers who 
were better paid, more motivated, and better experienced.  The most notorious of these 
security outfits, Alpha Firm, was composed of former Spetsnaz operators, and the Kremlin 
could have deniability of war atrocities because Putin believed Alpha Firm did not fall under 
the tenets of international law.   
The Russian people payed a heavy price for this continued engagement with 
Chechnya.   According to Ben Judah, “Between 2001 and 2007, Russia lost 1,170 lives to 
terrorist attacks, making it the third most terrorist-prone country in the world after 
Afghanistan and Iraq.”
69
  There were two events in particular that were damaging to the 
Russian people and government during this bloody campaign.  One was at Dubrovka Theatre 
in Moscow on October 20, 2002, where approximately one thousand people were taken 
hostage by fifty Chechen militants in a three-day standoff.  Russian FSB and Spetsnaz 
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operatives raided the theatre after pumping it full of sleeping gas, and 140 people were killed 
in the rescue attempt.  The second was the most nightmarish scenario that any country could 
face, and it took place in the village of Beslan at a school in 2004.  Chechen, Dagestani, and 
other Caucasus Islamic militants took teachers and students hostage with heavy assault 
weapons and wore suicide vests as an indication that there would be no way out for anyone.  
They also rigged the gymnasium, where a majority of the hostages were being held, with 
explosives.  Hundreds of children were killed, and the numbers were much higher than the 
indicated 384 casualties given by state media (some believe more than 500 and perhaps 700).  
The raid was an unmitigated disaster in planning and execution by Spetsnaz, FSB operatives, 
and local law enforcement.  It was an impossible scenario to begin with, but the fact that 
flamethrowers were used to kill the hostage takers shows the incomprehensible ineptitude 
that increased the casualty count.   While the death toll was significant from a military and 
civilian standpoint, it paled in comparison to that of the Chechens, 200,000 of whom were 
killed in both wars—28 percent of the original Chechen population.
70
  Van Herpen argues 
that the Russian wars were acts of genocide, and with the figures now available it is difficult 
to argue against his conclusion. 
However, things were not what they seemed in the apartment bombings throughout 
Russia that precipitated the war.  Due to sheer luck and astute awareness of local law 
enforcement observing suspicious activity outside an apartment early in the morning in 
Ryazan, a third attack was prevented.  They could never have guessed the identities of those 
they had just apprehended: an FSB team in Ryazan planting bombs in apartments, and as 
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inconceivable as it sounds, there is overwhelming evidence to support it.  The FSB team 
immediately produced their credentials in an attempt to get out of trouble, but they were still 
detained.  First, on the FSB team’s vehicle, a license plate from Moscow was covered by a 
license plate from the Ryazan oblast.  The explosive material discovered at Ryazan was 
hexogen, and forensics traced the material to a military base outside of Perm.  The same 
explosive material that detonated at the previous apartment bombing sites was located here, 
and was hidden in bags labelled “sugar”.  Only the Russian military had access to hexogen
71
.  
There was also a detonator timed to go off at 5:30 a.m., just like the other apartment 
bombings, which were detonated in the early morning for maximum casualties.
72
  Perhaps 
the most important question was, if it was just an exercise, why would the exercise use the 
real materials designed to make a bomb? 
The FSB operatives made calls prior to being apprehended and were told to split up 
on their way back to Moscow.  The call originated from the headquarters of the FSB.  The 
story began to unravel, and the Russian government said it was an exercise to test the 
readiness of local law enforcement.  A FSB defector, Major General Oleg Kalvgin, called the 
guise of an exercise “utter nonsense”.   Another damning piece of evidence was the Duma 
speaker announcing the Ryazan explosion three days before it actually happened, not 
realizing that he read the wrong legislative briefing until after he read it.
73
  The FSB agents 
were returned to FSB headquarters in Moscow, and their whereabouts have been unknown 
since their activities in Ryazan.  This overwhelming and compelling evidence goes well 
beyond the realm of conspiracy theory and moves into factual rational discourse.  With so 
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many revered Kremlinologist authors in agreement, most notably Lucas, Judah, Dawisha, 
and Van Herpen, there are simply too many researchers and authors with well-established 
credentials to be putting their reputations on the line.  More and more people are stepping 
forward, asserting that these acts were in fact murders carried out under the highest orders of 
the FSB, and it is highly plausible that Putin himself authorized them.
74
 
Even more sinister are the strong accusations by Van Herpen and Dawisha that 
organization for the war was a foregone conclusion agreed on between Chechen commander 
Shamil Basayev and Alexander Volishin, who was Assistant to the Chief of the Russian 
Presidential Administration.  Both men met at a French Riviera villa owned by a Saudi arms 
dealer. The meeting was facilitated by GRU middleman Anton Surikov, who Basayev could 
trust because he had worked with him before.
75
   Both sides agreed that it would be a 
“Potemkin War” (a superficial war where internal relations would be fine between the two 
parties) and that it would be a “small war, a border conflict, and a big performance with 
fireworks.”
76
 This leads one to believe these accusations are valid and that war was a 
predetermined arrangement by the highest ranks of the Kremlin, and even Putin himself.  
Thousands of Chechens and Russians died for nothing more than political gain and the 
solidification of Putin’s stature as the lead man in the Kremlin.   
Centralization Of Powers: The Gradual Destruction of Russian Civil Liberties 
This timeframe in Russia also saw media experience the beginnings of a major and 
continuing clampdown under Putin.  Prior to the Putin presidency, Russia enjoyed a 
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remarkably unfettered free press.  That all changed with Putin’s no-nonsense approach to 
opposition voices, which he believed would cause trouble.  Plenty of politicians argued it to 
have been a necessary result of the times, particularly when the nation needed support and 
not opposition voices during a crisis that Putin and other politicians believed had wider 
implications for the sovereignty of the nation.  The media was showing the Chechen war in 
all of its ferocity from both sides, and the vilifying of Russian military and intelligence 
personnel was a particularly personal matter for Putin, who quickly twisted the arms of 
television, radio, and newspaper employees to be more patriotic in their reporting.   Slander 
of Putin also became serious business.  Putin’s campaign reminded media outlets that, “the 
press service of the election headquarters will continue to closely watch all facts or lies in 
respect of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and reserves the right to use all available 
means in its arsenal for an asymmetrical response to provocations.”
77
  When channels like 
ORN and NTV did not bend to Putin’s will, they were taken over by the state.  The men who 
owned the networks fled into exile.  Some reporters and journalists, like Andrei Babitsky, 
died in suspicious circumstances.  Sergey Yushchenko, a Liberal Russia party member before 
the Duma became a rubber stamp, investigated allegations of war crimes and government 
involvement in the apartment bombings, and was gunned down outside his house.  Journalist 
Yelena Tregubova was targeted by a bombing and narrowly escaped the detonation.  Yuri 
Shchekochikhin, the editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, was showing symptoms of poisoning 
and it took two weeks for him to die.  His autopsy was made secret by the Russian 
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government.  These would be the first of many deaths likely perpetrated by the Kremlin.  No 
criminal proceedings were opened in any of these instances.
78
 
Vladimir Putin also fundamentally altered the functionality of the Duma and local 
government within the Russian Federation.  The Duma, a legislative body that was 
considered a free-for-all where real debate and discourse took place, lost its teeth over time 
and became nothing more than a rubber stamp for Putin’s United Russia Party.  The Kremlin 
created United Russia as an appendage, not the other way around.  The party had zero 
bureaucratic control over the Kremlin or Putin’s inner circles
79
.  People who wished to get on 
election ballots could only do so through the good graces of Vladimir Putin and a careful 
equation of money and loyalty.  Regions like Tartarstan, which were promised “as much 
sovereignty as they could swallow” by Yeltsin, saw their power to vote for locally elected 
officials disintegrate.
80
  It became abundantly clear that “sovereign democracy” was the new 
order under Putin’s Russia.  In contrast, “Vladimir Putin made his priority the re-
establishment of a strong state.  He disempowered disloyal regional governors, crushed the 
oligarchs who did not heed his insistence that they stay out of local politics, and obliterated 
the leadership of separatist uprisings in Chechnya.  He took complete control of television 
channels and neutered any opposition political parties.”
81
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Putin Pushes Back in Estonia and Georgia 
Toward the middle of last decade, the Kremlin had re-amassed the power required to 
claim once again that former Soviet states could not have a destiny of their own without 
Russia.  This came to a head in Estonia in 2007.  Since the collapse of the iron curtain, the 
Baltic States became capitalist success stories with vibrant and prosperous economies, and 
Russians are bitter about their success.  The independence of these countries particularly 
stings Putin.  Edward Lucas states that, “Estonia is where Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, 
economic muscle, and historical amnesia overlap.”
82
  Early in the spring of 2007, Estonia 
decided to remove a Soviet monument dedicated to the Red Army called the Monument to 
the Liberators of Tallinn.  Riots and looting followed on a night known in Tallinn as the 
Bronze Night.  Russia bussed in hooligans and troublemakers to protest the monument 
removal, and loudspeaker protests took place outside the Estonian Embassy in Moscow.  
They portrayed the Estonians as Nazi sympathizers when it was in fact the Red Army that 
had invaded Estonia in 1940, and the Tsar’s army before that.  The Russians continue to view 
these invasions as liberation by Soviet Forces.  On April 27,
 
2007, the situation escalated 
with a complex cyber-attack originating from Russian IP addresses.
83
   The Russian youth 
movement Nashi claimed responsibility for the attacks in response to the removal of the 
statue.  However, hacking and cybersecurity experts believe that the complexity, scope, and 
power of the attack was beyond them and could have only come from the Russian Defense 
Ministry.
84
  The cyber-attack was the chosen method of infrastructure incapacitation because 
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there are no formal treaties regarding physical or other damage done as a result, and 
deniability would have forced a firm response from NATO members who were likely still 
trying to develop a coherent response.   
The veering of the Former Soviet Republics, including Ukraine, to the West did not 
end with the Baltics, and Georgia would be the next country to make a move.  After the pro-
Western Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili rose to power in Tbilisi.  Saakashvili is an 
American-educated economist who chose to use Estonia and the Baltics as his model for 
economic transformation.  He was very successful in this endeavor, and is credited with 
transforming a nation that was considered a corrupt backwater into a booming economy with 
national identity.  He also pushed very vigorously for European Union and NATO 
membership.  A successful state that was showing a Western ideological slant now stood on 
the Kremlin’s doorstep in the Caucasus.  The Kremlin saw it as a threat to its geopolitical 
interests and worked to overthrow Saakashvili’s government.  The first salvo occurred when 
four GRU operatives (who were Russian military officers) were arrested with orders to stage 
political unrest.
85
  Russia recalled its ambassador, doubled oil prices, and imposed economic 
restrictions on Georgian goods.  The Kremlin’s calculation was that Georgia was too 
dependent on Russia’s economy to be self-sufficient.  Saakashvili outflanked them again, as 
an economist who knew how to diversify his economy and break into the European market 
with his goods, and the economy became one of the quickest growing in the world.  The 
Georgians also signed quick agreements that would grant Caspian oil with Georgia as an 
access point, something not lost on the Russians. 
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There are various indicators that the subsequent Russian invasion of Georgia was 
planned from the outset.  A telephone call was intercepted on August 7
th
 from a Russian 
soldier who called home to say his whole unit, the 58
th
 Army, was there and getting ready for 
a Georgia invasion.  South Ossetian women and children were evacuated on a “holiday” in 
the days prior to the opening of hostilities.  There were also Russian journalists who packed 
hotels in South Ossetia in the nights leading up to the invasion.  The EU is officially on 
record saying Georgia fired the first shot of the conflict but neglected to provide the bigger 
story that Russian regular military forces and Russian heavy equipment were already across 
the border violating Georgian territorial integrity.  Eighty thousand Russian soldiers were in 
Rostov participating in drills the week before as well, which is in immediate proximity to the 
Georgian border.
86
  South Ossetians began popping shots off across the border, and Georgian 
forces retaliated.  Georgian National Security Council Chairman Alexander Lomaia said that 
“Russian provocation and troop movements to re-enforce their position in South Ossetia had 
placed them in what was called a zugzwang; the chess move where you are compelled to 
move.”
87
  Saakashvili attempted to contact Medvedev immediately after learning Russian 
troops were in South Ossetia.  The war lasted from August 7 to August 12.  Despite some 
mobility errors and breaches of OPSEC the mission was successful for Russia and a 
resounding defeat for Georgia.  The FSB had a shadow government already in place for 
South Ossetia to take over following Russia’s victory.  “Russia’s version of events was much 
different, and according to their narrative, Georgian troops moved into South Ossetia and 
killed two thousand civilians.  Russian peacekeepers were also killed.  To stop the possibility 
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of genocide, Russian peacekeepers moved in for a humanitarian intervention.”
88
  Russia also 
used the same cyber-attack methods against Georgia that they used against Estonia and 
completely incapacitated their communications network to the point that the Georgian 
military needed to use cellular phones for direction.  These phone calls were easily collected 
by the GRU.  Ukraine was also accused of sending weapons to Georgia during the brief war 
despite no evidence being put forth to support the claim.  Ukraine showed further disapproval 
by demanding that Russia declare all naval movements and troop numbers when at 
Sevastopol.  Russia again scoffed at this request.  The Kremlin also calculated correctly that 
outside action from NATO, the EU, or United States would be not more than a condemnation 
of Russian action.  Lucas says that, “Russia knew with a high degree of certainty that 
America would not go to war to defend a friendly country that was under attack.  It also 
knew that the European Union was in no state to act as a decisive, well informed mediator.”
89
   
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now breakaway territories that are gradually moving 
toward Russian influence and likely outright annexation.  Russia has been providing Russian 
passports for citizens of the breakaway regions, further validating the narrative of protecting 
Russians abroad.  The Kremlin has not shown much commitment in improvement of 
infrastructure as of yet.  Job markets are non-existent in the enclaves and unemployment is 
sky high.  Yet the people look fondly upon the Russians as liberators; a clear indication that 
shared ethnic and national experiences often trump questions of economic prosperity.  They 
are nonetheless completely dependent on Russia economically. Both South Ossetia and 
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Abkhazia have a burgeoning black market and are magnets for corruption.  Abkhazia is 
sought after by Russian oligarchs as a place to buy Russian beachfront property should 
annexation happen, and plenty of real estate moguls are jumping the gun assessing that it will 
happen in the near future.   The breakaway regions are all but unrecognized by the 
international community.  The only three nations other than Russia that recognize their 
sovereignty are Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the tiny island nation of Nauru.  Finally, for all of 
the accusations by Russia of ethnic cleansing by the Georgian government, it was the South 
Ossetians who were killing ethnic Georgians.  Many Russian critics accuse the Kremlin of 
“creeping annexation”, with the prospect of gradually bringing these territories into the 
greater Russian territory.   
Creeping toward Authoritarianism: Putin’s Third Term 
The democratic process in Putin’s Russia has become a mockery.  Voting observers 
are strong-armed away from polling stations, and busses full of people drive from one ballot 
box to the next voting for Putin.   Those who did not vote for Putin were threatened with 
losing jobs, eviction, and physical force.  United Russia-backed poll station observers had 
been caught burning boxes of votes in areas that would likely vote against Putin.  It is also 
highly ironic that the Caucasus region would represent the highest turnout for United Russia, 
even surpassing the voters in Moscow.  It is preposterous that over ninety percent of votes in 
Chechnya and Dagestan would go to Vladimir Putin after the mass-killings of Chechens 
during the last 25 years.  Karen Dawisha participated as a ballot observer herself in the 





   Initially, voters were apathetic to a third Putin presidential term, but 
they quietly assembled in protest prior to his third term of office.  Apathy turned to anger, 
and in December 2011, 100,000 protestors of all political, religious, and ethnic origins took 
to the streets in Moscow alone with their various banners all protesting the obviously rigged 
election.  Protests also took place across the nation in Murmansk, Novosibirsk, the Caucasus, 
and other cities and towns across the Russian Federation due to the obviously skewed 
election results.  State-sponsored counter-protests were staged by undocumented migrants, 
who appeared less-than-enthusiastic to be there, gut given a higher wage than they earned in 




Since Putin’s third term in office, following massive protests throughout Moscow 
chanting “Russia without Putin,” Putin has taken a much more anti-Western streak than ever 
before.  He sincerely saw the protests as a continued Western version of weaponized “color 
revolutions,” and a personal insult to him.  Putin, like many post-imperial Russian leaders 
before him in Soviet times, is constantly on guard for the “fifth column,” which is 
supposedly an “enemy within” comprised of Russian dissenters.  Even with all that happened 
in Chechnya, Estonia, and Georgia, Putin became more boisterous and more defensive about 
Russia’s sovereignty and influence over its near abroad, demanding that Russian moves here 
be uncontested.  This was especially blunt when Putin hosted president Obama following 
Dmitriy Medvedev’s “election” to office.  In the exchange, United States Ambassador to 
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Russia, Michael McFaul, recalls a seething Putin “demanding that the United States cede to 
him the former Soviet Socialist Republics, Ukraine above all, as Russian sphere of 
influence.”
92
  Post-2012, Putin lashed out at the West for betraying promises and for showing 
double standards in diplomacy with Iraq, concluding that Russia would not behave as a 
vassal of America. 
The harassment has continued at home and abroad as well.  Russia continues to 
conduct massive war games of an invasion of the Baltic States, and even a mock nuclear 
strike on Warsaw.  Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are under the constant bombardment of 
informational warfare from Moscow, and Lithuanian president Grybavskaite sums up the 
Russian campaign well when he states “they are influencing our media, some politicians, 
they are buying people in our media, placing articles, open criminality, all done together.”
93
  
Referendums are funded to make Russian an official language, and Russian television 
stations portray the Baltic states as week and failing while engaging in any other means of 
propaganda that would further Russia’s strategic objectives.  They bend media in ways that 
would assure prison and a beating in Russia.  An Estonian intelligence agent was also 
kidnapped by Russian agents and charged with spying.  The FSB said it found "A Taurus 
handgun with ammunition, 5,000 Euros in cash, special equipment for concealed audio 
recording and documents that bear evidence of an intelligence mission were seized from the 
intruder.”
94
   Russian troops continue to do parachute drops within a few hundred meters of 
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the Baltic border and making other provocations.  The Baltic nations have been the most 
vocal proponents of a NATO presence in Eastern Europe for obvious reasons related to 
Russian belligerence.  Along with Poland, the Baltic nations are the only ones who spend the 
NATO recommended two percent of GDP on defense spending when virtually all other 
nations besides the United States have declined below this level.
95
  The Baltic States do not 
want their Russian “liberators” back. 
The early Putin administration’s diplomatic efforts with the West were very even-
keeled in terms of positive and negative response, and this depended on the narrative that the 
Kremlin wished to dictate.  For example, the September 11th terrorist attacks created the 
perfect opportunity to join the cause of the United States in rooting out terrorism.  Putin said 
he would be a staunch ally of the United States to root out terrorism, not hesitating to point to 
the fact that Russia knew terrorism all too well because of Chechen Islamists.  It also gave 
him the opportunity to justify the clamp down on liberties so the security and sovereignty of 
the state could be defended at all costs.  Even when ISAF/NATO allies requested using bases 
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Putin took the “long view” and believed it would be 
beneficial to grant access to these airfields, with the hopeful view that some leniency would 
be given on a later date (and not taking into account that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are 
sovereign nations!).  Putin hoped in particular that the United States and its Western allies 
would turn a blind eye to Russia’s actions in Chechnya.  When it became obvious these 
favors were not beneficial to the Kremlin’s interest, Putin pressed Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan to end the leases of the bases as soon as possible. Uzbekistan did not need much 
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convincing following the West’s response to the massacre at Andijan (a political protest on 
May 13, 2005 in the volatile Fergana valley where Uzbek military and government forces 
fired on and killed up to 1,500 protestors
96
), but Kyrgyzstan would remain a vital logistics 
and mobility hub until the end of “surge ops” of Operation Enduring Freedom, when 
ISAF/NATO members drastically drew down troop presence at the end of 2014.   
Sochi: All Eyes On Russia 
It is important also to take note that Russia’s international prestige is extremely 
important to Putin.  Putin and the rest of the Kremlin want to portray the image that Russia 
has returned as a great power, and they accomplished that by hosting the Winter Olympics in 
2014 and making a successful bid to host the World Cup, which is the most popular sporting 
event in the world, in 2018.  The symbolism attached to the Winter Olympics and Putin’s 
personal reputation were so important that all the stops were pulled out to ensure a safe 
event.  Putin promised a safe and successful Winter Olympic games in a region of 
questionable strategic security in the resort town of Sochi, which is also in immediate 
proximity to hot spots like Chechnya and Abkhazia.  The Olympics provided an ideal time 
for Islamic militants to humiliate Russia. Dagestani militants proudly boasted that “Black 
Widows” (female suicide bombers) had penetrated the towns where the festivities would be 
held, and politicians at home and abroad feared for the worst.
97
  The terrorist threat was very 
real, as two Black Widows had already detonated explosives in Volgograd in the buildup to 
the Olympics, killing 34 people.  In a video directed at Putin and the Kremlin, Islamic 
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militants promised, “If you hold these Olympics, we will give you a present for the innocent 
Muslim blood being spilled all around the world: in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Syria.  For 
the tourists who come, there will be a present too.”
98
 The stakes could not be any higher, and 
governments sent travel advisories saying that the Olympics presented a threat to the safety 
of ticket holders.   Looking from an adversarial point of view, the opportunity was too good 
to pass up.   
Putin made a personal promise that the games would be safe and successful, and he 
put the entire might of his intelligence and military apparatus in place to make sure 
everything went smoothly.  A “steel ring” was established around Sochi, and the FSB was 
entrusted with data collection of the principalities of Sochi, Adler, Krasnaya Polyana, and 
Rosa Khutor.  The FSB had unfettered access to phones, computers, and any other “cloud” 
data that could be collected on in the area to ensure security.  Athletes and tourists who 
purchased tickets needed to produce biometric data that could be scanned by security 
personnel at various checkpoints.  In spite of a tense environment, the Olympics went off 
without any attacks.  Putin and the Kremlin collectively sighed with relief after this success, 
but their eyes were turning toward the political spiral in Ukraine.  This became the new 
priority, and Russia switched gears to respond to a situation that was growing out of their 
control. 
With all of the turmoil occurring in Russia during the Wild 90’s, concerns with 
maintaining a strong hold over their near-abroad spheres of influence was a luxury that 
Russia could not afford.  However, maintaining some level of power over the former Soviet 
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states would become a priority as soon as the Kremlin could gain its feet under following the 
resolution of its own internal problems.  No former appendage was more important than 
Ukraine, which had always been viewed by Russians as their little brother who could not 
have a fate or path deviating from their own.  That fraternal brotherhood was not lost with the 
transition from Yeltsin to Putin.  In fact, it only grew.  Putin said, “We have common 
traditions, common mentality, common history, and common culture.  We are one people.”
99
  
Putin found the Orange Revolution completely repulsive and did everything he could to 
ensure Yanukovich’s success.  For the most part, Yanukovich behaved exactly as Putin 
hoped he would.  He signed lucrative gas deals with the Kremlin and ensured the strategic 
ports of Crimea would belong to Russia well into the future.  However, Putin could not be 
certain that Yanukovich would say no to the signing of an agreement making Ukraine a 
candidate for entry into the European Union.  The economic implications would have been 
especially significant if Ukraine decided to participate in the European Union, and Vladimir 
Putin knew this.   
Putin attempted a carrot-and-stick approach to remind Ukraine that Russia was still 
the big brother in the relationship.  The first attempt of positive re-enforcement was relaxing 
customs regulations against Ukraine in August.  He also offered discounted energy costs.  
That would not be enough, and the ultimatum with the EU was set in motion.  On November 
28, 2013, the time had come to sign the European Union association agreement in Vilnius, 
Lithuania. Knowing that economic reforms required by the EU would effectively eliminate 
his kickback corruption scheme, Yanukovych declined the offer, and instead chose to take a 
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last-minute offer of discounted gas and a $15 billion loan from Putin instead.  It was a 


















CHAPTER II:  ELEMENTS OF CONTROLLED INSTABILITY 
KEY PLAYERS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
We cannot discuss the Kremlin’s grand strategy without extensively covering the man 
that has been the orchestrator and implementer of every major decision behind the Kremlin’s 
walls over the past fifteen years: President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.  Putin was named 
by Yeltsin personally to be his successor in 1999 and formally took power at the turn of the 
millennium.  Yeltsin saw a man who would be able to return Russia’s status in the world and 
secure stability and purpose for the Russian Federation. Putin’s rise to power is the result of 
being at the right place at the right time and taking advantage of opportunities of upward 
mobility when situations presented themselves.  He was not expected to become president: it 
happened spontaneously.  Nor is he a man who cares much for politics, as he hates 
confrontation with any person or any organization that questions his vision for Russia.  He is 
acutely sensitive to outside criticism and finds it insulting to his character.  Putin became the 
embodiment of a revitalized Russia and returned the stability that Russians craved.  He is 
everything that Yeltsin was not: young, athletic, adventurous, energetic, and most 
importantly, a man who stands up for the convictions and beliefs of the Russian people as a 
majority of them view these. According to one influential figure that will be discussed in 
greater detail in this chapter, “He is everything we could ever dream of: a self-disciplined, 
sober, young, serious leader who takes care of his country.”
100
   
Vladimir Putin In Depth 
Much like Stalin, Putin is both a power player and a figurehead idolized and 
mythologized by the media.  He goes on archaeological excavations in the Black Sea, 
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underwater submersibles in Lake Baikal, has a seventh-degree black belt in judo, and rides 
shirtless on a horse in the Caucasus. He encourages strength of the family and the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and rarely drinks.  He has products from vodka to baked beans bearing his 
name.  He is a Russian action hero, and most Russians think he shares their values and 
aspirations.  However, as Anna Arutunyan states, “A leader is only as corrupt as the system 
that produces him.”
101
  Coming from Yeltsin’s wild 90’s presidency and the matrimony of 
government and organized crime, it may be surprising to see Putin as chief at the Kremlin, 
but it should come as no surprise to see someone of his profile filling that position.  Nor 
should it be surprising when he decided to cling to power for the fifteen years following, and 
that he is likely to try to do so for the next decade as well.  Putin wants a legacy that reads 
with the names of strong rulers of Russia, whether Tsars or Communists, and as a man who 
knows his country’s history well.  Putin has claimed, “Give me 20 years and you will not 
recognize Russia.”
102
  That quote, first made famous by Tsar Nicholas II, is not lost on 
manyin the international community or his own domestic opponents.   
Putin’s leadership model follows that of former KGB strongman and brief Soviet 
Union Chairman Yuri Andropov, who convinced the rest of the Communist Party that the 
Soviet Union needed to get involved in Afghanistan (using KGB intelligence and operatives 
initially to orchestrate Russian interests there).  Edward Lucas says, “Like Andropov, Mr. 
Putin believes that ruthless discipline is the key to economic recovery.  Like him, he places 
great value on the use of secret police.  Both collect information and to intimidate opponents 
and backstabbers.  Like him, he believes the west is both weak and hypocritical and can 
                                                          
101
 Anna Arutunyan, The Putin Mystique, (Petaluma, CA: Olive Branch Publishing, 2014), p.285. 
102
 Fiona Hill, Mr. Putin: Operative of the Kremlin, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institute Press, 2015) p.76. 
61 
 
easily be faced down with a mixture of threats and selective arm twisting.”
103
  Finally, like 
Andropov, Putin has no problems using his military or intelligence organizations to 
strengthen Russia’s interests abroad.  Putin is a KGB man to the core, and that is one of the 
biggest reasons that intelligence experts and policy makers should not take him lightly.  He 
joined the KGB in 1975 and was placed in Dresden where he rose to the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel. In Dresden, Putin’s career as a privileged operative under a feared superpower was 
crushed by what he viewed as poor leadership by Soviet policy-makers as they oversaw the 
collapse of the USSR. He is especially bitter that he was helpless during the protests that 
brought down the iron curtain, hoping for orders to act that never came.  It was at that time 
that Putin vowed he would never be that indecisive.  It hurt him dearly to see all that he 
worked for and loved destroyed by revolutionaries, and he grew to hate revolutionary activity 
with an equally rabid passion.
104
  One of the more famous quotes during his rule is calling the 
collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” 
which raised plenty of eyebrows.
105
  He deviates significantly from Yeltsin and Gorbachev, 
who saw the importance of dissent and its necessity in the nation’s dialogue and political 
process.  Putin sees it as nothing more than a burden that obstructs his vision for the Russian 
Federation.  There can be no doubt that Putin’s KGB background helped him in human 
relations and negotiations.  He researches the tendencies of people and what makes them tick 
and coaxes the diplomatic process along with a combination of trust and fear.  It is the kind 
of thing a spy does, and it was a KGB specialty. 
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Putin respects intelligence as much as he fears it.  Much like Stalin, Putin distrusts 
everyone and feels someone is out to get him.  He fears foreign influence and blames any 
instability (be it the collapse of the Soviet Union, Arab Spring, or “colored revolutions”) as 
Western plots, and that the West is targeting the Kremlin for regime change.  To Putin, 
Russia is now the center of an anti-Western, socially conservative axis and thus a bulwark 
against the menacing United States.  Putin was not always anti-American.  At first he wanted 
Russian acceptance in the world community and a stable economy.  Soon after entering 
office in 2000, Putin stated “it is hard to visualize NATO as my enemy.  I cannot imagine my 
own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world.”
106
  He has 
since developed a strong anti-Western agenda, particularly after the massive protests in 
Moscow following “re-election” to his third political term.  Putin also portrays himself to the 
masses as the only thing standing between Russia and its own internal collapse, with 
Caucasian militants, Siberian separatists, and Neo-Nazis as constant threats that if not held in 
check by Putin, will bring down their whole way of life as they know it.  He is a man who 
does not wish to be interfered with, as he wants to see his grand strategic objectives through 
to completion without obstruction.  He is also a strong believer in “a high and mighty state 
that takes precedence over national as well as individual rights.”
107
  Putin subscribes to the 
concept of “sovereign democracy”, which means Russia itself and its leadership can 
determine whether its system fulfills its own criteria
108
.  It can skirt the rules when required 
to fit the narrative and is a definite defensive posture that cannot be undone.  He has to 
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convince two audiences of his strength: the international community and his domestic base.  
Most of all, Putin wants to portray Russia as a recovered and great power, and events like the 
Sochi Olympics and the 2018 World Cup reinforce that.   
Putin wants Russia to be on good relations with Europe, but preaches that Russia’s 
exceptionalism means that it cannot be compared to nations like Estonia, Latvia, or even 
Poland.  He demands that they accept Russian culture and traditions as unique along with 
Russia’s (in other words, Putin’s) preferred method of governance.  He considers only 
Germany as a diplomatic, economic, and military equal.  Despite constant demands regarding 
Russian exceptionalism, Putin especially despises American exceptionalism and perceives 
that Americans treat Russia like a defeated nation after the Soviet dissolution, and he sees 
that as the greatest insult of all to himself and his country. He wishes to be on an even 
playing field with the United States despite not giving other nations in the diplomatic 
community the same leniency that he demands the United States give to Russia.  Putin views 
it as better to be alone and isolated for the sake of his own power structure than to be on good 
relations with Europe and the United States.  He does not fear political isolation; he embraces 
it. 
Political dissidents who have fallen out of favor with Putin, like his former banker 
Sergei Pugachev, have provided valuable insights that allow a slight peek behind the curtain 
to see how Putin’s mind works.  Pugachev was in Putin’s inner circle for ten years and knows 
him very well.  Pugachev says “everything in his (Putin’s) consciousness flows from the 
Soviet Union.  He surrounds himself with like-minded people who he didn’t know very well 
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and who had served with the KGB.  They began enriching themselves.”
109
  Pugachev also 
said that Putin initially only wanted to serve one term and walk away with his “winnings,” 
but his inner circle convinced him to stay on another term.  Since then, Pugachev has 
believed that Putin changed his mind and will retain power as long as he lives.  The most 
striking revelation is Pugachev’s claim that Putin is the richest man in the world with a net 
worth of at least $200 billion that he has accumulated during his time in power.
110
  This 
coincides with Forbes Magazine naming Putin the most powerful man in the world in 2013.  
Pugachev fears for his life and has been put on the Interpol most-wanted list by Putin.  
Despite living in London, he is in constant fear of a Litivenko-type killing.   
The Kleptocracy 
To consolidate his power, Vladimir Putin has brought his friends and previous work 
associates that he deems to be reliable and loyal into a fraternal oligarchy called the siloviki 
(security elites).  The siloviki consists of ex-KGB members and local government muscle 
from St. Petersburg that facilitated corruption and Putin’s consolidation of wealth and power 
in a gradual rise to the Kremlin itself.  According to one military expert, “there are a growing 
number of people dependent on the defense-industrial complex, and they are Putin’s core 
constituency.  With their families, they number about ten million people, strategically placed, 
and that’s a really important factor.  Taking care of them is probably more important than the 
stated goals of rearmament and modernizing of the military, which are probably largely 
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unattainable anyway.  This definitely plays a role in skewing Russian politics.”
111
  Many of 
these men were given vast sums of wealth via contracts granted by Putin’s connections and 
net worth.  These men give loyalty to Putin, and Putin returns it.  They are mutually 
beneficial to each other as a security apparatus to assure their personal wealth and power.  
The vast sums of oil wealth have made men like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (and former president who 
promptly gave power back to Putin after his only term), Kremlin Security Supervisor Nikolai 
Petruschev and Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov immensely powerful.  They were all 
previously involved in Putin’s power circle at the lower echelons.  Many have held or 
currently hold positions with the KGB, FSB, GRU, or some other military or security 
apparatus within the Russian Federation.  By 1994 a large portion of the four hundred retired 
KGB generals held positions in banks and joint ventures.
112
  When they speak to the press, 
they are practically extensions of Putin himself and all share the same line of thinking as their 
boss.  Regarding the siloviki and oligarchs, Dawisha states that “Putin operates a protection 
racket dependent on a code of behavior that punishes disloyalty while allowing access to 
economic predation on a world historic scale for the inner core of his elite.”
113
   
Another important fraternal foundation in the Kremlin power structure belongs to the 
oligarchs, who were a carryover from the Yeltsin administration following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, but have been consolidated and supported further by Putin.  Taking 
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advantage of the privatization of state-run enterprise, predatory capitalists who knew exactly 
how to participate in the transition, moved troves of state treasure to offshore accounts, 
robbing the government, and in turn the people, of hundreds of billions of dollars.  This 
rubbed salt in the wounds of a demoralized Russian public that often went without jobs, 
stable income, or a stable ruble during the Wild 90’s.  Some of these men are amongst the 
richest people in the world and include Far East oblast governor-turned-football club owner 
Roman Ambromovich; the Rothstein brothers (who knew Putin as judo partners and 
established an early bond) who were awarded lucrative contracts for the Sochi Olympics and 
most recently the bridge across the Kerch Strait to Crimea; and Matthias Warnig, a STASI 
(East German Intelligence) careerist who worked with Putin in Dresden and is now the 
chairman of Transneft. Most utilize Bank Rossiya for their domestic fortunes given that it 
was established as a safe haven for this fraternity to utilize without fear of repercussions, but 
it has been less reliable since the recent sanctions on Russia, which appear to have caused an 
increase of capital flight since the Ukraine crisis. The oligarchs are generally free to keep 
their vast treasure so long as they do not become politically active, but Putin has not hesitated 
to swing his axe when threatened with the perceived overreach of potential rivals.  The 
highest profile example being Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the owner of former oil giant Yukos.  
The oligarchs, worth millions and sometimes billions of dollars, are happy to keep their 
mouths shut and live extravagant lives in millionaire enclaves like Rublevka.  Those who 
have become wanted men by the Kremlin have made their way to London (rich Russian 
dissidents refer to it as “Londongrad”), and the British capital has been all too happy to take 
them and their vast troves of wealth into the country.  Capital flight has become a serious 
problem recently in Russia, but the Kremlin seems content in letting these troublemakers go 
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their way.  However, they often use the FSB as an avenue of bribery, reminding them to 
“think of their sick mothers back home” and their family members still in Russia can be 
drummed up on false charges as well with the possibility of prison (a ploy often used during 
the Cold War by the KGB to psychologically distress those who defected from the Soviet 
Union).  Because of this web, it is easy to see that the line between siloviki and oligarch can 
be a blurred one, and they are often one and the same.  But to be sure, very few of either 
group can claim to have made an honest buck during the emergence of the Russian 
Federation, instead makings their fortunes on the back of a lot of good honest people.  When 
discussing the oligarchs, Sherr makes the following significant observation: “Emboldened by 
their own political masters and endowed with resources, the representatives of Russian 
business can be formidable competitors and irresistible partners.  Russia’s exponents and 
representatives attract as well as intimidate.”
114
   
Putin’s Rasputin 
If there is an intellectual cornerstone around which Putin and the Kremlin develop 
their raison d’etre, it would be Aleksander Dugin, professor of sociology and international 
relations at Moscow State University who previously served as Chairman of the Geopolitical 
Section of the Duma’s Advisory Council on National Security in 1999.
115
  His work is read 
in Russia’s military academy, which indoctrinates their future military leaders into his 
influential frame of thought.
116
  He is also a revolutionary, and an unapologetic one at that, 
demanding violent action to produce positive strategic change for Russia.  To facilitate this 
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change, he encourages his supporters that “the new world order will not come about by 
means of aging old gentlemen meeting in seminars.  You must take a knife, put on a mask, 
go out of the house in the evening and kill at least one yank.”
117
  No doubt Putin has his own 
ideas on how to conduct foreign policy and how to rule Russia, but he is augmented by a 
formidable intellectual mind that adds more venom and audacity to an already aggressive 
grand-strategic posture.  Dugin does recognize that in terms of ethics, Putin is a realist and 
the best agent to forward his agenda.  For this reason, Putin and Dugin are mutually 
beneficial to one another.  Dugin may end up disappointed in the end that Putin acts on real 
events in the world and will likely not do anything as radical in scale as Dugin wishes. 
Kremlinologists often refer to Dugin, the son of a Soviet GRU officer, as “Putin’s 
Brain” or “Putin’s Rasputin” because so many of Putin’s speeches and political actions 
parallel Dugin’s advice to the letter.  On everything from foreign policy to Russian 
Orthodoxy, Dugin’s ideas and philosophies are obviously drawn upon when justifying any of 
the Kremlin’s political action.  He is a radical right intellectual who in 1980 was a member of 
the underground fascist movement called the Black SS Order and ran for president in 1993 
with the National-Bolshevik Party.
118
  Due to his firebrand lectures, he has been banned from 
entering Ukraine since 2009.  Dugin is also one of the individuals listed on the United States 
sanctions list following actions in Ukraine.  Two works written by Dugin reveal a radical 
fringe right-wing frame of conservatism that the Kremlin has learned to adore with time: The 
Fourth Political Theory and Eurasianism: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism.  
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Dugin believes that Russia has a sacred calling and destiny to be a bulwark against 
the West.  According to Dugin, there are three political theories that dominated the twentieth 
century; communism, fascism, and liberalism.  Dugin preaches that liberalism emerged as the 
victor, thus modern man in liberalism sees the “individual” as the hallmark standard of 
governance, but in a postmodern globalized world, the individual loses his identity in the 
morass of capitalism.
119
  Only liberalism has prevailed, but he adamantly believes that 
liberalism is now failing.  Dugin laments this defeat, as he argues that tradition was 
overthrown at the dawn of modernity, and that religion and family have lost their importance 
in modern society, which has led to decadence and deterioration of the moral fabric, and that 
the fourth political theory must uphold traditional values and beliefs to be successful.  The 
liberal, in contrast, values freedom from tradition.  Dugin blames progressive politics for the 
rise of the oligarchs and in the process absolves the Kremlin and Putin of blame for rampant 
corruption, which is a completely absurd notion but entirely in keeping with Dugin’s 
worldview and also a convenient position as Putin’s supporter.  The return to theology is 
“essential” to the fourth political theory.
120
  Dugin also shows considerable disgust at “human 
rights” and “tolerance” because it focuses on the individual, allowing dogmatic atheism and 
materialism to reign supreme as a result.  Dugin sees Russia as the natural leader of this 
“fourth political theory” movement because he views it as a bastion of traditionalism and 
anti-liberalism.  Dugin hopes that “the future world should be noetic in some way, 
characterized by multiplicity.  Diversity should be taken as its richness and treasure and not 
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as a reason for inevitable conflict: many civilizations, many poles, many centers, many sets 
of values on one planet and the whole of humanity.”
121
 
 Conversely, the United States is the bastion of liberalism that must be defeated.  
Dugin predicts the collapse of the United States and with it liberalism.  The end result, for 
Dugin, is a revolution to overthrow the current government systems in place to foster this 
new era and prevent another “American Century.”  He also emphasizes that Russia cannot do 
this alone and must enlist China, India, and like-minded right-wingers in Europe like the 
English Defense League or the French National Front.  To him, the intellectual rot in Europe 
is significant, but he has allies there.  He encourages European conservatives that “if the 
European New Right chooses us Russians, it means it chooses the barbaric element and 
therefore must choose our methods of action.”
122
  Dugin states that, “Only a global crusade 
against the United States, the west, globalization, and their political-ideological expression, 
liberalism, is capable of being an adequate response.”
123
  Even more bluntly, Dugin states, 
“the American empire should be destroyed, and at one point it will be.”
124
  Otherwise, 
according to Dugin, a future of individualism, liberal democracy, capitalism, and 
consumerism will reign supreme, which will be a catastrophe for humanity.  It is an active 
call for a quasi-religious apocalypse and mystic destiny that we have not seen in the greater 
political discourse of the international community since Nazism. 
Because of liberalism’s inherent weakness, Dugin argues the necessity of a fourth 
political theory—one that will be postmodern and born through dissent. He also argues that 
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the fourth political theory would benefit from defeated ideas like communism and fascism, 
which he argues have useful elements that could co-exist with this new movement, and 
elements of liberalism that can be used to bring about its own defeat.  According to Dugin, 
“the fourth political theory will be a crusade against postmodernity, post-industrial society, 
liberal thought realized in practice, and globalization as well as technological and logistical 
bases.”
125
  Most importantly for Dugin and his followers, “liberalism must be defeated and 
destroyed, and the individual must be thrown off his pedestal.”
126
  Following this train of 
thought, liberalism should be just as vilified as either fascism or communism.  Conservatives 
will head this new revolution and this idea.  The crux of his book is that it does not say 
exactly what this fourth political theory would be, but rather offers ideas that would help to 
facilitate a process that he feels is necessary, and that Russia will lead it.  It is no wonder that 
Putin and other Kremlin policy makers are infatuated with Dugin’s thought process given 
that it speaks to everything they believe. 
Dugin is a strong supporter of Eurasianism as an alternative to Western liberal 
democracy.  He also believes that Eurasianists should be ruled by the best representatives of 
society such as the aristocracy and warrior classes and that if Russian elites do not rule, the 
Western elites in Europe will do so with all of their progressive, liberal, anti-Eurasian ideals.  
Dugin preaches that the Westphalian state model is outdated and will be done away with as a 
result of the as-yet undefined fourth political theory.  Instead, what will remain are “large 
spaces” where common peoples to decide their own fate as their traditionalism and cultural 
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  In Dugin’s own words, “the Eurasian idea is a revolutionary concept on a 
global scale that is called upon to act as a new platform for mutual understanding and 
cooperation for a large conglomerate of different powers: states, nations, cultures, and 
religions that reject the Atlantic version of globalization.”
128
  Examples of such large spaces 
would be Chinese, Indian, Slavic, and Russian nation-states.  Eurasianism also preaches the 
end of the United States’ era of hegemony and the beginning of a multipolar world.  Dugin 
argues that if Putin and the Kremlin do not act now, the United States will “strip Moscow of 
control over the CIS states and begin the disintegration of the Russian Federation itself.”
129
   
Much like the fourth political theory, Russia will be and must be the nucleus of the 
multipolar movement.  It is the duty of smaller Slavic nations to align themselves under this 
area of influence, and Dugin especially sees Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as part of this 
“Russian Space,” which is also no coincidence given that Putin is so infatuated with bringing 
all of them under his Eurasian Customs Union, and also part of why critics are so scared of 
this prospect of making a potential mini-Soviet Union. (The Eurasian Customs Union was a 
concept Dugin was pressing especially hard for and that Putin has been rigorously pursuing 
as a valuable strategic objective of the Kremlin). Dugin’s teachings also encourage Putin’s 
idea that Russia should be treated as an equal on the world stage, and this utopian multipolar 
world that Dugin envisions is exactly the sort of platform that Putin wants on the 
international stage.  The personal appreciation is reciprocated. As Dugin says, “The 
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continuity of Putin’s course is the continuity of common sense and the preservation of Russia 
as a nation.”
130
   
Dugin also preaches of the philosophy of Weltanschauung (German for “world 
view”), which combines tradition, modernity, and even elements of post-modernism.  This 
philosophy has traditional communitarian bonds as a priority.  Dugin emphasizes that “there 
are four pillars of Eurasianism: differentialism, tradition, the rights of nations, and social 
fairness.  Ethnicities as the primary value and subjects of history.”
131
  In contrast, 
“democracy is a chaotic agitation of rebellious masses.”
132
  He believes that democracy and 
liberty are not in the Russian social construct, and that a “stable, monarchic trend, reflecting 
the fact that a powerful authoritarian figure is in high demand.”
133
  He viewed Yeltsin and 
Gorbachev as liberal democrats who devastated to the country’s prestige and way of life, and 
describes them both as a “national catastrophe and absurdity bordering on insanity.”
134
  
America is a unique case to Dugin because for some reason to him the American 
experience is invalid due to its being the bulwark of liberalism and lacking any deep or 
“credible” history, and his recommendation is “the only way America can save itself is to 
turn to God.”
135
  In line with the fourth political theory, it should come as no surprise when 
Dugin preaches that society will be destroyed if the West is allowed to continue to dominate 
and foster globalization on its terms.  Dugin believes that Putin should be seen and treated as 
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a father figure to the Russian people, as “a state is subconsciously perceived as a big family, 
and its head as the father.  In a family structure, the father possesses a stable authoritarian 
status, which means the rest of the family is submissive and complicit in enhancing the 
father’s authority instead of undermining it.”
136
  The traditionalism discussed earlier confirms 
this belief system of respect and unquestioning obedience to authority that can allow Russia 
to be the successful proponent of the fourth political theory and Eurasianism that Dugin 
wants so desperately to take hold.   
Like Putin, Dugin sees any attempt by Western nations to establish relations in 
Russia’s “near abroad” as a direct threat to Russia’s sovereignty. When asked about how 
Russia views the West’s development of friendly relations with former Soviet republics, 
particularly Ukraine and Georgia, Dugin replies: “…..as a declaration of war.  As a 
declaration of psychological, geopolitical, economic, and open war.”
137
  Ironically, in turn, 
we have seen Russia actively facilitate all but the last.  Even more foreboding, in an 
interview prior to the crisis in Ukraine, Dugin was asked what the Russian response would be 
if Ukraine joined NATO.  He said, “I think the reaction would be support of an uprising in 
eastern parts and Crimea, and I could not exclude the entrance of armed force there.”
138
  
Most controversial of all, he has repeatedly called for the killing of Ukrainians, saying things 
like “idiots should be purged from Ukraine.  A genocide of cretins is the obvious solution.  I 
do not believe that these are Ukrainians.  It’s just some bastardized race that emerged from 
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  The most controversial of all, “as long as the scum is in Kiev, Russian 
people cannot exist peacefully.  Either Kiev should be destroyed and built anew or people 
should come to their senses.  Kill! Kill! Kill!  There should be no talk anymore!”
140
  The 
Kremlin PR arm had to censor him after the outburst.  Putin is likely nowhere near as 
maniacal as Dugin, but there is no question he pulls a fair share of ideas from this influential 
if unbalanced man. 
Given Dugin’s belief in traditionalism and theocratic beliefs, it should come as no 
surprise that the Russian Orthodox Church plays an important role in keeping the country’s 
“moral compass” rigidly aligned with the Kremlin’s ideology.  Dugin preaches the church’s 
merits, emphasizing that, “it is important to understand that Orthodoxy is not just a religion.  
It is also a political doctrine and a political theology.”
141
  Unlike the leaders in the Soviet era, 
Putin and his Kremlin cronies have completely embraced the Russian Orthodox Church as a 
useful tool of government, and the church, led by former KGB man Patriarch Kirill I (who 
operated under the name Mikhailov), is all too willing to oblige.  The Russian Orthodox 
Church preaches heavily about “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World), Slavic Unity, and 
brotherhood.  This falls in line with what Dugin is saying, and he thinks so highly of Russian 
Orthodoxy that he says “I think the people and the president share responsibility before God 
for everything that happens in the country.”
142
  Like many other periods of history, the 
church plays a pivotal role in pacifying the population and encourages them to not be sinners.  
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Like all other Christian denominations, the Russian Orthodox Church especially emphasizes 
that God loves the poor masses, and their piety will be rewarded.  If they live a path of 
tranquility and peace, they will surely go to eternal paradise for their struggles.  The church 
plays up nationalism and is especially fond of Russia’s military personnel, and holy men will 
travel to the front lines to bless soldiers before they go into combat as they did earlier in 
Chechnya and Georgia.  It is a tool that brings people together and prepares them for hard 
times when necessary.  Dugin re-enforces this when he says, “the Russian people are an 
absolute for me, an inherent value and an end in itself.  These people are deeply suffused 
with the light of the Orthodox culture and have been chosen by divine providence for a 
special mission.”
143
  The church is also anti-Western and sees the Western way of life as a 
corrupt world that encourages sin and debauchery and is particularly pro-homosexual.  The 
church calls for Russians to embrace a greater calling and pushes the Third Rome concept of 
Moscow to which Putin subscribes heavily, and ultimately sees Putin as a man sent from God 
to facilitate Russia’s emergence as the new leader of a great reborn empire. Dugin especially 
dwells on the Third Rome concept, bluntly saying, “I think the best course would be to 
eradicate the state and replace it with a holy Empire.”
144
  Putin surrounds himself with the 
presence of the Russian Orthodox Church at major events, hoping to give the impression that 
he and the rest of Russia are virtuous and righteous, and God is ultimately on their side.   
The Puppet Master 
The next key player in Putin’s inner circle is the cunning political technologist and 
Kremlin grey cardinal, Vladislav Surkov.  Anna Arutunyan describes Surkov as “Vladimir 
Putin’s ideologist and no mere official.  In a power structure where Putin’s ministers and 
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aides were delegated the task of allotting assets to the right vassals, the realm of political 
fiefdoms was overseen by that strange dark bird, a master manipulator, and a one-man PR 
machine credited with standing behind every major and minor mystification in modern 
Russia.”
145
  Many of the Kremlin’s ideas may come from Dugin, but Surkov puts them into 
action.  The goal of a political technologist is to reinvent narrative, and as such reinvent 
society.  Surkov has four primary roles: encouraging splits in opposition parties, creating and 
establishing virtual political products, manipulating the media, and mobilizing state-
administered resources
146
.   
Since Putin came to power, Surkov has been immersed in the Russian political 
process serving as the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Deputy Prime 
Minister, and Assistant to the President on Foreign Affairs.  He has also held executive posts 
with Yukos, Alfa Bank, and Russia Channel 1 Television.  Surkov takes great pride in all of 
this and boasts openly, “I am the author, one of the authors, of the new Russian system.”
147
  
Any popular movement, patriotic movement, or opposition movement that establishes itself 
in Moscow is controlled and manipulated by the Kremlin soon after legitimacy.  Surkov, a 
Chechen who idolizes deceased American rap icon, Tupac Shakur, and orchestrates Russian 
society as if it was his own reality television show, has played a key role in organizing 
“astroturf” (alluding to a “grassroots” movement that is artificial) pro-Russian movements in 
Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltics, and even his own people in Chechnya.  He also makes sure 
that any alternative political parties are either infiltrated so as to become nothing more than 
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figurehead or “synthetic” opposition parties that are just another appendage of United Russia, 
or are delegitimized to the point of absurdity like the current Russian Communist Party.  
Surkov wanted more than just one political party to sell the multi-party idea, as single-party 
rule would bring up bad memories of the Communist Party during the Soviet Union.  Parties 
like Just Russia, Liberal-Democratic Party, Unity Party, Patriots of Russia, and the Right 
Cause Party are all shams and under strict guidance from Surkov himself.  Critics, and even 
Surkov himself, call this form of political manipulation “managed democracy.”  Any voting 
is done under his watchful eye to ensure ballots are stuffed and manipulated to favor United 
Russia.  Surkov also projects the image of Putin to the Russian people.  He tells the media 
what to show, and that is the strong and macho side of Vladimir Putin.  Photo ops of visiting 
orphanages, ensuring houses are rebuilt from forest fires, or a public dressing down of a 
factory supervisor is done to show compassion for the common Russian people.  All of this is 
carefully done to project a strong man and leader of inner and outer strength.   
Surkov is the man who created the Nashi youth movement, which encourages 
adolescents around Russia to be politically active under a Kremlin-crafted narrative. He has 
also encouraged pop culture movements like bringing back the Cossacks and enlisting a 
Russian biker gang called the Night Riders to expand Russian nationalism and patriotism.  
The Cossacks have been encouraged to move into trouble spots like the Caucasus to impress 
an honor code by which traditional Cossacks used to abide.  The Night Riders are a clever 
nationalist tool of provocation, and that was most recently on display when they tried to ride 
the same route as the Red Army to Berlin in 2014.  Their efforts were stopped at the border 
in Poland.  He also attempted to create a Russian Silicon Valley in Moscow, but it was one of 
his notable failures.  Economics seems to be a weak point of his despite knowing its 
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importance.  Following being named in sanctions by the United States for his role in the 
annexation of Crimea, Surkov’s response was “I see the decision by the administration in 
Washington as an acknowledgement of my service to Russia.  It is a big honor for me.”
148
   
The Next Mikhail Tukachevsky: The Mastermind Of Hybrid Warfare 
Russia’s military efforts under Putin are commanded by the man who literally wrote 
the book on modern Russian hybrid warfare; Colonel-General Valery Gerasimov and author 
of the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” which he proudly boasts is longer than Tolstoy’s epic War And 
Peace.  Perhaps the most important paragraph in the whole doctrine is the following:  
The very rules of war have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving 
political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the 
power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.  The focus of applied methods of 
conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, 
informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — applied in 
coordination with the protest potential of the population.  All this is supplemented by 
military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of 
informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of 
forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to 





This is a lengthy reference, but every word is vital to understanding the mastermind 
of Russian hybrid warfare and the methods that he applies when coordinating the Kremlin’s 
hybrid warfare efforts.  These efforts are fostered by what he calls an “indirect action” 
strategy that has been lauded by the Russian Security Council, and he surrounds himself with 
like-minded generals to facilitate his ambitious new strategy.  Indirect action focuses on 
using the DIME method of national strategic power, or using diplomatic, informational, 
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military, and economic measures to defeat an adversary and his will to fight.  Gerasimov’s 
ideas have been praised because the strategy is low cost with high reward, and escalation or 
de-escalation are easily managed by commanders.  Indirect action also works as a very 
effective counterpunch to a superior adversary, like the United States.  It is designed and 
coordinated to work efficiently with the government to advance national-security interests.  
Gerasimov’s ideas have been executed to near-perfection, validating him as perhaps the most 
influential mind on twenty-first-century warfare.  Gerasimov is also responsible for standing 
up the KSO in 2013, which is the Russian equivalent to US SOCOM.
150
  It is where the most 
elite Spetsnaz and intelligence operatives train in their methods of warfare and 
reconnaissance.  Gerasimov has also encouraged working with various intelligence agencies 
and military branches of flag officers and intelligence officials not only for operational 
experience in learning how other branches of defense do things, but also due to historical 
Russian paranoia of posturing for a coup.
151
  He is exactly the sort of general that NATO 
should be fearful of.  He is giving his latest “lecture” to Europe and the United States in 
Donbass.   
The Intelligence Community Reborn 
Any discussion about Russia’s grand-strategic efforts must include their imposing 
intelligence apparatus that has been robust and evolutionary in both its defensive and 
offensive postures ever since the October Revolution.   Organizational structures and lettered 
agencies have come and gone since the end of the Cold War, but that evolution has held 
steady since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Currently, the Russian intelligence 
community has three “Main Intelligence Directorates” designed to fulfill unique tasks 
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catering to their skill sets; the SVR, FSB, and GRU.  The SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) 
serves primarily as an espionage entity that participates in “far abroad” operations.  An 
example of SVR handiwork would be the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in the United 
Kingdom with polonium.  A less successful example would be Anna Chapman and her team, 
which was embarrassingly uncovered by the FBI in New York.  While it cannot be ruled out 
completely, it is not likely that the SVR served much of a role in the annexation process.   
The FSB (Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) is the functional 
equivalent of the FBI in the United States and focuses on counterespionage, keeping the 
Russian Federation safe, quieting dissent at home, prosecuting “foreign agent” organizations, 
and tax fraud, and conducting a myriad of other tasks of interest primarily at the domestic 
level.   
The GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye) is the bulldog of the Russian 
intelligence community and has no equivalent in the West.  It capitalizes on the loose 
command structure and instability that its commanders and operatives work to create.  The 
talents and mission of the GRU fit the task of “controlled instability” like a glove.  It is the 
“bridge” intelligence agency between Russian military intelligence and the lettered civilian 
intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, fostering the seamless fluidity of the whole 
intelligence process so that both the military and intelligence communities of the Kremlin are 
on the same page and are able to execute their mission with optimal efficiency and 
effectiveness. As far as accountability is concerned, the GRU answers only to the Russian 
Defense Ministry and Putin himself.  The GRU also gives intelligence summaries 
(INTSUMs) to senior policymakers and military officers—the key policy “customers” in the 
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relationship.  Areas of primary intelligence responsibility include Spetsnaz operations as well 
as IMINT, ELINT, and SIGINT exploitation.   
The GRU is an intelligence organization that was born in blood during the October 
Revolution, purged from existence twice by Josef Stalin and then revived by him at a record 
pace following the German Invasion, Operation Barbarossa, on June 22, 1941, and has seen 
nine of the thirteen men leading it executed.  The GRU has been involved in training fighters 
since the Cold War-era and was intimately involved as a counterpunch to Western actions 
during the Cold War in countries such as Cuba, Namibia, Vietnam, Syria, and Egypt.  That 
footprint has retreated from the “far abroad” and been consolidated in the “near abroad” 
realm out of economic and strategic necessity in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.  Its 
primary purpose is to foster instability and establish Russian interests where they are 
deployed.  The GRU is active in Russia’s “near abroad”, most recently in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan officially, and the Baltics and Ukraine were certainly part 
of the list even before the current situation in Ukraine.  For all of the military ineffectiveness 
that Russia showed in the Georgia campaign, its SIGINT utilization was highly effective and 
the communications jamming facilitated by the GRU forced the Georgian military to use 
cellular phones whose transmissions were easily intercepted.  The GRU was responsible for 
utilizing Spetsnaz, mercenaries, the Chechen Vostok Brigade, paratroopers, and their own 
civilian assets to achieve the necessary tactical and operational objectives asked of them. 
The Tip of the Spear 
The Spetsnaz is the elite fighting force of the Russian Federation and one of the most 
extensively trained military units in the world.  Galeotti emphasizes that “Spetsnaz are the 
heart of the new Russian way of war that emphasizes speed, surprise, and deception over 
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continual military force, and their skills ensure that they will maintain their special status in 
the future.”
152
  These operatives are sent on operations with the mindset that they do not 
exist, giving them plausible deniability regarding their part in creating the instability and 
mayhem ordered by the Kremlin.  They are the tactical spearhead in the fighting force and 
can be inserted into a battlespace using many different methods of infiltration, including 
miniature submarines, parachutes, and posing as civilian tourists.  They are also expert hand-




These feared intelligence and special operations warriors are trained in survival, 
reconnaissance, urban tactics, foreign languages, interrogation, camouflage, concealment, 
assassination of high-value individuals, elimination of key targets like strategic missiles, and 
so forth.  Their utility and resourcefulness have steadily increased.  In training, they are 
subjected to brutal psychological measures to keep them alert and able to act for when the 
day comes that they may experience what they are preparing for in the field.  Their 
instructors constantly keep them in a training state of fear designed to turn the fight-or-flight 
instinct into a fight-or-fight instinct.  It is this psychological transformation of instinct that 
their instructors insist will one day allow them to complete their missions and save their 
lives.   
The candidates are subjected to land navigation during the Siberian winter, cross-
country skiing for miles in the Caucasus mountains, crawling under barbed wire filled with 
pools of animal blood and entrails, or even put in a city by their trainers who give local 
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police descriptions of them and say they are drug dealers.  They must then get outside the 
city by any means they can without being apprehended.  Once they graduate, they are given 
the red beret coveted by all members of the Russian military.  It is not uncommon to see a 
Spetsnaz candidate die in training from exhaustion, exposure to the Russian winter, jumping 
out of an airplane, or during harsh interrogation exercises where they are trained not to talk 
and some of the trainers just take it too far.  Any of the aforementioned casualties are written 
off as training accidents and are acceptable casualties in shaping the Spetsnaz community.   
In conventional warfare, they are agents of chaos inserted behind enemy lines with 
the objective of creating and exploiting weak points in the enemy’s defenses for the 
conventional military to concentrate their attack on, thereby having the capacity to be key 
players at any level of war.  In terms of unconventional-warfare techniques, they are trained 
in guerrilla warfare and anti-terrorism tactics as well.  The importance of “red teaming” is 
indoctrinated into their way of thinking so they think like their adversary would in hopes of 
anticipating future events that could prove crucial in a mission or battlespace.  To illustrate 
the importance of Spetsnaz to the Russian intelligence community, and the GRU in 
particular, Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov states that, “the majority of GRU officers have 
been at some time very closely familiar with the Spetsnaz, or are themselves Spetsnaz 
officers, or have worked in the intelligence directorate of a district or group of forces.”
154
  
The SVR (Zaslon Brigade) and FSB (Alpha Brigade) also have their own Spetsnaz units as 
well.  They are jacks-of-all-trades trained to be the best of the best, and there can be no doubt 
that these men were the first “boots on the ground” in Crimea.   
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For the Spetsnaz operative, the mission comes first.  Operations security (OPSEC) is 
of sacred importance, and any divulging of secrets is considered high treason and punishable 
by death.  They will kill anyone who endangers the mission, including their own operatives if 
they become injured to the point where they impede the operation.  Suvorov says the most 
common instance for this is broken legs during parachute drops.  If a civilian detects a 
Spetsnaz operative during the unfolding of a mission in a hot battlespace, that person is 
silenced permanently. It does not matter if it is a man, woman, or child, that person who 
observed them has to die if it risks the mission.  Anything written in the Geneva Conventions 
about humanitarian methods is irrelevant to them because strategic objectives take priority 
over political chivalry at the international level.  Their rules of engagement are hindered only 
if their superiors dictate otherwise, and up until recently, the idea of winning “hearts and 
minds” was a completely foreign concept to them as a fighting force.   
When a battlespace becomes an operational environment for a mission, the Spetsnaz 
will also orchestrate their military version of controlled instability, which Suvorov calls the 
“predatory period.”
155
  Anything from influencing media and blackmailing politicians, or 
facilitating riots in symbolic locations like city centers, constitute what the Spetsnaz call 
“grey terror” because they are covert activities that allow for deniability but give the 
operatives an advantage of confusion and intimidation to carry out their mission.  Once 
operations move from covert to overt military action, Spetsnaz orchestrate the “red terror” 
phase and the elimination of adversary targets.  There is a third colored phase of terror called 
“pink terror” where there is still peace, but Spetsenaz have already begun targeted physical 
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destruction including train derailment, spreading biological agents, poisoning water supplies, 
blowing up dams, and starting forest fires.
156
  Pink terror is a very risky and aggressive set of 
actions taken only by the best Spetsnaz operatives, but when executed efficiently they 
facilitate exactly what military commanders and Kremlin policy makers want when 
bargaining for an upper hand at a negotiation table.  The less Russia is punished for using 
pink terror, the more they will use it. Pink terror is what is most obviously being used by the 
Russians against Ukraine on a large scale, and has been since Russian forces moved into 
Crimea and the Donbass region.   
Like Spetsnaz, Russian intelligence has been a very formidable adversary in the post-
Soviet world.  Following the emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism, China, and other world 
challenges, the intelligence communities of the United States and Europe have taken their 
eyes off Russia more than at any time in the past century.  This has not gone without 
criticism by Western scholars and strategists who have warned about adopting such a lax 
stance towards a Kremlin that has remained at least covertly aggressive ever since Putin 
came to power.  Edward Lucas reminds us that, “Russia uses its intelligence agencies as a 
broad and malevolent force to penetrate our society and skew our decision making.  We do 
little to protect ourselves.”
157
  Russian intelligence has been all too willing to take advantage 
of this weakness, and it explains why Western intelligence agencies and policy makers have 
been so consistently on the back foot in the 21
st
 century.  Crimea was the pinnacle of the 
combination of Russian intelligence opportunistic aggression and the Western policy-
intelligence blend of apathy and obliviousness, to the nature and extent of the threat. 
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Preparation and execution from beginning to end bear the signature of Gerasimov’s 
touch, especially given the circumstances of how the Crimea peninsula was taken.  There was 
something truly unique about the role of the GRU and Spetsnaz in Crimea.  The chaos and 
confusion that it embraces were there, but there were no gunshots or explosions.  Crimea 
needed to be treated differently than Chechnya and Georgia.  In the minds of Russian 
intelligence and military leaders, these people were Russian citizens who needed to be 
liberated.  These were not enemies but compatriots, and that mindset needed a tactical 
adjustment that the GRU has traditionally not utilized: winning “hearts and minds” as well as 
keeping order and peace.  Soldiers constantly assured the locals that they were not there to 
hurt them, but to help them and keep them safe.  They took extra care to comfort and assure 
the people that they were friendly, which no doubt was extensively trained as well because it 
is so far out of the element of the traditional GRU and Spetsnaz roles of killing and 
maximum damage.  They adapted impressively.  There was not a single military related 
fatality during the initial annexation of Crimea on the Russian side, and only one Ukrainian 
military officer was killed in the annexation.
158
  Tartar and Ukrainian dissidents have 
disappeared without being heard from again, but that is an integral part of the GRU’s, 
Spetsnaz’s, and FSB’s operations as well.  These “disappeared” people do not tally as either 
formal military or civilian casualties to the Russians in a conventional warfare environment, 
and they accept the disappearance of dissidents as acceptable collateral since they practice 
“disappearing” in their own country as well.  In most cases, these “disappeared” dissidents 
are found deceased with signs of torture. 
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 Vladimir Putin has been the man shaping Russia’s grand strategy since the turn of the 
millennium.  He has some very imposing tools that he has been utilizing to foster instability 
against “near abroad” countries that have tried to move too far out of the reach of the Russian 
Federation’s sphere of influence.   If Vladimir Putin does play chess, as the saying goes, he 
has some very powerful and useful pieces at his disposal.  He knows how to sacrifice pawns 
like Khodorkovsky and Litvinenko, but should he begin to lose his knights, bishops, and 
rooks, he knows he will have much more difficulty moving his pieces around as effectively 
as possible.  He maintains a potent center of gravity using very resourceful men in key 
personnel positions, and utilizes his intelligence, military, siloviki, and oligarchs all as 
conduits within a well-oiled and interconnected system.  All of these men and organizations 
know that within their corrupt system of kleptocracy, they depend on one another, and very 
few will dare to rattle the cage to bring down what they have built on the backs of the 









 This chapter focuses on the most important clash of Western and Russian grand 
strategies since the end of the Cold War, and why Russian leaders are putting so much of 
their reputation on the line with the international community.  The Euromaiden protests and 
armed conflict that happened immediately after were the culmination of history, distant and 
recent, as well as current geopolitical players.  Everything has come to the fore with these 
events in terms of age-old Russian obsession with the security of the motherland. The 
Euromaiden crisis was really just a delay in long overdue and much larger geopolitical 
upheaval within the former Soviet Union.  This chapter focuses on the actual events on the 
ground, and each one of them is significant in trying to understand the mindset that lies 
behind Putin’s decision-making process.  While there is basic analysis in this chapter out of 
necessity, the analysis behind the events that have recently occurred (and some that are still 
unfolding) will be discussed in later chapters.  In the discussion up to this point, we can bring 
together key insights from previous chapters in order to get a better picture of the events that 
have taken place since on the ground, and make assessments regarding their meaning and 
what is likely to transpire next in Putin’s high-stakes game. 
At the end of November 2013, thousands of Ukrainian citizens began filling the main 
square of Kiev—the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square).  The primary cause was 
President Yanukovich’s refusal of the European Union Cooperation agreement for the last-
ditch deal with Putin, but it was also a combination of other issues primarily stemming from 
the rampant corruption of the Ukrainian government and a rise in nationalism to separate 
further from Russian influence.  This mass gathering of protesters was even bigger than the 
one associated with the Orange Revolution and was coined the Euromaiden by social media 
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and soon the news media. Without the help of social media, the Euromaiden would have 
been impossible.  Much like the Arab Spring, social media was crucial for information and 
coordination.  Loudspeakers played the popular song “Release the Cobblestones” by the 
Kremlin-reviled Russian punk rock band Pussy Riot, which made Putin furious.   Police 
brutality exacerbated an already delicate situation, and attempts to subdue the protestors 
coercively were unsuccessful in breaking their will. 
 By January, it became obvious that the protestors were there to stay despite 
Yanukovich’s rubber-stamp Rada passing a law to make protesting illegal.  Yanukovich also 
offered to reel in his presidential powers and form a unity government with mediation from 
the European Union.  He would also restore the 2004 constitution and promised early 
elections.  The protestors at this point wanted nothing less than Yanukovich’s resignation.  
The protests increased in February, and the Yanukovich government hired titushki 
(hooligans) to cause enough unrest to allow even more extensive use of police force.  The 
titushki was responsible for people being roughed up or even kidnapped.  On February 18, 
2014, twenty protestors and six titushki were killed in confrontations on the streets.  The 
boiling point was reached on February 20 when snipers opened fire on protestors, killing at 
least seventeen and as many as twenty.
159
 
 Putin was furious that Yanukovich was not even tougher with the protestors and that 
he lost control of not just Kiev, but Ukraine itself.  It was widely rumored that he planned to 
expand the sniper killings of protesters and institute a massive crackdown right before he was 
toppled.  The former Ukrainian president retreated to Russia from Kharkiv via helicopter, 
                                                          
159




thinking of his own safety.  The president did not leave empty-handed, emptying the 
Ukrainian treasury of $32 billion USD before his departure
160
.  Yanukovich was formally 
impeached by the Rada February 22, and Orange Revolution heroine Yulia Tymoshenko was 
released from prison (she participated in a hunger strike in solidarity with the Euromaiden 
protesters).  By the time the Euromaiden protests subsided, about one hundred people were 
killed (dubbed the Heavenly Hundred by protestors and the Rada).   
 While protests continued in Kiev, counter-protests were being orchestrated in one of 
the country’s most strategically critical locations: the Crimea.  The protests emerged on a 
notable scale on February 23, the day after Yanukovich fled to Russia.  Many of the 
protesters were angry seniors who still had a strong patriotic attachment to the Soviet Union 
and Russia.  Many members of the Ukrainian elite Berkut special operations force fled to 
Crimea and were greeted as heroes in one of the few places they could receive a warm 
welcome.
161
   
 Without warning, well-trained and well-armed soldiers without symbols or insignia 
began swarming the peninsula, targeting critical nodes such as airports, legislative 
administration buildings, and ports.  Unknown elements arrived at the Simferopol and 
Sevastopol airports early on the morning on February 27.  It quickly became obvious that 
these unidentified well-trained and disciplined soldiers were no mere ragtag citizen militia, 
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but likely Spetsnaz and GRU operatives.  The peninsula was being overrun by these “little 
green men” of unknown origin.  Armor was brought in from a base near Moscow.
162
   
 Once Crimea was secured, self-defense forces and militias were formally established, 
but they were so ragtag and pathetic-looking that it was blatantly obvious that these were not 
the well-trained men who took the peninsula.  They were nonetheless backed by the “men in 
green” to give their nonthreatening demeanor some teeth.  They were older citizens who 
could barely stand, organized criminals in tracksuits, but the exceptions were the Berkut who 
wanted revenge for what happened to them in Kiev.  On March 6, a hastily formed Crimean 
parliament requested an immediate referendum for independence within ten days.
163
   
 The referendum to join Ukraine March 16 did not even have a “no” option, but rather 
a “yes: join Russia now” or “yes: join Russia later” option.  In what was already a 
predetermined conclusion, 96.7 percent of the people in Crimea voted to join the Russian 
Federation.  This number is not credible when looking at the Crimean ethnic Tartar 
demographic alone, which has been staunchly anti-Russian since the Stalin deportations.  The 
last thing the Tartars would want is to link back up with Russia.  Despite hot air from world 
leaders condemning the act, Crimea was formally annexed on March 18, 2014.  Furthermore, 
the OSCE Parliamentary assembly concluded that the referendum was conducted in an 
environment that could not be considered remotely free or fair.  The referendums in Crimea 
were conducted amid a climate of fear, violence, and lawlessness.
164
  Thomas Grant 
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emphasizes that “a war zone is not the place to have a vote to decide the constitutional fate of 
a country.”
165
  Therefore, the “right to self-determination” is also a fallacy. 
 The annexation of Crimea by Russia was an intelligence and military masterpiece.  
Crimea, a peninsula with few access points from the mainland, makes the territory easy to 
defend from the Ukrainian mainland.  The environment was absolutely ideal for Spetsnaz 
operatives, whose tactics focus on rear assault of enemy lines.  With Ukraine’s navy in 
tatters, there is no hope of a counteroffensive to regain the peninsula.  Russia suffered no 
casualties during the conflict, and the Ukrainian forces were quickly surrounded at their 
bases.  The Ukrainian military had twenty thousand troops on the peninsula, but stood by 
waiting for orders that never came.  They were either absorbed into the Russian army with 
their current ranks or were allowed to go to Ukraine demoralized and humiliated.   Russia 
cleverly used the Status of Forces agreement tied to the Black Sea Fleet deal to bring as 
many troops onto the peninsula as the agreement allowed: 25,000.  Putin has constantly stuck 
to his narrative that the events in Crimea were spontaneous despite military units from the 
Black Sea Fleet, the East Chechen Battalion, the 31
st
 Guards brigade, the 22
nd
 Guards 
Brigade, GRU and other military units ultimately totaling 35,000 that took part in the 
conquest.  More Russian equipment arrived from the Kerch Strait crossing daily, making the 
Russian forces that much stronger.
166
  
 The annexation was devastating to the Ukrainian Navy, which called the port of 
Sevastopol home and shared the cherished warm-water port with Russia.  With the 
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annexation, Russia commandeered two thirds of the Ukrainian ships.
167
  Out of the 8,000 
sailors who served in the Ukrainian naval forces in Crimea, only 2,000 chose to remain with 
Ukraine.  The rest of the sailors switched allegiance to the Russian Navy.  Odessa has 
become the new home of the Ukrainian fleet, and the sailors there are determined to make 
sure a Crimea situation does not unfold there since it is the country’s only remaining 
significant port connected to the Black Sea that can take in naval vessels.  The other port, 
Mariupol, borders the Sea of Azov and can thus easily be blockaded by Russian ships.  Many 
of the ships that remain are old Soviet holdovers, and one officer laments that, “the only way 
to get these pieces of junk moving is to get some paddles and start rowing.”
168
 
 The ethnic group most unhappy to see the return of the Russians was the Crimean 
Tartars.  The Tartars preferred Ukrainian rule and many have moved to Lviv to find refuge 
from the conflict.  The Tartars are vengeful because they had only returned to the peninsula 
from the Stalinist deportations in the 1980’s.  Now Tartar media is being crushed, political 
and social gatherings are prohibited, and the Tartars themselves are being forced off of their 
land again.  Two important Tartar leaders, Mustafa Dzenilev and Refat Churabov, have been 
banned from re-entering Crimea for five years because they were designated as political 
undesirables by the Russian Federation.
169
  The Tartars were also prohibited from assembling 
in memorial of the deportations on their anniversary in May 2014.  In September 2014, there 
was a raid on the Tartar self-governing council. Books, hard drives, and memory sticks were 
confiscated because they were “extremist literature” according to the new Russian 
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authorities.  One council member said in protest, “first, they prevent us from freely marking 
our genocide; our Holocaust.  Second, they exclude our leaders.  Third, they attack us with 
these gun-toting search teams and shut down the Mejlis (Tartar council).  This is nothing less 
than a campaign of terror.”
170
  To date, seventeen Tartars are missing and only one of their 
bodies has been identified.  Putin has tasked the FSB with the Tartar clampdown.  The new 
pro-Russian prime minister of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, emphasized that, “all activities 
aimed at non-recognition of Crimea’s joining to Russia and non-recognition of the leadership 
of the country will face prosecution under the law and we will take a very tough stance with 
this.”
171
  Many Tartars know that they will not be able to return for a long time, if ever, and 
they are deeply saddened by losing their homeland a second time.
172
 
 The United Nations was quick to condemn the annexation, and on March 27
 
overwhelmingly voted on a referendum stating that the Crimea vote was invalid not only 
because it did not meet the most fundamental standards of electoral voting, but also because 
it was part of Ukraine and did not have the right to administer the vote.  The United States 
and European Union were quick to condemn the annexation, and sanctions were prepared in 
response.  These initially focused only on targeted individuals within the Kremlin, but moved 
to a much broader economic focus when the situation became more serious and Russia 
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 Soon after the annexation of Crimea, the same sort of unrest that led to the annexation 
began taking place right across the border in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the 
Donbass.  Russia began a massive military buildup across the border near Rostov with 
30,000 troops, which is significantly more than would participate in any exercise.  Sizable 
deployments also occurred in the border cities of Belgorod and Kursk.  Armored vehicle, air 
transport, missile launchers, and other heavy weapons arrived from across the country’s 
armories.  The sheer numbers were adequate to take not just Donetsk and Luhansk, but 
Kharkiv, Odessa, and territory bordering Transnistria (the eastern pro-Russian enclave of 
Moldova).  The numbers of Russian troops as well as Putin’s intentions alarmed Ukrainian 
and Western leaders.  The Duma even gave Putin war powers to invade Ukraine.  Putin 
would symbolically rescind these powers voluntarily to portray that he was trying to de-
escalate the volatile situation.  The invasion-sized force eventually decreased as well, but the 
forces that remained in Rostov following the initial buildup were more than adequate to 
launch operations into Ukraine.  The military buildup became a valuable chess piece for the 
Kremlin to show that it is still a powerful force in any near-abroad affairs.
174
   
 Protests soon began in the pro-Yanukovich (and pro-Russian) oblasts of Donetsk and 
Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.  A sizable demographic sincerely deplored the way Kiev and 
Western Ukraine had been acting.  Separatists seized legislative and administrative buildings 
throughout both cities.  Miners and pensioners were waiving Russian and Soviet flags in the 
central squares, and Russian provocateurs were bussed in from across the border to 
exacerbate the unstable situation.  Much like Crimea, many of the protestors were over fifty 
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and longed to rejoin Russia and see the return of the Soviet Union.  Protest organizers, led by 




   
 Despite the many provocateurs bussed in from Russia, it would be inaccurate to say 
that there are not very large number of ethnic Russian locals who are willing to fight for their 
freedom or for annexation to the Russian Federation.  Interviews with the separatists tend to 
underscore similar motives for their actions but some are more ambitious than others.  One 
commander, Alexander Matyushin in Donetsk, says, “We are fighting for the liberation of all 
Russian lands and we are ready to march all the way to the Danube.  We must restore the 
historic injustice which befell the Russian people in the twentieth century.  We need to take 
land which is ours by right and bring it back into the fold of Holy Russia.”
176
  For some, this 
is not a short-term conflict, and they want to keep pushing west.   
The vote proceeded without a shred of electoral integrity.  Five days before the 
referendum, the SBU intercepted a message from Russian National Unity Party Member 
Aleksandr Barkashov saying to “write something down like ninety nine percent.  Well, not 
ninety nine percent.  Eighty-nine percent voted for the DPR and that is it.”
177
  The Donetsk 
People’s Republic was created with a purported 89 percent of the oblast’s vote (the exact 
number recommended by Barkashov), while the Luhansk’s People’s Republic was created 
with 96 percent of the vote.  Donetsk and Luhansk appealed to the Kremlin as places for 
                                                          
175
 Simon Deyner, Anna Nemtsova. “Eastern Ukrainians vote for self-rule in referendum opposed by West”, 




 Dina Newman. “Ukraine rebels dream of New Russia”, BBC News.  Last updated, October 23, 2014.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29721466.  
177
 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2015), p. 108. 
98 
 
“frozen conflict” because they had just the right blend of ethnic Russians to make it a 
plausible talking point that their popular movement was grassroots in nature and legitimate in 
its aims.  It was an absolutely ideal environment for the GRU to create unrest and take root.  
Donetsk and Luhansk have the highest concentration of ethnic Russians outside of Crimea, 
but despite this a CNN Poll found out that in eastern Ukraine, only 37 percent of them 
preferred annexation by Russia while 49 percent preferred to stay within Ukraine.
178
  
Together, the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk referred to their collective 
territory as the Federated Republic of Novorossiya (New Russia).  Conflict between the 
Ukrainian government and the separatists was inevitable, and the first skirmish began May 1 
in the town of Slovyansk in the Donetsk Oblast.  Following this, Ukraine’s acting president, 






, following the election of Petro Poroshenko to the Ukrainian presidency, 
the order was given to orchestrate an anti-terrorist operation in Donbass (the terrorist 
designation for the separatists is given to this day).  Poroshenko promised the conflict would 
be quick and the rebels would be defeated.  One of the most important strategic targets was 
quickly deemed to be the Donetsk International Airport.  Forty separatists were killed in the 
opening shelling of the Donetsk airport
180
.  On June 12, the first Russian tanks were observed 
crossing the Ukrainian border, indicating their introduction into the eastern Ukrainian 
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battlespace.  On June 19, a Ukrainian transport plane carrying 49 soldiers was shot down by 
an advanced air-defense system believed to be a BUK missile launcher.
181
 
As in any war-torn area, a humanitarian crisis emerged as people left the cities and 
towns controlled by the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic in droves.  Russia schemed 
a way to force Ukraine to act on the conflict one way or another, and they decided on the use 
of a humanitarian convoy to Donbass as their means for doing so.  Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov called for humanitarian assistance to prevent “catastrophe” in the Donbass.  
The Kremlin ploy was extremely clever because it forced Ukraine to take a course of action 
one way or the other.  They would either let the convoy pass without incident and look weak, 
or they would resist passage of the convoy by force, giving Russia the perfect pretext to 
invade while making the Ukrainian government appear inhumane to eastern Ukrainians by 
not allowing them to receive the aid.  It echoes the strategic method used by Russia against 
Georgia in 2008.  Likely recognizing this, Ukraine reluctantly let the convoy pass.  On 
August 22, the convoy passed through a separatist-controlled checkpoint that Russia was 
specifically told not to use, and it set the precedent that Russia could deliver more of these 
convoys to Donetsk and Luhansk regardless of their contents.
182
  
The conflict was going poorly for the separatists at the onset of hostilities, and the 
Kremlin felt the need to put their finger on the scale to even things out by bringing in 
advanced weaponry across two borders controlled by Luhansk.  One of the more advanced 
systems brought in to negate the threat of Ukrainian aircraft was the BUK missile system 
(SA-11 Gadfly), which is an advanced air-defense system operated by Russia.  On July 17, 
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Malaysian airlines passenger jet MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine carrying 298 
passengers en route to Malaysia.  The Dutch-led investigation concluded October 23, 2015, 
and showed that there is overwhelming evidence that it was a BUK air defense system that 
brought down flight MH17, but stopped short of blaming Russia directly.  Multiple leads 
from journalists, forensic experts, and eyewitness accounts simply confirm the other 
evidence.  A phone conversation between Girkin and the GRU at 4:40 states “we have just 
shot down a plane.”
183
 It was initially boasted on DPR and LPR websites that “we have just 
shot down an AN-26 near Torez.  It scattered somewhere around the Progress Mine.  We 
warned them not to fly into our sky.”
184
  Ukraine communications teams intercepted a key 
message from the separatist operators relating to MH17: “Our friends from high above are 
very much interested in the fate of the black boxes.  I mean people from Moscow.  They must 
be under our control.  All that you find must not come into someone else’s hands.”
185
  With 
plenty of evidence already available of Russian and separatist responsibility, the European 
Union and United States established much more severe and overarching economic sanctions 
targeting Russia’s banking and oil companies, most notably Russian oil giant Rosneft.  
Russia took the retaliatory measure of placing sanctions on Western food supplies, which had 
a major impact on the European agricultural economy and cost nations like Poland, the 
Netherlands, and France millions of dollars because Russia has been a massive market for 
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  The Kremlin and the separatists have denied any involvement to this day and have 
constantly tried to deflect the blame for their actions.   
Initial investigations and eyewitness accounts counter the Kremlin narrative with 
compelling evidence.  An interim report published in September found that based on the data 
from the aircraft’s black box recorders, photographic and radar evidence, and satellite 
imagery, the Boeing was brought down by high-energy objects in its vicinity, consistent with 
an attack from the air or the ground.
187
  A rebel fighter named Igor, who only gives his first 
name for security reasons, said that the battery’s mission was to discourage SU-25 ground 
attack jets from attacking separatist targets in the area.  A BUK missile had been launched 
against the Ukrainian jets half an hour before Malaysian Airlines flight 17 came down, 
forcing the pilots of the SU-25s to pull out
188
. A farmer named Valentina Kovalenko was 
digging up potatoes in her field and described what she saw.  “It took off, at first we thought 
a plane was crashing, but it was a rocket, then saw smoke from what I thought came from the 
Progress Mine in Torez” (a town nearly ten kilometers northeast of her position).
189
  Olga 
Krasilnikova also said she saw a rocket sometime between 4 and 5 p.m. local time.  She says 
“I saw it flying, it flew right over me, from the side, I saw smoke in the sky then I heard an 
explosion and I saw huge clouds of smoke.”
190
  This story correlates with actual events, as 
the aircraft was downed at 4:20 p.m.  Perhaps the most compelling eyewitness account comes 
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from Pyotr Krasilnikova, who says “My mother and I were in the yard as it happened.  There 
was such a bang that we sat down in the yard, our legs gave way beneath us.  Then we got 
curious and went to the other side of the house to take a look.  The rocket was here, it 
wiggled around, then some kind of rocket stage separated and then somewhere towards 
Lutuhyne and Torez I saw the plane fall apart in the air.”
191
  This also correlates, because 
BUK missiles often zig-zag in the air before radar lock is established and steers the missile to 
its target.   
A Dutch BBC journalist, Jeroen Akkermans, used his journalist cover to his 
advantage and gathered evidence at the crash site that was small enough to conceal and not 
look suspicious.  Akkermans states, “I visited the site several times, and after months of 
seeing evidence lying at the scene undisturbed, I decided to take some small fragments with 
me.  At least three of them were later linked to a surface-to-air missile by forensics analysts 
and experts.”
192
  These same forensic experts ruled out any possibility of air-to-air munitions 
and thus any possibility of an aircraft shooting it down.  British defense analysts linked the 
damaged hour glass-shaped fragment that Akkermans had to a 9N314 warhead, which arms 
at least one type of BUK missile system.  German missile expert Robert Schmucker analyzed 
it as well and said, “looking at the damage, the velocity, the height of the fragments, it all 
adds up to a BUK missile, to me it is pure mathematics.”
193
  The evidence collected by 
Akkermans is some of the most compelling to date, and his information and evidence were 
given to the Dutch team overseeing the investigation.   
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 The initial performance of the Ukrainian military surprised many experts both in the 
west and Russia, as it beat back the separatists convincingly from Slovyansk and the 
strategically important port city of Mariupol.  Things were going so well for Poroshenko and 
the Ukrainian military that there were discussions about a diplomatic roadmap to end the 
conflict.  Troops even captured a northern neighborhood in Luhansk.  The front lines were 
soon the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk themselves, but the Ukrainian army stalled their 
offensive with the mindset of trying to encircle the cities.  From the onset of hostilities in the 
east, the Ukraine government identified the fight against the separatists as a terrorist 
operation.  Donetsk and Luhansk begged Russia for military support knowing they would fall 
without it.   
When it became obvious that the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist movements would 
fail without immediate intervention, Russia became more directly involved.  The movement 
was heavily Russian-influenced from the onset of hostilities, and one of the most influential 
players was retired GRU operative Igor Girkin, whose nomme de guerre was “Strelkov”, a 
famous Russian general.  Girkin is a retired FSB operative who proudly claims he was the 
one who started the conflict in Ukraine, and was a vital organizational leader for the 
separatist militia in the onset of the fighting.
194
  In July, Girkin was wounded and retreated 
from the warzone saying that he was going on vacation.  He never came back from his 
vacation.  He was eventually succeeded by Alexander Zakharchenko to give the movement a 
Ukrainian face in contrast to the former FSB colonel Girkin.  Zakharchenko was originally 
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part of the pro-Russia “Oplot” militia, becoming the prime minister and proving himself on 
the battlefield, where he had already been shot twice.
195
 
The pro-separatist improvement on the battlefield was noted in late August, and 
Ukrainian forces all of a sudden were receiving fire from artillery with firepower and range 
much superior to their own.  Tactical equality became a tactical advantage for the separatists 
very quickly, and it became increasingly clear that the advanced weapons and well-trained 
troops could only have come from Russia.  On August 24, the separatists paraded Ukrainian 
POWs through central Donetsk and onlookers pelted the prisoners with beer bottles, eggs, 
and tomatoes.
196
  Two days later, ten Russian paratroopers captured by the Ukrainian forces 
near the town of Dzerkalniy in Luhansk claimed that they were lost. They were wearing the 
same white arm-bands that the “little green men” were wearing in Crimea.
197
  Russia has 
constantly maintained that Russian troops have never participated in the ongoing fighting in 
Ukraine, but very few have taken this seriously.   
On August 27, Russian armor crossed the border at a resort town of 40,000 near the 
Sea of Azov called Novoazovsk, which had previously experienced no separatist activity.  
The few Ukrainian military members stationed there were quickly overwhelmed by Russian 
forces.  According to Sergeant Alexsei Panko, “They crossed the border, took up positions, 
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and started shooting.  This is now a war with Russia.”
198
  The day before, a farmer in the 
village of Kolosky said he counted 38 armored personnel carriers, two fueling trucks, and 
numerous transport vehicles filled with men crossing the border.  It was a brilliant move 
because it stretched the Ukrainian lines thinner to cover what would have been an unimpeded 
corridor to Mariupol.  It also provided relief to Donetsk and Luhansk separatist fighters and 
the Russian military units with them.  The war was proceeding catastrophically badly for the 
Ukrainian military, which was being beaten back on all fronts.  This would not have been 
possible without considerable Russian involvement.  Military analyst Paul Floyd believes 
that without this continued support the rebels could not have lasted for more than a month or 
two.
199
  U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said, “Russian incursions into 
Ukraine indicate a Russian-directed counteroffensive is underway.”
200
  The Kremlin dug in 
its feet, determined that the Donbass separatist movement would not fail on Putin’s watch.   
When the Russians tipped the scales in the separatists’ favor by providing armor and 
manpower, it became in Ukraine’s interest to settle the conflict diplomatically, and after 
negotiations the Minsk I Accords were signed on September 16.  They were intended to end 
hostilities in the Donbass and establish a line-of-contact from which heavy weapons would 
be pulled back.  A prisoner exchange was one of the higher-profile successes of the accords.  
One of the key elements of the accords was the introduction of observers from the 
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who would supposedly report 
any violations to the ceasefire.  There would be 250 OSCE observers on the line of 
conflict.
201
  The OSCE was eventually shown to have no teeth.  Its teams were constantly 
turned away from “restricted areas” by the separatists (especially along the Russia-Ukraine 
border) in blatant violation of the Minsk I Accords.  Because the Donetsk and Luhansk 
People’s Republics are separate entities, it gives the Kremlin deniability and they can say that 
they do not have influence over the separatists’ actions.  This is another example of how 
Putin and Russia skirt international standards when they see fit.
202
 
This extends to the treatment of Ukrainian captives.  In regards to torture, Amnesty 
International has found instances of both sides torturing their prisoners (the Aydar Battalion 
is the most notable culprit of torture by pro-Ukrainian forces), but only on DPR and LPR 
territory is such egregious activity practiced on the civilian population if they are showing 
any signs of dissent.  For instance, early in the conflict, the mayor of Horlivka tore down the 
DPR flag and disappeared soon after.  His body was found in a river.
203
  On August 25, a 
woman in Donetsk accused of being a spy was forced to hold a sign at the city’s main street 
that read, “She kills our children.”
204
  Human Rights Watch has noted that civilians have 
been subject to torture, hard labor, or degrading treatment by the rebels.
205
  There are 
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countless other instances of people disappearing if they are even suspected of activity against 
the separatists.   
Some of the fiercest fighting between the Ukrainians and the separatists took place at 
the Donetsk International Airport.  The airport was built for the European soccer 
championship that was co-hosted between Poland and Ukraine.  It cost $900 million and was 
a state of the art facility built for the occasion.  It is now in ruins.  The symbolism of the 
airport remained high for months, and the Russian military sent everyone from mercenaries 
to paratroopers and even Spetsnaz to dislodge the Ukrainians who for months held out 
against the constant artillery barrages and assaults.  The Ukrainians defending the airport 
were affectionately nicknamed cyborgs because they fought with so much ferocity and 
showed no fear.  One account from intercepted Russian documents gives Russian troop 
casualties as 382 dead and over 500 wounded.
206
  Despite a sustained effort, the Ukrainians 
lost the airport on January 15, 2015 to the separatist forces.
207
   
The Russians and separatists were using the Minsk I Accords merely as a rearming 
and regrouping opportunity.  Soon after taking the airport, separatists seized a 500 square-
kilometer swath of Ukrainian territory between Novoazovsk and Donetsk on January 20.  
Novoazovsk and Donetsk were now connected by land.  Four days later, separatists shelled 
Mariupol and 30 civilians were killed with 102 wounded.
208
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On February 12, the Minsk II Accords were signed after long and sustained 
negotiation between Ukraine and Russia with France and Germany serving as primary 
mediators.  Angela Merkel and Francoise Hollande see this diplomatic effort as the last 
chance to prevent a long and sustained “frozen conflict.”  Among the most important 
agreements reached were that Donetsk and Luhansk would both be given special economic 
status that would make them immune from any economic agreements reached between the 
European Union and Kiev.  There would also be amnesty of separatists in the territories, and 
the preference of the Russian language for the two oblasts.  Finally, Debaltseve would not be 
part of the ceasefire, a concession strong-armed by Russia so the separatist forces could gain 
the strategically important town before the ceasefire went into effect. 
The most intense engagement prior to the establishment of the Minsk II ceasefire was 
the capture of the strategic town of Debaltseve, which linked Donetsk and Luhansk via 
highway and rail.  Russian troops and armor crossed the border in droves in order quickly to 
capture the town and suffered high casualties during the engagement because, according to 
Russian forces there, the local separatists would not take part in the fighting because they 
believed it was too dangerous.  According to the OSCE, during the four days following the 
signing of Minsk II, the DPR and LPR forces broke the ceasefire 250 times in other areas 
along the Minsk II line of conflict even if Debaltseve is not included.
209
  Losing Debaltseve 
was a major morale blow for the Ukrainian military and a major victory for the separatists 
and their Russian counterparts.   
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On May 10, Sergeant Alexander Alexandrov and Captain Yevgeny Yerofeyev, two 
members of Russia’s 3
rd
 Non-Divisional Brigade, were wounded and captured by Ukrainian 
forces in the Luhansk oblast and were brought to a hospital in Kiev for treatment.  Both have 
admitted that they are servicemen of the Russian military, and had been operating in Ukraine 
since March 6.  Both fighters are from Togliatti, a town near the Volga River.
210
 The 
Ukrainian forces that captured them said there were fourteen Russians and that they killed all 
but two of them, losing one of their own in the process.  Since Russia says these men are not 
from their military forces, Ukrainian lawmakers have said they will be tried as terrorists with 
a minimum fifteen-year prison sentence.
211
  This was brilliant on Ukraine’s part because it 
put Russian leadership in a bind.  Military spokesman Andriy Lysenko proudly boasted “the 
leadership of the Russian Federation will have difficulty saying these two guys just got lost,” 
alluding to the dismissal of involvement by the ten Russian soldiers apprehended earlier.
212
  
Despite the admission and detailed accounts from both Alexandrov and Yerofeyev, Kremlin 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov still towed the line that there are no Russian military members in 
Ukraine. 
This conflict has created a catastrophic refugee situation.  The Russian “supply 
trucks,” even if fully loaded with humanitarian aid, would have never been enough to feed 
those trapped in the conflict.  Nemtsov estimates that approximately 800,000 Ukrainians 
have been displaced.
213
  At least 400,000 have fled to Russia.  Some have been sent to larger 
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regular cities of Russia like Perm, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok, but some have been sent to 
dying backwaters like Murmansk, Yakutsk, and Magadan far from any civilization.  Source 
documents seem to indicate that they still prefer that isolation and logistical difficulty to 
being in a war zone, which should not be surprising.  Locals are upset the refugees are given 
the precious jobs and opportunities that are hard to get in these towns.  Some also looked to 
Western Ukraine to escape the conflict in Kiev and Lviv.  The refugees quickly found the 
locals very kind, providing them food, basic living supplies, and temporary housing in hotels. 
These were not the “fascists” about which the separatist leaders warned them.  It is as much 




For those who remain, there is not much love for the DPR or LPR pseudo-states.  
There are no sincere efforts from the DPR or LPR governments to create jobs or social or 
government institutions within the territories.  Luhansk in particular had no electricity or 
running water for 17 days in August.  An estimated 104,000 are without water, electricity, or 
gas in the Donetsk Oblast.
215
  Both Ukraine and Russia feared an outbreak of disease, and 
residents were standing in line for food.  Banking and infrastructure do not work, and 
businesses have failed at an alarming rate.  Kiev stopped providing state funds for the 
rebellious regions in November.  There are no jobs, food is scarce, people do not feel 
protected, and there are constant complaints that the foreign Russian fighters harass and steal 
from the citizens.  The food crisis has also been used as a recruiting tool for those who 
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remain to join the separatist fighters so that they can feed their families.  Despite the militant 
clampdown on the area, protests have been staged showing disdain for their new officials and 
government.  The most high profile incident occurred in the separatist-held town of 
Sverdlovsk in the Luhansk Oblast on November 17, 2014.  The protesters demanded the 
Russians leave the city, and clashes ensued between the local separatists and Cossacks from 
Russia.
216
  The slogan “Sverdlovsk is Ukraine” was spray-painted on the Executive 
Committee building.  Protestors also poured blue and yellow paint on the military 
recruitment office and chanted, “Get out of the city! Get Lost!”  The Cossacks tried to 
intervene, but the local militia blocked them.  A rally of women took place the day before in 
the town of Chervonopartyzansk.
217
  
 The Kremlin has thus far been hesitant to attempt any annexation of east Ukraine, not 
from a punitive diplomatic standpoint, but because their already fragile economy would not 
be able to undertake the rehabilitation effort to restore the war-torn infrastructure of the 
Donbass, an area known as a rust-belt that has been a money pit since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union.  Crimean infrastructure alone will already cost millions of dollars (Russia 
plans on investing $12 billion in the region over the next five years), and for a nation that is 
already under considerable economic stress, adding the Donbas to this would be an unwise 
fiscal overreach.  However, it is the absolutely ideal environment to prop up pseudo-states for 
a frozen conflict that creates an economic drain on the Ukraine.  It also makes the Ukrainians 
look politically weak and unable effectively to govern their own country.   
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 This does not mean that Russia is not already paying a high price to support this 
movement.  In fact, numbers derived from Boris Nemtsov’s research have shown that the 
Kremlin is paying dearly to foster the unrest.
218
 Nonetheless, Putin still finds the price to be 
worth it because even the high cost is worth not seeing a successful Ukraine at Russia’s 
doorstep.  It is in Putin’s interests to see Ukraine falter, and maybe even fail.  It gives him a 
perfect example to demonstrate to ethnic Russians, who adulate him, that these “color” 
revolutions are a destructive influence.  It is important for Putin to keep up the tempo in the 
Donbass because it thrusts Donetsk and Luhansk to the forefront of the Ukrainian 
government’s main problems and makes it difficult to engage with the country’s many 
pressing economic issues.  It is important from a secondary standpoint because it makes the 
annexation of Crimea look more and more like a foregone conclusion.  Finally, if Putin is 
able to keep his grasp on Donetsk and Luhansk, it assures Russia’s say in Ukrainian affairs in 
any of their political or diplomatic decision making process, not to mention continuing 
economic leverage with natural gas and other commodities.  The role of the Russian military 
is now one of training in an attempt to leave less of a footprint on the conflict.  It is training 
separatists on towed artillery, multiple rocket-launch (MRL) systems, and other complicated 
systems like the BUK missile launcher.
219
   
 Kharkiv and Odessa have been on a precarious edge and the tension could be cut with 
a knife, but multiple attempts to organize astroturf movements to create “People’s Republics” 
in these oblasts have thus far been unsuccessful.  Pro-Russian protesters have already staged 
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protests in these cities.  In Odessa, an anti-Jewish pamphlet was circulated calling for their 
registration on March 23, 2014.  Paradoxically, it was designed to feed the Russian argument 
of Nazism in Ukraine, but it was found to be a ruse organized by a Russian Neo-Nazi, Anton 
Rayevsky.
220
  He was deported and banned from entering Ukraine after the pamphlet 
distribution.  The most violent of these follow-on separatist efforts took place on May 5 in 
Odessa, when pro-separatists took over a trade union building.  Both sides began fighting, 
which spiraled out of control, and the trade union building caught fire with 42 pro-Russian 
protestors inside.  Investigators have not identified the individuals responsible, and they 
probably will not be able to and cynically enough might not want to anyway given the 
current highly adversarial climate.  The Kremlin has used it as a focal point of Ukrainian 
inaction and has protested the event extensively.  A plot to foster a “People’s Republic” in 
Odessa was also foiled on October 14, 2014.
221
  In 2015 alone there have been ten bombings 
in Odessa and the surrounding area, and thirty of the suspected saboteurs were arrested by 
Ukrainian law enforcement with the help of Ukrainian intelligence.  The Ukraine Crisis 
Media Center has said the bombings have had a considerable psychological effect that 
achieve a sense of hopelessness and undermine faith in elected officials and their ability to 
bring stability and security far from the front lines.
222
  
Bloody protests have been frequent in Kharkiv following the Euromaiden protests.  
Kharkiv is a dangerous and volatile area because it is only twenty kilometers from the border 
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with Russia, and busloads of Russians were brought across the border to participate in the 
multiple pro-Russian protests in March and April 2014.  On March 15, 2014, pro-Russian 
protestors broke into a Ukrainian library and burned any books they could find written in 
Ukrainian.  A Muscovite daredevil scaled a government building, took down the Ukrainian 
flag, and hoisted the Russian red, white, and blue flag in its place. (A Ukrainian protestor 
would return the favor in kind in Moscow atop a Soviet hotel.  Sizeable protests and counter-
protests met frequently with confrontation and sometimes fatalities.  On September 29, 2014, 
a statue of Lenin was toppled in the city square by masked men.  There was hardly any 
public protest afterwards, but a pro-Russian group called the Kharkiv Partisans issued a 
statement that if any more Soviet memorials were taken down, five Ukrainian citizens would 
be killed.
223
  The city experienced multiple bombings between October and December of 
2014, including a hospital, a Ukrainian National Guard Base, and a rock bar that was known 
to host pro-Ukrainian meetings.  The most recent bombing, on February 22, killed three 
people and wounded fifteen.
224
    
 Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine’s fourth largest city, initially had pro-Russian protests as 
well, but had been quelled much quicker due to a no-nonsense oligarch mayor, Ivan 
Ivanovych Kulichenko who owns Privat Bank and has paid for his own militia (two thousand 
active, twenty thousand in reserve).  Lucrative bounties were also put out for the capture of 
any individuals proven to take part in pro-separatist activity, even as high as $500,000 for a 
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 Dnipropetrovsk still poses a unique situation because the mayor was forced 
to resign by Poroshenko after falling out with the president.  While there are fears the militia 
could cause political trouble with Kiev, it is still affectionately known as “Lviv of the East” 
by other Ukrainians, and its citizens have been active in putting down any pro-Russian 
trouble in the city.  Civilians have also have taken it upon themselves to undertake basic 
training on the outskirts of the city, and the militia has been willing to help.  They recognize 
that not everyone can take part in the fighting because they have jobs and families, but also 
know that if fighting comes to their doorstep, they will at least have basic fighting capacity 
and be able to follow orders.  The fighting is only 150 miles away, so they know it is a good 
idea to be ready despite the current calm in the city. 
 Kiev has not been immune from the conflict either, and bomb threats have been 
issued in the metros and polling stations to create chaos and disorder.  The calls were traced 
and originated in Luhansk.  It is a simple method to sow fear, but effective.  The Ukrainian 
capital city was remarkably calm following the protests, which went against the Kremlin 
narrative that it was a lawless city with anarchy in the aftermath of the Euromaiden.  The 
Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, has also been instrumental in keeping the capital 
safe from harm from complex attacks that were stopped before they could take place. 
Initially, however, the SBU was also left devastated with hard drives destroyed, their 
headquarters ransacked by obvious professionals, and senior leaders turning up in Moscow 
after the Euromaiden riots.  They had to start from scratch with new recruits with little 
experience, but have done remarkably well given the circumstances and have prevented 
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attacks and broken up insurgency cells in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa since hostilities began. 
Perhaps the most important was the arrest of Oleg Bahtiyarov on March 31st.  Bahtiyarov’s 
task was to enlist two hundred provocateurs who would use Molotov cocktails, bats, and 
sliding ladders to storm the Rada for $500 each to disrupt and discredit the government.  He 
belonged to the Eurasian Youth Union of Russia, and was a student of Dugin’s at Moscow 
State University.
226
 A second high-profile attempt at destabilization of the capital occurred 
on October 22, 2014.  The Russian NGO (non-governmental organization) Hromadska 
Initiativa (Public Initiative) was to carry out an attack on high-ranking officials and critical 
infrastructure.  The nicknames used were Victor, The Architect, and The Student.  According 
to the SBU, all were recruited by Russian intelligence and given arms including assault rifles, 
RPGs, and a portable air defense system.  The same figures were seen scuffling with police 
the week before
227
. The most recent SBU haul took place on Victory Day, May 9, 2015.  One 
hundred twenty members of “Alfa”, the SBU’s most elite unit, stormed nineteen properties 
across Ukraine and arrested twenty individuals found with weapons caches and intending to 
play the role of Ukrainian nationalists who would attack elderly Soviet veterans and post 
footage of it on the internet to enrage ethnic Russians and cause further unrest.
228
 
 The conflict has been devastating to the Ukrainian military, and president Poroshenko 
has conceded that the conflict no longer can be won militarily as two-thirds of their armor 
has been destroyed in combat.  The military had performed reasonably well given its level of 
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training, manpower, and weaponry, which were all sub-par. Ukrainian troops have 
complained that the people in command give indecisive and vague orders.  The push to the 
rebel-held east went well until military leadership wanted to wait to move into the cities, 
which was obviously a fateful decision.  They were afraid of the close-quarters combat of an 
urban environment and knew they would have sustained high casualties if they moved in.  
The Rada has recognized the need to overhaul defense spending, and has increased it to five 
percent of their total budget, but with the state of the military and the challenge they are 
facing, it was a move that should have occurred prior to Crimea’s annexation.
229
  At the end 
of 2014 the Rada also overwhelmingly voted to repeal Ukraine’s non-bloc status so they 
could move to join a military alliance like NATO.
230
  In the same legislation, the Rada signed 
legislation that would ban Ukraine from becoming a member of the Eurasian Customs Union.  
NATO Secretary General Rogh Rasmussen said that Ukraine will be a member of NATO if it 
so wishes and fulfills the necessary criteria.  Rasmussen stated “we adhere to the principle 
that each country has the right to decide its foreign and security policy for itself without 
interference from the outside.”
231
  Rasmussen also states that Georgia and Ukraine can join 
NATO despite the fact that some territory in their respective countries is not under their 
control.  Eastern European countries have been open to this prospect, but countries like 
France, Germany, and Italy are much more skeptical of allowing Georgia and Ukraine into 
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the alliance.  Ukrainian and Western military officials are not optimistic about any near-term 
chances of Ukraine joining NATO. 
The Ukrainian military has found militias absolutely critical to their manpower 
despite their controversial and unabashed far right-wing ideals.  There are estimates that there 
are as many as thirty militias operating with the Ukrainian military.
232
  Oligarch mercenaries, 
soccer hooligans, and political idealists are the primary participants in these militias, but 
there are foreigners as well.  Some of the militias even have representation in the Rada, such 
as the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov.  The fact that militias like the Azov 
Brigade, Aydar Battalion, and Pravi Sektor use SS insignia proudly is possibly the biggest 
propaganda piece that Russia has to work with for their narrative.   
 In spring 2015, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom offered to deploy 
trainers to Western Ukraine to offer advice and training to the Ukrainian military in a training 
exercise known as Operation Fearless Guardian.
233
  Ukrainian officers taking part in the 
training said that many of the tactics and methods being shown to them by U.S. trainers were 
tactics that were not effective in the war that they are fighting.  They had a valid point.  
Ukrainian troops had very little use for the IED training they had received, but they thought 
the concealment methods used in hiding from UAVs was very useful to them.  Many of the 
U.S. paratrooper instructors were seasoned veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan and are fluent in 
the asymmetrical warfare that they had experienced.  In Donbass, there are both conventional 
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and unconventional operations underway; it is a true hybrid war.  The Americans are used to 
air superiority and firepower, something the Ukrainian officers were very quick to point out 
was not an advantage they have.  While it is practiced in the American military, there are 
very few American trainers who had first-hand experience engaging tanks on the battlefield 
with infantry.  Very few, if any, were attuned to the dusty Cold War playbooks that needed to 
be brought back out.  In contrast, the Ukrainians subscribe to Soviet military doctrine and are 
used to waiting for orders from the higher levels of the chain of command.  They are not used 
to lieutenants and captains making key decisions on the battlefield, but the U.S. paratroopers 
were encouraging them to do this.  Despite these issues, both the U.S. trainers and Ukrainian 
trainees felt they learned something from each other and it was a good experience for both 
sides.  The United States commander made it very clear that they would be nowhere near the 
front lines, despite any Russian rhetoric that was being drummed up saying otherwise.   
The nationalist militias have nonetheless been effective fighting forces and have been 
equally efficient in recruitment.  The Azov Brigade’s Facebook page appeals to recruits that 
“you will find nothing here but trouble, war, adventure and perhaps even death, but you will 
definitely have some memories and lifelong friends.”
234
   Most of the recruits have come 
from Norway, Sweden, and Finland, but some have also come from France and Spain.  The 
Azov Brigade states they have twelve fighters currently on the battlefront with twenty-four 
more they hope to bring to Kiev and send to the front lines.  One of the Swedish recruits is an 
expert in urban warfare, another is a sniper from Sweden who has a five-thousand Euro 
bounty on his head by pro-Russian separatists.  He joined because of the Berkut snipers in 
                                                          
234
 Christopher Allen.  “Meet the European Fighters Who Have Gone to War in Ukraine”, Vice News.  Last 
updated August 24, 2015.  http://www.vice.com/read/european-british-fighters-in-ukraine-920.  
120 
 
the Kiev protests, and wanted to fight against those snipers and protect others from sharing 
the same fate as earlier sniper victims.  Interestingly enough, there are estimated to be 100 
ethnic Russians fighting in Ukraine with pro-Kiev militias.
235
  One of these Russians who 
interviewed with the Kyiv Post, who does not give his name out of concern for his family’s 
safety, used to work for the FSB.  He says that, “Every Russian is indoctrinated starting from 
the cradle with the ideas of Moscow as the Third Rome and war against the whole world.”
236
  
He also jokes that his former friends who are fighting for the separatists told him that Kiev is 
“controlled by fascists and Jews.” There are also about 100 Georgians fighting with the 
militias.
237
   On April 23 2015, the Rada ratified a law to make it easier for these foreign 
fighters to gain citizenship to Ukraine.   
There are strong worries that the militias may grow too strong and powerful to 
control, and that if events play out the wrong way, they could turn their weapons on Kiev.  
Poroshenko has already threatened to disband Aydar Battalion, but after they showed up at 
the Rada he rescinded the threat.  The militias grow in power and legitimacy every day.  The 
fact that foreigners are fighting on both sides goes against both of the Minsk Accords, but the 
level of Russian involvement in the separatist opposition exponentially exceeds any foreign 
involvement on the Ukrainian side.   
Ukraine is experiencing economic warfare just as they are a military war, and natural 
gas has been the lever Russia uses.  Ukraine imports 80 percent of its petrol and natural gas 
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from the Russian Federation, and it is crucial to keeping Ukraine’s population warm during 
the long, harsh winters.  It is not just Ukraine that is dependent on Russian fossil fuels, but 
the European continent as a whole.  The Kremlin has threatened to use fossil fuels as a 
weapon in the economic struggle, and has stated that if Ukraine does not pay its gas bill that 
Russia will not just shut off gas to Ukraine, but to mainland Europe as well.  In a world that 
has such high dependency on fossil fuels, this is a very strong weapon to use.   
The Ukraine leadership has been appealing for loans from world powers because of 
their dire financial situation.  Poroshenko has repeatedly appealed to various organizations 
and governments, and has been able to get a $15 billion loan from the International Monetary 
Fund thanks to the honest steps of anti-corruption legislation that have been passed by the 
Rada.  The United States has assisted with a loan of $1 billion, and the European Union has 
provided $1.4 billion.  For all the aid provided, it still might not be enough to prevent the 
nation from going into default, which is what Russia has wanted all along since the 
Euromaiden.  Poroshenko has also appealed for military aid, telling the U.S. Congress that, 
“warm blankets and clothes won’t stop the Russian Army.”
238
  Even if hostilities were to end 
right now, according to Nemtsov’s research, the current estimate to rebuild the Donbass 
would stand at approximately $225 million.
239
 
 So far the conflict has killed over 8,000 people officially, and scores more Russian 
military members and mercenaries unofficially.  The Minsk II Accords have been broken 
multiple times, and it appears that the agreement will dissolve like its predecessor did, and 
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under the same circumstances.  While there have been ceasefire infringements noted on both 
sides by the OSCE, the scales are largely tipped by the separatists, who use provocative 
sniper fire and mortar fire from civilian centers to provoke the Ukrainian forces.
240
  It gives 
Russia and the local separatist forces time to regroup, rearm, and harass the Ukrainian army.  
Over 100 Ukrainian military members have died since the Minsk II Accords.  Mariupol 
residents constantly live in fear that they will be the separatists’ next target, and the only 
town between them and the Russian-led separatist forces is Shyrokyne, where Ukraine has 
established a line of defense for what they fear is an upcoming engagement.  Russian armor 
is being moved across the border at its highest rate since the start of the conflict, and civilians 
are being moved from hospitals in Donetsk and Horlivka with tents being erected near them.  
Alexander Zakharchenko has made his intentions clear:  “Kramatorsk, Mariupol, and 
Slovyansk; they’ll be ours.”
241
  It remains to be seen if this is just “maskirovka” or a true 
threat that will be carried through.  One thing is certain: The separatists will not be able to 
carry this off without a sizeable Russian contingent alongside them.  Could this be 
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MASKIROVKA: RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 The reader may have noticed in the previous chapter that there was no deep 
examination of “why” Putin and his administration are behaving the way they were.  Many of 
those details will be looked at with more specificity in this chapter.  These include key 
decision-making processes and the triggers that made Putin act the way that he did in 
Ukraine.  During the Cold War, the communists harnessed the human condition, and 
propaganda was its most powerful force of manipulation.  The Kremlin has since perfected 
this manipulation of the information battlespace.  It is in the strategic military and 
intelligence philosophy of maskirovka (which translates in Russian to “something masked”) 
that we see the Russian Federation’s masterstrokes of deception in full practice, and the 
Kremlin has dedicated millions of dollars to a diplomatic, military, media, and intelligence 
apparatus that has been so effective against Western diplomatic efforts to contain it.  Equally 
important is how the Ukrainian conflict is portrayed to the Russian people themselves.  The 
Kremlin knows that controlling the information battlespace enhances prospects of success, 
while losing it exacerbates the possibility of failure.  This complex brand of disinformation 
and deception is one of the most crucial elements of the Putin regime’s approach and 
implementation, and it has been an indispensable element in his objective of keeping his 
adversaries guessing and his own people anywhere from docile to highly supportive.  
Churchill once said, “In wartime, truth is so precious she should always be accompanied by a 
bodyguard of lies.”  The Kremlin could not agree more, even if one body of lies often masks 





 Maskirovka: The Doctrine 
 Maskirovka is defined in Russian military doctrine as a form of support or combat 
operations, its purpose being to conceal the activities and disposition of friendly troops, and 
to deceive the enemy with regards to grouping and intentions of such troops.
242
  Generally, 
maskirovka conveys only a short-term advantage, and it is heavily reliant on surprise.  
According to the same Russian military doctrine, “Surprise makes it possible to inflict heavy 
losses upon the enemy in short periods of time, to paralyze his will, and deprive him of the 
opportunity of organizing resistance.”
243
  There are five key methods to maskirovka: surprise, 
kamufliazh (camouflage), demonstrativnye manevry (maneuvers intended to deceive), skrytie 
(concealment), imitatsia (the use of decoys and military dummies), and dezinformatsia 
(disinformation; a knowing attempt to deceive).  Concealment focuses on shrouding 
movement of military force by utilizing camouflage and concealment, or moving in the 
forests or hours of darkness.  Simulation focuses on using decoys or other physical means of 
masking forces.  Demonstration is the utilization of troop movement to give a false 
representation of intent, such as concentrating troops in an area that is not to be attacked.  
Disinformation, perhaps the most favored component of maskirovka used by the Russian 
Federation, uses false press reports or broadcasts or bending information that forces the 
adversary to question what is true and what is not.   According to Krueger, “Soviet 
commanders will continually seek to achieve new elements of surprise,”
244
 and the generals 
of the Russian Federation will be no different.  Gerasimov is beyond question the Kremlin’s 
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most influential general in the post-Soviet military of the Russian Federation, and his 
doctrine of hybrid warfare is completely dependent on maskirovka; for him and the new 
generation of military leaders in Russia, it would be unthinkable to plan militarily without it.  
However, in the Donbass, it has shown resiliency toward long-term military and intelligence 
efforts as well.  Maskirovka can be stretched out over a long period of time when the intent is 
to create a frozen conflict, as has been created in Ukraine. 
 The Soviets took their maskirovka efforts very seriously.  General Sverdlov states 
that maskirovka “conceals what is, and shows that which is not.”
245
 Very strict methods for 
turning vehicle engines on and off, going into radio silence, utilizing terrain for masking 
forces, and extreme detail when using camouflage and netting are all elements of this 
doctrine.  Soviet soldiers were expected to make concealment efforts without orders to do so 
but were encouraged to work with the chain of command to avoid confusion.  For example, 
Krueger describes such an example from World War II, stating that, “officers were posted 
every three to five kilometers and non-commissioned officers every one to two kilometers for 
the purpose of insuring traffic regulation and camouflage discipline during covert 
movements.”
246
  Following the intelligence and operational disasters in the opening stages of 
World War II emphasized in earlier chapters, it is obvious why the Soviets took maskirovka 
efforts so seriously.  During the turn of events in Stalingrad, the Red Army’s maskirovka 
doctrine really came of age, and deception and misinformation became basic fundamentals of 
all tactical, operational, and strategic planning in the march to Berlin.  Soviet aircraft would 
fly over Red Army positions to make sure camouflage and spacing were satisfactory.  
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Markers were dropped from the sky over visible forces so adjustments could be made.  When 
the Red Army advanced through Ukraine, soldiers built an entire decoy village to confuse 
German forces on numbers and disposition.  The most critical information was often hand-
held correspondence of which only one copy would be made.  When the tide was turning in 
World War II between the Nazis and the Red Army, sometimes only the Soviet high 
command had information regarding which units would be used for deception or real battle.  
Soviet troops and field commanders would not know until the day of operations.  This was 
also the case when Russian troops landed in Crimea in 2014, which will be discussed in 
greater detail later.  Operations security was taken very seriously by the military throughout 
the existence of the Soviet Union up to the point of its demise, and that trend has followed 
through to the current military establishment of the Russian Federation. 
 Maskirovka is not just important to military efforts in Russia, but to the intelligence 
community as well.  Lettered intelligence agencies like the NKVD and KGB were involved 
in all aspects of Soviet life.  Intelligence organizations made sure that carefully orchestrated 
and nearly clinical efforts were taken to control the narrative of politics inside the country, 
and propaganda efforts were used on their own citizens perhaps more extensively than their 
adversaries.  In a nation like the Soviet Union, control of information and control of the 
people themselves is crucial for maintaining strength and stability.  The NKVD was 
augmented with the military to make sure that a “fifth column” did not emerge that could 
threaten the communist party.  It created the tension that was discussed in earlier chapters, 
and was done with the dual purpose of making sure that no one intelligence community 
would gain too much influence, but also to keep them in check through competitive friction.  
That equilibrium continues to this day, and there is no love lost in rival communities like the 
127 
 
SVR, GRU, or FSB in terms of influence.  Putin and his current administration have seen the 
value in that competition to make sure that any potential internal adversaries do not unseat 
them.  The propaganda machine and flow of disinformation under Putin are arguably just as 
great as any time during the Soviet Union, and the intelligence community plays a key role in 
making sure the Russian Federation’s own citizens are pacified through a carefully 
orchestrated flow of media and harsh clamping down on dissidents.  For the Kremlin, 
utilization of maskirovka on its own citizens is just as important of utilization of these 
methods abroad to maintain the siloviki’s (Putin’s fraternal security apparatus) grip of power.  
As such, it is important to remember that maskirovka is not just discussed in military 
terminology as a hard power tool, but also as a soft-power asset in diplomacy, media, and 
propaganda.  The same principles apply to these domains as they would to military 
terminology and are used with the same ruthless and cunning mindset designed to throw the 
adversary off balance and to win in the informational battlespace and, by extension and as 
necessary, in the arena of armed conflict. 
Controlling Television 
For Putin and his Kremlin associates, the most important target in the media 
disinformation campaign is the Russian people themselves. What matters most in an 
authoritarian dictatorship like Putin’s is control of security services and propaganda to show 
what the “truth” is according to the Kremlin.  The state-run media sets up the West as a 
piñata to deflect any potential backlash from Putin’s authoritarianism.  Ninety percent of 
Russians get most of what they know about the world through state-run television.
247
  
Russian sociologist Lilia Shevtsova states, “The regime is deliberately trying to keep the 
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minds of the public in a schizophrenic state, obstructing the formation of a civic culture and 
legal mentality.  If the demand for a special state path and an iron hand strengthens in Russia, 
it will not be because of the inability of Russians to live in a democratic and free society, but 
because they have been deliberately disoriented and trapped by fears, phobias, and 
insecurities provoked by the ruling elite.”
248
  Since dismantling most news sources critical of 
the regime, all that remains are the Russia Today, ITAR-TASS, and Rossiya-1 state-run 
channels that rule the airwaves constantly battering the public with Kremlin propaganda on a 
scale that rivals the actions of the Soviet Union itself.  The objective of the new state-run 
propaganda is not to persuade, but to captivate; it disrupts Western narratives and supplants 
them with conspiracy theories.
249
  Any regional event that appeals to emotions and conflict 
be it Donbass, Crimea, the Baltics, or any other location is sensationalized and turned into a 
struggle of good (Russia) and evil (NATO and the United States in particular), and this is 
especially effective when ethnic Russians are portrayed as being persecuted or in imminent 
danger of  “fascists” or “imperialists.”  Ukraine is now the main focus of Kremlin 
propaganda, and the “illegitimate fascist government that was facilitated by the CIA” is what 
takes up a majority of the air-time (while completely omitting any hints of Russian 
involvement there).  Fringe Ukrainian organizations like the Pravi Sektor, which had only 
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two percent of the votes in the elections of the current Rada, are a bullseye that Russian state 
media is all too eager to hit repeatedly.
250
 
Any discourse is very carefully organized by these networks to tow the Kremlin 
narrative. Otherwise, it is omitted from the news completely.  This leaves the consumers of 
state-run news confused, paranoid, and unsure of the truth, which is exactly what the Kremlin 
wants.  Putin needs only to make a few arrests and amplify the message of total control on 
television, and over the course of his time in charge he has been able to do just that.  The 
purpose of these state run media organizations is two-fold.  First, they encourage Russian 
nationalism and appeal to ideals that should make them proud to be Russian, like the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the strength of their military forces, and remind Russians that they are 
still a power in the world to be respected and reckoned with.  Second, it is to control any 
anger and discontent and channel it into a way that is advantageous to the Kremlin itself.  
Finding equilibrium in this combination is exactly what the Kremlin is looking for.   
Russia Today is a media organization that demands special examination, as it is the 
primary offensive media weapon that the Kremlin uses to spread its point of view across the 
world, where Rossiya-1, ITAR-TASS, and others are focused on spoon-feeding the Russian 
populace their slanted news.  RT has a jaw-dropping budget of nearly $350 million dollars 
and has news outlets in the United States, Europe, South America, and Asia that portray an 
obvious Russian slant, constantly deriding Western governments and their vilification of 
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  Since the Euromaiden kicked off, the network has been in overdrive with an all-
out offensive vilifying Ukraine and the West while doing all it can to show the virtues and 
good intentions of Russia.  American outlets like Fox News and MSNBC are guilty of similar 
forms of journalistic sensationalism, but they pale in comparison to anything that RT churns 
out.  Political firebrands like Alexander Dugin are brought in as correspondents to reinforce 
talking points with anger and self-affirmation.  There is no partisanship or division of point 
of view at RT—only a single-minded ideological and political sense of purpose.   
RT deserves special mention because it is the Kremlin’s offensive mouthpiece outside 
of Russia.  Margarina Simonyan is in charge of RT’s foreign media propaganda machine and 
has been its editor in chief since 2005.  The American voice for RT is Stephen Cohen, a 
scholar of Russian studies who received his degree from Princeton.  He has always been an 
admirer of the Soviet Union and is RT’s favorite “agent of influence”. Sergei Kurginyan is 
another RT anchor and Soviet admirer who has organized pro-Putin rallies and has been 
caught on video consulting and strategizing with LPR and DPR separatists.  For some of 
RT’s foreign correspondents, the obvious disinformation campaign has been too much.  
Anchor Liz Wahl resigned on-air in November 2014 due to the distortion of events in Crimea 
and Donbass, and Sara Firth did the same, calling it “most shockingly obvious 
disinformation” when discussing coverage of the Russian downing of MH17.
252
   
There are a dozen key correspondents who are continuously recirculated on state-run 
media and are recognized by Russians everywhere.  The foremost firebrand Rossiya-1 
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correspondent is Dmitri Kiselyov, who shows the world through a Russian viewpoint on his 
show “News of the Week”.  His dubious claim to fame was his assertion that Russia should 
turn the United States into radioactive dust and that Ukraine is not a real country.
253
  
Kiselyov said “when I saw the horror in Ukraine, and I returned to Russia I realized we need 
to produce values.”
254
  As a master of theatrical sarcasm and apocalyptic rhetoric, Kiselyov 
far eclipses Bill O’Reilly or Chris Hayes, and as a theoretician of conspiracy he utterly 
shames Glenn Beck and Lawrence O’Donnell.
255
  Kiselyov idolizes Putin and states that 
“Putin is comparable among his predecessors in the twentieth century only to Stalin,” saying 
this is a positive trait!  Kiselyov, like many other Russians, says Stalin did what was 
necessary during the times in which he lived.  Another frightening and fascinating figure is 
Dmitry Tsorionov; another Russian Orthodox fundamentalist who thinks Putin’s power is 
sacred, and that God has given Putin this authority.  On air, he gave a lecture revolving 
around the question “is Vladimir Putin God by nature or only by grace? Can one worship 
Vladimir Vladimirovich as God on earth
256
?”  It seems as though many Russians already do 
so. 
In instances when journalists or activists become too much of a burden to the 
Kremlin, they have been imprisoned or even killed.  Journalists like Anna Politkovskaya and 
Galina Starovoitova, who were covering the conflict in Chechnya, were both killed in 
extremely suspicious circumstances as they worked to expose possible Russian war crimes 
during the conflict.  Antiwar journalist Dmitry Monakhov was arrested in Red Square and 
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sent to a psychiatric evaluation facility.  Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB operative who 
accused Putin of ordering the assassination of Politovskaya, was assassinated by a FSB 
operative in London with a lethal dose of polonium-210.
257
 (The same FSB operative now 
holds a seat in the Duma and therefore has diplomatic immunity.) There are also strong 
accusations from Ukraine that Russian FSB operatives attempted to kill former Ukrainian 
president Viktor Yushchenko in a similar fashion, using a high concentration of 
Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) that left his face permanently bloated and disfigured.
258
  
Perhaps the most high profile of these assassinations in recent years was the assassination of 
dissident Boris Nemtsov, who was one of the most influential opposition figures in Russia.  
He was killed on the night of February 27, 2015, across from Red Square.
259
  Nemtsov was 
working on Putin. War., a damning 65-page article that showed that Russia was intimately 
involved in destabilizing Ukraine and that it is costing their country hundreds of billions of 
rubles.  It has been published posthumously and is perhaps the most valuable single reference 
for this thesis.  According to Nemtsov’s work, Russia has spent $1.04 billion in the war in 
Ukraine, and $8.5 billion in total on near-abroad actions (before February when he was 
gunned down).  According to Nemtsov, there were 37,000 separatists supported by 10,000 
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Russian militants at the beginning of 2015 during some of the fiercest fighting in Donbass to 
date.  He also claims that 70 soldiers were killed in the Debaltseve invasion alone.
260
   
The Kremlin’s use of misleading and sometimes blatantly false news reports put the 
impetus on Western nations to prove the Kremlin’s misinformation wrong.  Otherwise, Putin 
and his inner circle are simply validated in what they push to and through the media.  Even if 
a given story is proven wrong, however, the Russians have moved onto the next big 
exaggerated story or one that shows Europe or the United States doing something far worse 
in comparison.  Van Herpen warns that, “when faced with unequivocal evidence, Russia 
continues to deny the facts.”
261
  It is not just lies that the Kremlin utilizes, but convenient 
truths as well to forward their political and strategic agendas, especially if it comes at the 
expense of the United States or Europe.  Recent historical blunders by the United States and 
Europe have been taken advantage of by the Kremlin, who are quick to chide any double 
standards when talking about human- rights issues in Russia or diplomatic efforts with 
regimes like Assad’s Syria or the Ayatollah Khamenei’s in Iran.  To be fair, Western-led 
overthrows of the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, Moamar Gaddafi, and other strongmen like 
them have been nothing short of grand-strategic fiascoes in terms of manipulating the 
information environment, so it is easy to make the West and particularly the United States 
look irresponsible as a superpower for invading other countries and encouraging revolutions.  
This has played perfectly into the Kremlin’s hands. 
 
 
                                                          
260
 Boris Nemtsov. Putin. War. (Moscow, Russia: Free Russia Foundation, 2015), p. 61. 
261
 Marcel Van Herpen, Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism, (London, UK: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2014), p. 231. 
134 
 
Appealing To History and Culture 
The nationalist script has been by far the most important in making sure that there is 
no threat of internal disorder.   Russian leaders try to bolster national pride by delivering the 
narrative that economic hardship is an unavoidable price for defending national interests.  
Van Herpen emphasizes that “nationalism is a well-known safety valve for oppressed 
populations”
262
 and one upon which Putin has been more and more reliant to keep the 
country proud and patriotic.  It appeals to the Russian people to fight through the sanctions 
levied by the West, and exclaims that the nation is tough and has been through much worse.  
There is no harm in being proud of one’s country and one’s heritage, but any citizen should 
be mindful of whether that patriotism is actually distracting attention from serious domestic 
issues.  For the casual Russian citizen surrounded by state-run media, it is much harder to 
determine what constitutes healthy pride and what constitutes constructive and justified 
criticism in one’s country and leadership.  This is especially true of Putin’s Russia, where 
protest in general is regarded as unpatriotic and instantly brings accusations of being part of a 
“Fifth Column”.  Edward Lucas reinforces this view stating that “the crudest reason is that it 
is an easy way to stay in control.  Portraying Russia as a fortress besieged by malevolent 




Maskirovka on the Internet 
The internet is also a valuable tool of maskirovka against the Russian people.  It 
provides a shroud of what information is shared and what is not, making it a bulwark of 
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Russia’s internal disinformation campaign.  Putin has a strong hatred for the internet and 
sincerely believes that it is a CIA weapon.  As such, the FSB is charged with sanitizing the 
internet and blocking sites that the Kremlin deems dangerous to the state by fostering 
“extremist activity”.  More recently, the duma passed a law that forces any bloggers with 
over three thousand followers to register with the state to operate.  Otherwise they constitute 
an “unsanctioned form of protest”.  Russia is also threatening to block Twitter, Goggle, and 
Facebook as they are unable to censor data on these sites because they are not based in 
Russia.
264
  Putin and the Kremlin want to be able to take the internet offline in case of a 
cyberattack or protests, and it is very likely only a matter of time before the internet in Russia 
is completely censored by the Kremlin as part of this crackdown.  Until that happens, the 
Russian Federation has stood up a powerful data mining collection tool that is reminiscent of 
the NSA’s PRISM program revealed by Edward Snowden.  The data mining that Snowden 
disclosed also gives the Kremlin an excuse to put webpages under the “protection” of 
Russian servers (webpages ending in .ru)  to make sure that they are safe from CIA 
decryption.
265
   
Putin seized the opportunity to use Snowden as a pawn to say that Russia does not 
collect data, phone records, or emails from its citizens.  That could not be any further from 
the truth.  This does not necessarily justify data collection by Western governments, but 
Russia’s data collection is just as extensive and probably far more evasive than that of any 
Western government.  This is accomplished using a stored data base called SORM, or 
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System of Operative Investigative Measures.
266
  SORM collects on all forms of electronic 
data.  It can be queried with word searches and monitors all “open data”, such as social 
media.  With open data provided by SORM, FSB intelligence analysts based in Lubyanka 
can determine patterns of interest and relations with family and friends.  What is not 
disclosed to the public is that SORM also collects on “closed systems” as well.  SORM is 
designated into three specific realms: SORM-1 analyzes phone calls, SORM-2 collects on the 
internet, and SORM-3 collects on all other electronic information.  Private information of 
opposition leaders like Nemtsov published by state newspapers could only be collected using 
SORM.  When the “iron ring” was being set up around Sochi to provide security for the 
Olympic Games, SORM was heavily relied upon to find out identities of participants, ticket 
holders, and anyone else in the city.  The extent of collection was so extensive that the U.S. 
government strongly recommended bringing a disposable phone or replacing sim cards upon 
arrival and, at a bare minimum, leaving laptop computers at home while avoiding at all cost 
entering personal information into any network or system.
267
 
One of the most peculiar tools devised in the Kremlin maskirovka campaign has been 
the Kremlin internet “troll”.  In internet terminology, a troll is someone who posts on a blog 
with the sole intention of stoking the passions of the readers of the article, often posting 
information that is as shocking as it is controversial.  For Putin and the Kremlin, trolling is a 
serious high-stakes business, and funding for these trolls is expected to increase by $250 
million annually in the Russian state budget.
268
  Trolls are designed to be equalizers of 
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support in blogosphere dialogue, and they function to support Russia’s “brand”, which 
currently is wildly unpopular internationally according to one of the Kremlin’s internal 
strategy documents.
269
  The Kremlin has created an internet army of trolls that post 
provocative posts on an industrial scale, taking over discussions and rational discourse in the 
process.  The trolls are tasked with a quota of posts per day on heavy-traffic news sites and 
blogospheres like Yahoo, Huffington Post, BBC, CNN, Kyiv Post, and the Moscow Times.  
They post in these groups to take over what is otherwise rational political discourse amongst 
users.  Multiple trolls swarm blogs and take over all discussion by defending the Kremlin’s 
moves and vilifying the Western powers and Ukraine.  They intentionally discredit the 
Euromaiden and the fledgling Ukrainian government by using degrading buzzwords and key 
phrases like calling the protestors “fascists” and the new Kiev government a “junta” that 
came to power in an unconstitutional coup.  They repeat this line over and over again hoping 
that if they repeat it enough the reader will begin to accept it as truth.  Even if the troll is 
caught in a lie, he/she will always fall back on moral equivalence, arguing that for every bad 
thing Russia has done, the United States and Europe have done much worse.  They also 
question where we get our news sources, arguing that Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN are all 
biased and that we need to watch more credible news like RT to get the truth.  They claim in 
broken English that they are former Marines, Oxford lawyers, Stanford medical students, or 
just Americans who disagree with our policy against Russia.  Others will just call discussants 
homosexuals, Nazis, Jews, or something else intended to be derogatory.  As such, a troll 
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cannot lose an argument; they are taught that as well.  For each response a troll receives, 
he/she receives a pay bonus for each comment in a thread that originates from their initial 
post.  Reading the comments brings forth emotional sensations from amusement to anger to 
bewilderment.  One anonymous troll says, “We are trying to change reality.  Reality has 
indeed begun to change as a result of the appearance of our information in public.”
270
   
There are former trolls who have given interviews on the inner workings of what goes 
on inside their offices and how they take part in their “operations”.  Marat Bukhard was 
interviewed by Radio Free Europe, and he admits he is pro-Western, does not believe what 
he writes, and only does it for the money.
271
  He says that despite a few veteran trolls who 
sincerely believe what they type, most of the trolls are just younger people looking to make 
ends meet and are forced to hide their viewpoints lest they be fired.  Bukhard only does it 
because the job pays very well by Russian standards, and is tax-free and paid in cash in an 
attempt to hide the trolls’ footprints.  Bukhard says his daily quota is 135 comments a day 
during a twelve hours shift.  He operates using six Facebook accounts under false names.  
The turnover is very high because of burnout from stress and the hours involved.  The teams 
comprise three people who complement and augment each other to make their numbers look 
even larger and show that they have some support base that represents their point of view.  
He also says that there are “troll factories” all over Russia, and they begin work in 
Vladivostok and end in Kaliningrad so the number of time zones covered is maximized, 
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giving them a twenty-four hour blueprint that is especially valuable for reaching an American 
audience.
272
   
Because of this work’s subject matter and timelines, the internet has been a very 
valuable tool that is necessary to provide up-to-date information on the conflict itself, and I 
have also participated at times in the discussions with the trolls. Understanding this unique 
informational battlefield, and precise connections to the underlying reasons that the Kremlin 
puts so much emphasis on waging such a high-scale offensive on Western media outlets is a 
challenging task.  With the exception of fringe conspiracy theorists, there simply are not 
many Americans, British, or Ukrainian posters taking the Russia Today narrative seriously or 
many who believe what the Russian trolls post on the comments sections of news sites.  
Looking at posting history, it does not seem that they are peeling off any educated American 
or European posters into being coerced into the trolls’ line of argument, namely, that the 
Western media is biased against Russia and engaged in a conspiracy of some sort.  With the 
exception of giving Western news agencies the impression of a sizable demographic being 
offended by a supposedly anti-Russian slant, there does not appear to be any larger or 
coherent strategic purpose or effort, and one has to question why the Kremlin is putting such 
a concerted effort into paying for this harassing disinformation campaign.  Perhaps the 
Russian leadership is trying to sway domestic audiences by discrediting any news outlet that 
is not Russian state media. 
Putinjugind 
 An additional tool for molding what Putin considers to be model citizens takes place 
at the childhood and young adult level with the Nashi.  The Nashi organization is the 





brainchild of Viktor Surkhov, and was a nationalist movement focused on Russia’s youth 
devised to be a counter to the liberal and West-looking Orange Revolution by promoting 
Russian conservative values and an alternative to Western liberalism.  These children, teens, 
and young adults are indoctrinated early to be ardent Kremlin supporters, and membership 
enhances their prospects for getting into a preferred school, university, academy, or a 
desirable job.  The Nashi are “morally Russian”, religiously devout to Russian Orthodoxy, 
encourage buying Russian-made products, maintain Russian cultural values, and most 
importantly are pro-Putin and pro-United Russia.  Critics quip that they are “Putinjugind”, 
which is a snide reference to comparing the Nashi to Nazi Germany’s Hitler Youth.  The first 
recruits were soccer hooligans who supported the country’s large soccer teams like Zenit St. 
Petersburg, Spartak Moscow, Dynamo Moscow, and others, and who have a far-right 
nationalist slant that is anti-immigrant and believe Russian culture is under threat from 
Muslims, homosexuals, and other minorities.  The nashi are made up of a demographic that is 
used to causing trouble and looking for fights, and have been trucked throughout Russia’s 
near-abroad to defend Russian interests to countries like Georgia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
and most recently Ukraine. In 2007, when Estonia removed the Bronze Soldier memorial of 
the Soviet Red Army, the Nashi were there to protest its removal.  Following the Euromaiden 
protests, Nashi were bussed across the border to the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, 
Luhansk, and even as far into Ukrainian territory as Dnipropetrovsk to protest the 
Euromaiden and give the look of a grassroots protest movement similar to the Euromaiden.
273
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The Nashi are designed to be a physical spark so propaganda teams can take over and 
catch instances of ethnic Russians being abused and persecuted in other countries by local 
police forces that are stuck in a zero-sum game of either letting the hooligans trash the city 
neighborhoods in which they are protesting, or clamp down on them and give Russia red 
meat to throw into its well-versed propaganda machine.  Anything that can exacerbate the 
situation further is encouraged.  During the 2007 Estonia protests, a very vulnerable 
demographic was brought to the cause as well; the Mishki, which are younger Nashi 7-15 
years old.  They would sing “I love Russia, I love Putin, Together we will win.”
274
  It 
galvanizes the state-run media outlets in Russia like TASS and RT, and is processed in ways 
that can pull at the emotions of Russian citizens themselves and make them feel like they are 
victims of persecution.  It also validates former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
doctrine of defending ethnic Russians wherever they are.  With the events in Ukraine, we can 
see just how far Putin and the Kremlin are willing to push that doctrine. 
The Kremlin is also very active in deploying Nashi elements in Russia itself when 
they want to send a message to a group or individual.  They are granted protest privileges 
immediately while normal Russian citizens would need to give local authorities such a 
request months in advance to do something similar, and even then they would have to 
confine their activities to a very specific place with a specific number of participants.  In 
many instances, the police help the Nashi mobilize and are already prepared for their 
presence.  If they want to put pressure on individuals who work in Western embassies, they 
will swarm them and shout at them relentlessly that they are undesirables and not welcome in 
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Russia.  One of the Nashi’s greatest success stories was bringing down one of Russia’s most 
prominent dissenting media voices: Kommersant.  Kommersant ran a scathing article on the 
Nashi, and in response the Nashi mobilized at metro stations and began handing out toilet 
paper with the Kommersant logo with the phone number of the editor attached.  The Nashi 
press secretary ordered its operatives to “block their (Kommersant’s) work, psychologically 
and physically pester them.  Revenge is essential.”
275
 
Putin has also insisted that school textbooks emphasize heavily on the positive history 
of Russia rather than the negative.  To accomplish this, Putin established the Commission to 
Prevent Falsification of History in 2009.
276
  These sanitized textbooks tend to absolve Russia 
of any prior atrocities.  For instance, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was necessary for peace, 
Stalin’s purges were required for industrialization and modernization, and the 22,000 Polish 
officers shot in the Katyn Forest were Nazi sympathizers.  For every bad thing Russia has 
done, there is a historical example of something worse than someone else did to absolve 
them.  They also marginalize the participation of Western nations fighting the Nazis and 
blame them for not helping the Soviet Union more or coming to their aid sooner, which 
resulted in many more millions of lives lost.  It is a curriculum that sets up perfect candidates 
to get plugged into the Nashi program.   
The Masquerade of Democracy 
 When discussing maskirovka being utilized domestically, it is important to discuss 
the political masquerade that has taken place in the Russian Federation ever since Putin came 
to power.  The political structure in Russia itself is a carefully orchestrated example of 
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maskirovka.  Putin’s United Russia has gotten away with turning the Duma into a rubber-
stamp institution with no teeth.  United Russian officials buy their way onto ballots and must 
pass tests of loyalty before being named to the party ballot.  That official will benefit from 
the aid of seeing ballots stuffed in his or her favor to gain a seat at the local government level 
or the Duma.  Any sincere opposition parties that rise from the grassroots are quickly 
identified by Surkov and his political operatives and dealt with in one of three ways: They 
are either quashed from existence, are undermined to look like a fringe lunatic element, or 
adopted as an official “opposition party” that loses its root purpose and becomes nothing 
more than United Russia with minimal slanted political differences that mean nothing in the 
grant scheme of keeping Putin and the Kremlin firmly in control of the country’s political 
discourse.  On Election Day, ballot boxes are stuffed and voters are bussed to different ballot 
boxes around the city to inflate numbers even further to add to the democratic sham that the 
Kremlin pushes on its people.  Pomerantsev states that, “the brilliance of this new type of 
authoritarianism is that instead of simply oppressing opposition, as had been the case of 
twentieth century strains, it climbed inside ideologies and movements, exploiting them and 
rendering them absurd.  The Kremlin idea is to own all forms of political discourse, to not let 
any independent movements develop outside its walls.”
277
  This is of course done through 
Vladislav Surkov.  Finally, there is nothing a few titushki or Nashi cannot do to quiet the 
opposition with a baton or even a gun-shot.  The domestic dissent is repressed one way or 
another.  These tools of fear and manipulation on the domestic front keep the citizens of the 
Russian Federation in a combined state of apathy and fear.  In summing up these measures, 
Van Herpen states, “The regime needs enemies of the people to absorb aggression that is 
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building up in a society where there exists no independent judiciary, where political freedoms 
have become a farce, political parties are created by the Kremlin, elections are stolen, and 
journalists and human rights activists are regularly murdered.”
278
 
Maskirovka Against the EU 
Not only is the Kremlin utilizing maskirovka for defensive purposes, but it also 
maneuvers offensively to sway European governments by giving far-right political parties 
sizable donations to gain influence in Western Europe.  The Kremlin seeks to create fractures 
in political and diplomatic bulwarks, and hammers at them relentlessly once they are 
identified.  The effort has often been successful, and Russia has given legitimacy to fringe 
parties in Europe that previously had small levels of influence.  Many of them are extremely 
anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant and hold traditional values in high regard.  They will resort 
to violent means to get their political points across.  In Hungary, the Jobbik Party has grown 
from a fringe element to the country’s third-largest political party.  Hungary’s President 
Viktor Orban is also believed to have received lucrative donations from the Kremlin in his 
rise to power and has been one of Russia’s strongest supporters in Europe.  In the United 
Kingdom, the UK Independence Party doubled its Parliament representation in the most 
recent elections.  France’s National Front Party, headed by firebrand Marine Le Pen has also 
done extraordinarily well in French elections with the help of a nice pay bumper of forty 
million Euros from the Kremlin.  Many French political strategists have been particularly 
frightened by the National Front’s quick rise to influence, especially with how many French 
citizens have become jaded with many of the more traditional political parties who they view 
as unable to get anything done.  Germany’s National Democratic Party, Italy’s Lega Nord, 
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Austria’s Freedom Party, Greece’s Golden Dawn, and Bulgaria’s Attack Party have also 
received lucrative payments from the Kremlin to promote Russian interests in Europe in 
hopes of chipping away at the unity of the European Union and NATO.  The Kremlin has 
also funded secessionist movements in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque region, and even 
Texas.  It is a very effective ploy of divide-and-conquer, and the neutral observer can already 
see nations like Germany, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and France faltering in their commitment to 
sanctions partially due to the internal democratic processes of these countries that have seen 
politicians bought and paid for by the Kremlin.
279
  European society does have sincere 
concerns about social issues like uncontrolled immigration, radical Islam, economic 
stagnation, crippling debt of some member nations, and the marginalizing of their culture, but 
the Kremlin has been all too happy to throw additional wood into the fire below the cauldron 
of Europe to make the stew that is European politics even more volatile than it would be 
without Russian influence.   
This serves to not only fulfill Russia’s diplomatic strategies, but its social strategies as 
well in being a bastion of pure Russian Orthodox society that stands up for decency and 
conservatism.  Progressive Europe is easily vilified, and the Russian media highlights 
everything from cross-dressing Conchita Wurst winning the Eurovision awards to The 
United States legalizing gay marriage as representative of the weakening and ultimate 
downfall of Europe.  When punk bands like Pussy Riot dance on the stairs of the Church of 
Christ the Savior in Moscow, it paints an easy crosshair on the “deviants” of society, like 
homosexuals and political dissidents, while making the case that Russia is in need of social 
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discipline, and that only Putin can maintain that discipline.  This appeals to far-right groups 
in Europe who are equally disgusted by European progressivism and want to roll back what 
they see as years of the weakening and decline of society.  Putin can be that symbol of 
traditionalism and conservatism that they crave, and he is all too willing to give them that 
persona.  Russia is now the flagship of European conservatism, and this makes disaffected 
Europeans ripe for manipulation and being what Lenin would call “useful idiots” in a bigger 
grand-strategic game.   
Other Forms of Domestic Maskirovka 
The Kremlin has not hesitated using maskirovka against Western diplomats either, 
making former United States Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul such a target.  The 
night following his introduction at the Kremlin, McFaul was attacked viciously on Channel 
One by conservative correspondent Mikhail Leontiev.  Like any effective propagandist, 
Leontiev had artfully woven the true and the half-preposterous into a fabric of lurid colors.  
He blasted McFaul as an expert on democracy promotion who knew nothing about Russia 
and worked for American-backed NGOs who were backed by American intelligence and 
“internet Führer Alexei Navalny.”
280
  Leontiev also concluded that McFaul was there to 
finish the revolution with the help of the fifth column.  This lambasting worked perfectly 
because McFaul was vilified not just in Russia, but his employers in the U.S. and in other 
diplomatic loops perceived that he was wrecking Russian-American relations.   
Talking points like ISIS and Islamic terrorism are constructive for clamping down on 
Caucasian and Central Asian minorities and stoking xenophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Pan-
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Slavism.  Putin and his allies use the American war on terror when they see it fitting their 
script but are happy to point out the Iraq and Afghanistan wars when it threatens their 
interests in a place like Syria.  Media anchors will foam at the mouth saying that Russian jobs 
are being taken away by Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kazakhs, but do not mention that Slavic 
Russians would never take the jobs shoveling the streets or rooftops.  Their favorite posture 
of deflection is all-consuming anti-Americanism.  Bobo Lo says “in adopting anti-
Americanism as a tool to claw back lost authority, Putin has acted in tradition of previous 
rulers, such as Nicholas II, Lenin, and Stalin who exploited the idea of a Russia besieged by 
enemies abroad and traitors within.”
281
  They’ll also conjure the constant specter of 
Caucasian terrorism that could hit at any moment.  Anything that can be used as a distraction 
to look away from problems at home is fair game. 
One of the more peculiar and infamous pieces of legislation ratified by the Duma and 
authorized by president Putin is that any NGOs that receive foreign aid from adversarial 
nations are forced to register as “foreign agents”.  Putin sincerely believes these NGOs to be 
forms of soft power and thus established this countermeasure to negate their effectiveness.  
This stigma is applied to all organizations the Kremlin accuses of acting against the interests 
of the Russian Federation, from adoption agencies to those that promote democracy and 
human rights.  The most hostile of these designations, reserved for particularly troublesome 
organizations, is “aggressor state.”
282
  This legislation banished CNN from Russia at the end 
of 2014.  Like most Russian legislation, the definition of what constitutes a foreign agent or 
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an aggressor state is vague so legislation can be applied whenever it is politically convenient.  
This was the case when Putin was looking for a scapegoat to blame for the protests in 
Moscow when he was re-elected to power for a third term following Medvedev’s brief 
presidency.  He blamed the organization responsible for a Georgian politician’s rally, which 
had itself received funding from Hillary Clinton using a NGO.  It sounds completely absurd, 
but it tugs at the nationalist strings of the Russian people that the Kremlin so heavily depends 















MASKIROVKA IN UKRAINE: CRIMEA AND THE DONBAS 
There can be no doubt that the Kremlin was completely responsible for all actions 
taken in Crimea during the Euromaiden crisis.  Strategically, the situation was spiraling to an 
unacceptable crisis in what the Kremlin considers to be its “near abroad”, which consists of 
all of the former republics of the Soviet Union.  Of all of the former Soviet republics, there is 
none that holds the high priority and historical significance to Russia that Ukraine does (at 
least in the minds of the Russians themselves).  The Kremlin went to work immediately to 
take what advantage they could of the crisis in Ukraine, and while the world watched the 
winter Olympics in Sochi, Putin gave the order early on the morning of February 27, 2014 to 
take the necessary steps to secure and occupy the Crimean peninsula.
283
  If the leadership in 
the Kremlin was going to lose its ability to influence Ukraine, Putin and his crew were at 
least going to take Crimea as a consolation prize.   
Maskirovka in Crimea 
Early on the morning of February 27, unidentified men began taking control of 
critical nodes in Crimea, starting with the Black Sea Fleet home port, Sevastopol, then the 
Sevastopol and Simferopol airports.  Administration buildings were stormed by angry 
“locals” and commandeered to form an impromptu government organization.  Ukrainian 
naval vessels were commandeered, and Ukrainian military facilities were surrounded while 
Ukrainian military commanders waited for orders from higher in their chain for direction that 
never came.  Russian troops and intelligence operatives encouraged the local populace to 
participate given that there were many people in Crimea who were not only against what was 
happening in Kiev, but also potentially in favor of rejoining Russia.  The “militants of 
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unknown origin” (in actuality Russian troops) seemed to come from nowhere overnight, and 
journalists identified them as “little green men” because no one knew where they came from.  
They wore no insignia and displayed no formal indicators of country of origin, but wore the 
type of camouflage uniforms that the regular Russian military wore and tied white rope 
around their arms, obviously meant to indicate to each operative that they were authentic 
members of the operating team.  The little green men were obviously not the ragtag bunch of 
local militia that Russian media was making them out to be.  The men in the airport videos 
and news feeds moved with tactical fluidity that was designed for urban warfare and taking 
buildings one by one, marking corners and posting up in ideally situated positions; skills and 
insights that would have taken weeks at a bare minimum to learn efficiently.  The way that 
these unknown operatives carried their weapons and their muzzle security were other notable 
marks of professionals.  The equipment utilized was uniform and the latest in Russian 
technology, including tactical radios, the VSS Vintorez assault rifle that puts priority on 
silence over accuracy, and Ratnik camouflage that only recently became available to the 
Russian military.
284
  Most symbolically of all, the little green men carried with them a calling 
card that is used extensively by only one special-forces group in the world; the 92SF Cold 
Steel Shovel that functions as an additional appendage of the Russian Spetsnaz operatives.   
GRU: The Favorite Intelligence Tool of Controlled Instability 
There is one intelligence organization in the Russian intelligence community that 
bears the unquestionable signature of direct involvement and participation in the annexation 
of Crimea: the GRU.  It deserves special discussion in the Ukrainian conflict because the 
GRU has been the Russian intelligence organization at the forefront of the maskirovka 
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campaign from the annexation of Crimea, to the current crisis playing out in Donbass, and 
now in the attempts at destabilization in Odessa and Kharkiv.  The GRU is the bulldog of the 
Russian intelligence community and has no comparable equal in the United States or the 
West. The GRU was responsible for utilizing Spetsnaz, mercenaries, the Chechen Vostok 
Brigade, paratroopers, and their own civilian assets to achieve the necessary tactical and 
operational objectives asked of them.  Its primary purpose is to foster instability and establish 
Russian interests where they are deployed.  The GRU is active in Russia’s “near abroad”, and 
Crimea is already their backyard.  It is as close to a domestic operating environment as one 
can get.  The talents and mission of the GRU fit the task of “controlled instability” like a 
glove.  The agency is a crossover between Russian military intelligence and the lettered 
civilian intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.  As such, it fosters something 
approaching a seamless fluidity of the whole intelligence process so that both the military 
and intelligence communities are on the same page and able to execute their mission with 
optimal efficiency and effectiveness.  Ironically, prior to the crises in Crimea, Donetsk, and 
Luhansk, the GRU was quickly falling out of favor in the upper levels of Kremlin leadership 
and was perilously close to losing its status as a Main Intelligence Directorate.  Russian 
leadership was highly critical of its performance in Chechnya, and seriously pondered its 
relevance to the Russian intelligence community.  
  Crimea was the breath of life that the GRU needed to regain its bearing and morale.  
It was the ideal operating environment.  GRU operatives could meld seamlessly with a 
sizable and sympathetic Russian-speaking population and move with much less effort than 
they would even in a place like Chechnya.  It would be easy to foster an environment of 
unrest by simply recruiting a few guys at a bar who would be excited at the prospect of 
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starting a rebellion and moving the Crimea back into Russia.  Multiply this by pro-Russian 
Crimeans at every bar and hot spot in Sevastopol and Simferopol, and one quickly arrives at 
the numbers required to recruit and field an imposing protesting force.  There were already 
plenty of anti-Kiev attitudes on the peninsula in the first place even if was not nearly as one-
sided as Kremlin propagandists would have media consumers believe, and it just needed the 
GRU to tip the first domino forward for the rest of the developments to fall into place.  
Critical nodes of the city were identified for tactical purposes that would have operational 
implications and allow the large numbers of Russian troops deploying into the Crimea to 
have maximum freedom of movement and action.  The Russians were also mindful of the 
fact that the peninsula has two chokepoints with mainland Ukraine that can be easily 
defended from any mainland force, and that only a small force would have been necessary to 
fortify those ingress/egress routes.  Without the GRU, the annexation of Crimea would have 
been an exponentially more daunting task for Putin and the Kremlin.   
Gerasimov’s Handiwork 
There was something truly unique about the role of the GRU and Spetsnaz in Crimea.  
They spread their customary chaos and confusion, but there were no gunshots or explosions.  
Crimea needed to be treated differently than Chechnya and Georgia.  In the minds of Russian 
intelligence and military leaders, these people were Russian citizens who needed to be 
liberated.  These were not enemies that they would be engaging with in Crimea, but 
compatriots, and that mindset needed a tactical adjustment that the GRU has traditionally not 
utilized: winning “hearts and minds” as well as keeping order and peace.  Soldiers constantly 
assured the locals that they were not there to hurt them, but to help them and keep them safe.  
They took extra care to comfort and assure the people that they were friendly, which no 
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doubt was extensively trained as well because it is so far out of the element of the traditional 
GRU and Spetsnaz roles of killing adversaries and causing extensive damage.
285
 
Gerasimov was largely responsible for getting his officers and enlisted personnel 
mentally prepared for the daunting task, and this was crucial for Russia’s success at the 
operational level of warfare.  In the weeks of the buildup, Russian officers made watching 
the events taking place in Ukraine mandatory evening viewing for their enlisted personnel.  
The media portrayed the Crimeans and eastern Ukrainians as victims of strife caused by the 
Euromaiden riots.  Bearing the signature of Russian OPSEC dating back to World War II, all 
but the most senior officers involved in the operation were completely oblivious of the details 
until their deployment and mission execution.
286
  In fact, many of the operatives who were 
charged with securing Sevastopol had no idea where they were being deployed; just that they 
were being deployed.  In total, up to 30,000 Russian troops were mobilized and inserted onto 
the peninsula either in Sevastopol on the Western side or across the Kerch Strait on the 
eastern side.  It was just enough cover to get away with the Status of Forces Agreement that 
was agreed with Ukraine that stated Russia could station as many as 25,000 soldiers on the 
peninsula.
287
  It takes an impressive mobility effort and a seamless set of operational-level 
orders to follow to put that sort of deployment together successfully, let alone as quietly as 
did the Russians.  It shows just how seriously the Russians take their OPSEC guidelines and 
procedures.  They knew exactly where to go, who to “disappear”, and what critical nodes to 
target for maximum effect.  
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From any standpoint, the annexation of Crimea was a resounding success.  To quote 
NATO four-star General Philip M. Breedlove, the invasion of Crimea was a military and 
intelligence masterpiece.
288
  Everything from the diplomatic, military, and intelligence 
operations was the epitome of the doctrine of maskirovka and the effective implementation 
of all intelligence and operational concepts.  It was not just the Ukrainians who were left 
confused and disoriented by the annexation, but NATO was as well.  An entire army of 
thousands was able to conceal its intentions, skirt a status-of-forces agreement, and target 
critical nodes on the peninsula without losing a single soldier or cause a single loss of life 
among the adversary or civilian populace (there have been targeted disappearances of 
political dissidents by the FSB, but no shots in open conflict).  Every policy-maker and 
commander in the Western hemisphere knew that they were caught unprepared for the 
Crimean operation, but they were equally unprepared regarding how to mount an effective 
response to protect Ukrainian sovereignty or to condemn Russia.
289
   
The Decorated Little Green Men 
Russia unequivocally denies that it used its troops to annex the Crimean peninsula, 
but the evidence of involvement of Russian military and intelligence forces is overwhelming.  
In fact, Russian leaders awarded decorations to the military and intelligence personnel who 
took part in the annexation.  Oleg Teryushin, a Russian paratrooper interviewed about being 
awarded a decoration “for returning Crimea,” says it will be a nice story that he can tell his 
kids one day, but it will be of little use for getting him into the university that he wants.  He 
says that his commanders kept silent until the last moment. His commanders told him told 
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him and his comrades to remove all symbols and insignia from their uniforms.  They were 
given green balaclavas and dark sunglasses to conceal their identities, and white ribbons to 
tie on their sleeves to indicate they were all on the same side.  The white ribbons would be 
switched each day to different arms and legs to ensure authentication.  Oleg also says that his 
unit was thoroughly drilled to tell Crimeans that they were there to help them and not to harm 
them.  Oleg also says the journalists were aggressive, and they were trained and prepared for 
that too.  He believes he was one of the first to land in Crimea when he arrived in Sevastopol 
on February 24.  He left on April 12 and received his citation in May.  Oleg says 
commanders made their troops watch the Ukrainian riots each evening to fuel disgust and 
boost patriotism.  Alexei Karuna, a sailor in the Russian Navy, also agreed to give his 
account of Russia’s participation in the annexation.  He estimates that there were 15,000 
Russian military members stationed at the Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol.  There were 
another 20,000 reinforcements and special-forces troops already dispersed in the peninsula 
(which exceeded the agreed status-of-forces agreement numbers by 10,000).  After Alexei 
received his citation, his commander joked that he would call him again when the time came 
to reclaim the rest of the Soviet Union. The 11th and 83rd assault brigades as well as the 38th 
communications regiment received decorations for their involvement in Crimea.
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If At First It Succeeds, Do It Again 
 Even more stunning was the Kremlin using the exact same ploy in the Donbass region 
with an equally unimpressive response from NATO and Western diplomats.  It was clear that 
the Ukrainian military was going to war, and it was not a mere separatist rebellion against 
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which they were pitted.  Trained members of Russia’s military like the GRU, Spetsnaz, 
paratroopers, mercenaries, Cossacks, and various other skilled groups that had comprised the 
force structure of the “little green men” in the Crimea began a slow creep across the border 
around 20-22 August 2014.   Russia was already using the GRU to foster instability in other 
regions of Ukraine, and was successful in implementing an “astroturf” independence 
movement in Ukraine’s easternmost provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk.  Putin and his 
diplomatic team added fuel to the fire by bringing a dangerous historical identifier into play, 
describing the areas of upheaval as Novorossiya (New Russia).  This was done intentionally 
to provide a pretext that there is historical justification for Russian intervention in this swath 
of south and eastern Ukraine that includes Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, and stretches all 
the way to the border of Transdnistria on the eastern Moldovan border.  By constantly 
bringing up Novorossiya on the international stage, Putin again created the pretext that 
Russia lost something with deep historical roots in the USSR and Tsarist Russia before that, 
and that the Kremlin is merely correcting that historical injustice by attempting to bring the 
area back under Russian control and protect the ethnic Russians residing there.  If the whole 
of Novorossiya were ever taken, it would be more than half of Ukraine’s current international 
boundaries and make the country completely landlocked.  Russian media has been showing 
maps of Novorossiya, and has given the separatists a flag and a cause for which to fight.  
Novorossiya has been a valuable recruiting tool that appeals to the Russian public, produces 
volunteers to go to the front, and makes separatist leaders optimistic that their goal of joining 
the Russian Federation will eventually be achieved.
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It is easy to look at the strategic implications for Crimea when the Kremlin opened up 
this additional battlefront.  When looking strategically at what the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
means for the Crimea, the opening of hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk also serves a 
purpose in legitimizing Russian control of Crimea.  It puts the impetus of a crisis that is 
happening “here and now” not just on the new Ukrainian government, but the EU and United 
States as well.  Using “little green men” tactics in Donbass and creating a frozen conflict 
inherently puts Crimea on the backburner and gives more credibility to the annexation’s 
legitimacy.  If the Kremlin permanently posts tens of thousands of troops on the eastern 
Ukrainian border as a constant threat, it keeps the international community on edge.  In fact, 
the Crimea has quickly become an afterthought as Western leaders fruitlessly try to defuse 
the situation in the Donbass region.   
 Using troop movements to mask intentions and confuse the enemy is a clinical 
example of maskirovka, and one that the Russians have mastered in keeping Ukraine and 
NATO guessing throughout the conflict.  While manipulating the conflict inside of Ukraine, 
the Kremlin has constantly raised the specter of drawing a wider conflict by bringing in 
hundreds of troops for drills and posting them on the eastern side of the border as well as 
Belgorod, which is less than 50 miles from the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.  Ukraine and 
NATO analysts put the numbers at approximately 40,000 troops, and the number of BTGs 
(battalion tactical groups) stretched along the border since the opening of hostilities in 
Crimea has been between ten and thirteen.
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  In mid-March 2014, troops were brought in to 
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participate in armored convoy tactics, live-fire artillery exercises, and unconventional 
warfare exercises in numbers much higher than what would constitute routine exercises in 
the area.  This was done to send a message to Ukraine that the Kremlin will constantly have a 
gun to its neighbor’s head and to provide a firm stance with a Ukrainian government that 
they see as illegitimate and that they want to fail.  Russian diplomats like Sergei Lavrov 
constantly preached that there was nothing to worry about, insisting that anyone who 
sounded alarms was just trying to stoke fear. The drills have been constant, and the guise of 
drills has also made the transfer of weapons and armor to the DPR and LPR separatists much 
easier in the process.   
With Ukraine, the stakes are exceptionally high for Putin, and as a result he continues 
to throw the full weight of his disinformation campaign behind it.  This is recognized by 
Ukrainian Interior Minister Argen Avakov, who warned “the information war that they are 
waging against us is more dangerous than a bullet”.
293
  When discussing Ukraine, it is crucial 
for the Kremlin to portray its “positive” leadership role and at the same time vilify the newly-
elected Ukrainian government and the West using instances in history that pull the Russian 
people’s nationalist strings.  In terms of modern history, there is no more important rallying 
point than World War II and how the Red Army defeated the Nazis at the cost of over twenty 
million Russians killed.  To do this, the media brings out the “nuclear option” in using 
terminology reserved only for the most hated villains in modern Russian history, and does 
not hesitate comparing the Ukrainians who took part in the Euromaiden protests as Nazis and 
Nazi sympathizers who are threatening ethnic Russians and their way of life.   
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The level of fabrication being used to describe the Ukrainian villains holds no 
bounds.  One of the most controversial uses of disinformation and stoking hatred by a news 
organization was the interview of a woman in Slovyansk who told of a three-year-old boy 
being crucified by the Ukrainian military.  The woman, who gives her first name as Galina, 
states to the Russian media outlet, “one man nailed him while two others held him.  All of 
this happened before his mother’s eyes.  Then they took the mother.  The mother saw how 
the child bled.  The child cried and screamed; people fainted.  When the child was dead after 
having agonized for half an hour, they took the mother, tied her unconscious to a tank, and 
drove three times around the square.  Each circuit of the square was one kilometer.”
294
  This 
was completely fabricated, but Russians did not bat an eye when they heard it.  The media 
also portray the “humanitarian” convoys as a heroic gesture that shows the Russian 
Federation’s willingness to move quickly and not wait on United Nations or European Union 
red tape to help those in need.  When television, radio, and news announcers constantly push 
these stories on consumers, it becomes easier to control them and tell them who to vent their 
anger on whether Ukrainians, or the EU, or some other party.  Even when a story is 
completely fabricated, maskirovka puts the impetus of disproving the information on 
Westerners and Ukrainians.  It is even more difficult for them to expose the Russian public 
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 For all of the successes that the Russian intelligence and military have had, there were 
still faults in their execution.  The first obvious hint that locals and Ukrainian journalists 
picked up on immediately were regional dialects that were not Ukrainian.  Much like 
someone in England can differentiate an English regional dialect from Newcastle in the 
northeast, Liverpool in the northwest, or Plymouth in the southwest, a Russian speaker can 
instantly identify a regional dialect from Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Siberia and 
unmistakably pinpoint where that person is originally from.  There is not much that the 
operatives could have done to mask that.  The other two OPSEC breaches were preventable.  
The advent of social media has been a thorn in the side of commanders preaching OPSEC 
since its creation.  The ISAF and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan had countless 
breaches of OPSEC involving the posting and geotagging their exact locations on social 
media sites like Facebook.  The Russian military was no different in this regard, and on the 
highly popular Russian social networking site Vkontakte, operatives posted where they were 
during this time and the geotagging data is unmistakable.  To put the issue beyond dispute, 
some of the little green men just went out and admitted on camera to journalists that they 
were from Russia.  To the native speaker, the difference between the little green men and the 
locals was obvious.  Realistically, these were probably anticipated as information-related 
collateral damage prior to the conflict.  However much commanders may preach OPSEC, it 
would be unrealistic to expect so many soldiers to keep their mouths quiet in such a large-
scale operation no matter how much training they had.  Despite these lapses in OPSEC, the 
commanders and policy makers involved likely weighed these possibilities in the buildup.  In 




The maskirovka narrative that Russia has been pushing in Ukraine has been 
relentless, but the shroud of disinformation that is cast on this effort has weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of its own, and it is extremely important that Western nations call out the 
disinformation when they can.  In all of the narratives put forth by Kremlin spokesmen and 
state-run media, there have been holes in the stories that should be exploited.  One of the 
most important took place when MH17 was shot down, and the previous chapter discussed in 
detail the eyewitness accounts of the use of the BUK missile system.  The shooting down of 
the aircraft was a disaster for the image of Russia’s role in the conflict, and Russian leaders 
kicked their maskirovka campaign into overdrive to attempt to deflect blame in responsibility 
for shooting down the passenger jet.  Russian-state media claimed to have received 
unprecedented eyewitness account that proved the aircraft was downed by a Ukrainian SU-25 
Frogfoot whose pilot thought he was targeting Putin’s private jet.  This would require being 
able to see a fighter-jet-sized aircraft operating at fifteen thousand feet above sea level at the 
same altitude where MH17 was flying.  That is not a call that could be made by anyone from 
a view on the ground, and it is clearly a fabricated account.
295
 
 The most damnable evidence has been presented by British imagery analyst Elliot 
Huggins, who has no formal military training in the career field but is self-taught and has a 
very thorough understanding of methods taught in the field like point mensuration and 
utilization of reference imagery.  Imagery analysis is a clinical intelligence tool that can be 
used to prove or disprove activity in an area at a given time.  Some of the images that the 
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Kremlin used in their defense were taken weeks prior to the crash.
296
  Huggins explains that 
commercial imagery from the date imaged on the crash that there were puddles around the 
crash site.  In the Russian images, there were no puddles or freshly disturbed earth from 
vehicle tracks.  Huggins also concluded that those images were likely taken around June, 
because other commercial imagery taken in June showed no puddles or freshly disturbed 
earth from vehicle tracks in the area imaged.
297
  Compounding these signatures, the 
“Malaysian Airlines” emblem was on the wrong area of the aircraft and the wrong type of 
Boeing was used.  There were so many holes in the narrative, but a disappointing lack of 
pushback from both the United States and Europe to disprove it, saying the responsible thing 
to do would be to wait for the Dutch-led investigation to produce conclusive findings. 
Even if the imagery analysis is not thorough enough, the metadata footprint itself puts 
the fabrication beyond doubt.  Simply by looking at commercial reference imagery, and the 
date and time that a satellite photo is taken, the Russian photos that were presented as 
evidence were doctored with Adobe Photoshop, and it is very easy to see this because the 
metadata that was used in the original commercial imagery was digitally altered.
298
  The 
metadata are unmistakable fingerprints written in binary code, and any image can be traced 
to these fingerprints.  It is very easy to tell from that binary code alone when an image has 
been altered or not simply by looking at the pattern of “1” and “0” left by the saved image 
itself.  The Kremlin used this doctored imagery a mere four days after the crash had taken 
place.  This digital blueprint is perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence for anyone 
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wishing to disprove Russian’s fabrication.  Where Russia boasts of MH17 imagery 
authenticity, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov laughed off the NATO provided 
imagery as “just images from computer games.”
299
 
 Connecting the Russian military to the use of the BUK missile system is even easier 
based on the fact that there is no way a common Donbass separatist could have learned how 
to use a system as complex as a BUK, nor was the BUK in the Ukrainian arsenal in the first 
place.  Ukrainian Prime Minister Arsiney Yatsenyuk explains by saying “drunken guerillas 
cannot manage this system.  They need to work in cooperation with another radar that we 
don’t have in Ukrainian territory.  It strains credulity to think that it could used by separatists 
without at least some measure of Russian support and technical assistance.”
300
  The BUK 
launcher itself would have taken weeks of training to be able to operate effectively because 
of the complexity of the weapons system.  The BUK launcher is a key component to the 
Dutch investigation, and that research is currently ongoing, but ballistic forensic experts from 
several countries have already ruled out the possibility of an air-to-air missile or even its 
potential to be confused with a surface-to-air missile.  These insights augment the 
overwhelming evidence that is already available through open-source means. 
Additional imagery products provide ample evidence of Russian involvement in 
eastern Ukraine.  Tanks seen in Rostov, Russia and Novoazovsk, Ukraine that have the exact 
same camouflage blots were photographed at each location.  No Russian camouflage is ever 
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  On July 17, a video was posted on You Tube of MRLs (multiple rocket 
launchers) firing from a point of origin that appears to be Gukovo, Russia, based on buildings 
of similar height, color, and dimensions in COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) imagery.  
Ground scarring from artillery was identified at that exact location days later.
302
  Eyewitness 
accounts from Russian civilians from Gukovo further validated this event.  From high-
altitude imagery, T-72B3s, Kamaz-43629 Dozers, SA-22s, and ZB26 Grad Launchers that 
have never been exported have been identified conclusively in Donbass.  Russian artillery 
has also been shelling across the Ukrainian border, and the Atlantic Council has provided 
very detailed imagery that illustrates the direct tie between impact craters in Ukraine and the 
points of friction left by heavy artillery on the Russian side of the border.  The crater impact 
points themselves provide rudimentary direction and distance information, and the ground 
scarring caused by the firing of artillery on the Russian side shows the artillery pieces were 
pointed at eastern Ukraine.
303
   
“There Are No Russian Military Personnel in Ukraine” 
 There is no bigger hole in the Kremlin narrative than the assertion that there are no 
Russian soldiers in Ukraine.  The Ukrainian government has been working very hard to 
continuously publicize the extent of Russian involvement in their country.  According to 
Viktor Muzhenko, the Ukrainian Army Chief of Staff, the Russian army’s 15th mechanized 
infantry brigade, 8th mechanical infantry brigade, 331st airborne regiment, and 98th airborne 
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regiment are currently operating in Ukraine.
304
  Muzhenko also says, “We have the details of 
Russian units, where they are deployed, their numbers, and their weapons”.
305
  There have 
been countless instances from brave journalists and the Mothers of Soldiers Committee of 
servicemen wounded and killed in eastern Ukraine evidenced by graves, families making 
memorial posts of their dead sons on Vkontakte, and official letters from the Russian 
Defense ministry of a suspiciously high number of Russian soldiers dying in live-fire training 
accidents in Rostov.  When Russian military members get sent to Rostov for “training 
exercises”, they know exactly what it means, and not all of them come home. Russian 
conscripts, who are constantly bullied and hazed by career military members, are called 
traitors and cowards and threatened with prison by commanders if they do not “volunteer” 
for the campaign in eastern Ukraine.  As flimsy as Russian military law is, conscripts are not 
allowed to serve abroad according to Russian law, so they are forced to sign military 
contracts to authorize their movement across the border.  Even more hypocritical, Russian 
military members are not allowed to take leave to fight in an armed conflict without their 
commander, the FSB, and even the Defense minister signing that authorization.
306
  Ironically, 
this is exactly the narrative the Kremlin is forwarding to its public; namely, that it is 
following all of these laws and procedures when in fact it is violating every one of them.  
Furthermore, DPR president Zakharchenko says “We have Russian soldiers here who would 
rather spend their holidays not on the beach but fighting for freedom with their brothers.”
307
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When their contracts are fulfilled, they often find upon return that they must serve another 
three years in the Russian military, a fact unbeknownst to most of the conscripts.  There have 
been pictures taken by OSCE observers of trucks labelled “Cargo 200” (the marking of 
vehicles carrying deceased bodies) crossing to and from the Russian border from the conflict 
zone, and in June there were reports of mobile crematories being brought to the Donbass for 
the purpose of destroying evidence of any dead Russian soldiers, intelligence operatives, or 
mercenaries.
308
  There are also organizations in the Russian Federation that have been active 
in enlisting contractors and mercenaries in the fight for eastern Ukraine.   
 Many of these men are former Spetsnaz and paratroopers and their experience in the 
fight is extremely valuable, while others are volunteers with no military background.  
Recruiting organizations for the conflict accept virtually everyone.  One recruiter is Vladimir 
Yefimov, a retired Spetsnaz officer and head of the Sverdlovsk Oblask Fund for Special 
Forces Veterans, organizes army veterans and volunteers to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
309
  
Yefimov says that some of the men who volunteer go for adventure, and some are idealists 
who want to stop the brutality of the “Ukrainian fascists” and help people who are unable to 
defend themselves.  He says even addicts would come to his office in hopes of recruitment 
and that the rush of war may be able to scare them clean (heroin usage is very heavy in 
Yekaterinburg). Yefimov proudly boasts that he has sent 250 men to the front since the war 
started, and that salaries start from $1,000 to $4,000 per month depending on prior rank and 
the skill sets each man can provide.  Men with no military experience start at $1,500 per 
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month, former enlisted at $2,600 per month and officers at $4,000.  Yefimov would not say 
where the funds for his operation came from.  Men with prior military experience go to 
Donetsk and the others head to Luhansk and get paid less.  He says that the first men were 
sent in the humanitarian convoys discussed in the previous chapter, and that they sign 
contracts to provide “humanitarian assistance” to the Donbass, which he chuckles about as he 
says it.
310
  His final warning is that if they are killed in action they will not likely be returned 
to Russia.  Rather, it will be disposed of on-site and their families may never hear what 
happened to them. 
 The DPR and LPR Leadership has been another source of embarrassing 
contradictions for Russia’s narrative.  DPR leadership has towed the usual line, saying that a 
Nazi junta was responsible for the Euromaiden riots, then saying the upper echelons of the 
Rada are now run by Jews, which is considered a demeaning slander in many Slavic 
countries in Eastern Europe.  Of course, the argument that the Rada is a Nazi junta run by 
Jews makes no ideological sense whatsoever and is by definition impossible.  Moreover, the 
most key participants in the DPR and LPR during their time of formation were Russian: 
Arseniy Pavlov who leads the Spartan Battalion, Sergey Petrovsky who has worked in 
Russian intelligence, Igor “Strelkov” who was a former FSB colonel, Igor Besler, Alexandr 
Zhuchovsky, Aleksey Milchakov, Leonid Simonin, and Pavel Karpov have all been affiliated 
with the Kremlin at one time or another.
311
   
 Supplying weaponry has been equally creative through methods of maskirovka.  The 
humanitarian convoys have already been mentioned as methods of supply to the DPR and 
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LPR.  Major General Gordon Davis called the first convoy “a wonderful example of 
maskirovka.”  The Russian Orthodox Church has also sent coffins filled with weapons to the 
front
312
.  When a checkpoint guard in Krasny Luch was asked if anyone has been supplying 
them, he said “Yes, our brothers are supplying us.  You know who.”
313
  Another fighter 




“Let Me Repeat: There Are No Russian Military Personnel In Ukraine” 
 There are multitudes of detailed examples of Russian soldiers being buried with 
military honors following involvement in Ukraine.  Burials occur early in the morning and 
services are rapid in order to avoid causing a scene that might alert the opposition.  The 
godmother of Pavel Zhilin, a paratrooper of the 331st airborne regiment, was given a 
deceased body that was not Pavel’s.  Inside the coffin was a headless body with a shoe size 
three sizes smaller than Pavel’s.
315
  In another instance, activists Ruslan Leviev and Vadim 
Korovin from Moscow identified fresh graves from Anton Savelyev in the Tambov Oblast 
from the 16th special operations brigade.  A video was taken with freshly disturbed dirt, a 
photo of Anton in military uniform, and flowers with a wreath that read “to the defender of 
the Fatherland, from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”.  They took videos 
of what they saw because they said, “we want to show society that the defense ministry is 
literally abandoning its own troops and disavowing them like this.  We are showing society 
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the consequences of war.  This is our response to the Russian propaganda that there are no 
Russian troops in Ukraine.”
316
 On May 4 2015, Timur Mamayusopov of Tartarstan and Ivan 
Karapolov of the Kurgonsk oblast were reported killed in Ukraine.  Ukraine journalists back 
this up saying there was an engagement on May 4 with eight Russian soldiers in the group.  
Six of the Russian soldiers were killed and the other two retreated.  The deceased carried 
Kizlyar combat knives, favorites of the GRU.  Timur’s mother posted pictures of her son on 
social media saying “Timur, we will never forget you.”
317
  An additional instance comes 
from an interview of a wounded soldier who took part in the invasion of Debaltseve.  
Opposition Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta (one of the few opposition newspapers 
remaining in operation) interviewed 20-year-old Russian serviceman Dorzhi Batomunkuyev, 
who was severely burned after his tank was destroyed.  Dorzhi Batomunkuyev is 20 years 
old. A conscript drafted into the army on November 25, 2013, he entered into a three-year 
contract in June 2014.
318
 Batomunkuyev is an ethnic Buryat whose unit came from Ulan-Ude 
in Russia’s Far East and a member of the 5th separate Guards Tank Brigade.  On January 23 
2015, Batomunkuyev posted on his Vkontakte account that he would be “out of touch”.  He 
says he began training in Rostov, crossed the border on February 8, 2015, and sustained his 
severe wounds fighting for Debaltseve on February 19, 2015.  He gave his interview with 
Novaya Gazeta on February 28.  While resting in his hospital bed, he tells Novaya Gazeta 
that “there were lots of troop trains every day from various cities.”
319
  Finally there is the 
simple fact that there would be very few, if any, Buryats living in Ukraine.  Everything about 
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Batomunkuyov’s account seems authentic, and the man paid a very serious price for 
performing service that his own country denies.  There are dozens of accounts similar to 
these all over open-source media, and it becomes more and more difficult to deny them. 
 Dorzhi’s account is validated by a mercenary who identifies himself as “Yakut,” who 
is a former Russian paratrooper.  He says “It’s not local militia anymore.  It is mostly 
Russians who take part.  It is the professionals that are here now.  The locals are mainly 
miners and farmers who have no combat experience.  The guys coming in, they are the 
experienced people who have been through more than one war.”
320
 
 A final account was given by the BBC who interviewed Dmitry Sapozhnikov, a 
former Spetsnaz member who was a “volunteer” for the front.  Sapozhnikov was badly 
wounded during the engagement and gave the interview from his hospital bed.  He says, “all 
large scale operations are led by Russian officers and Russian generals.  They develop plans 
together with our commanders and we fulfill the orders”.  He also lauds the Buryat tank unit 
that reinforced them in Debaltseve, saying “thanks to their help we managed to take 
Debaltseve.  I don’t think we would have been able to do it without them.”
321
     
 Much like their predecessors, these journalists and activists have taken their lives into 
their own hands reporting this information.  Even beyond the assassination of Nemtsov, 
activists and journalists have been beaten, threatened, and coerced by Russian authorities for 
reporting this information.  Lev Shosberg, a Russian deputy from Pskov, was amongst the 
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first to report on Russian soldiers being killed in Ukraine.  He was severely beaten as a result.  
In September of 2014, a BBC news team of journalists travelled to Astrakhan in an attempt 
to report on Russian military burials, where their cameraman was beaten up.  The camera he 
was carrying was smashed and memory cards erased by three aggressors.  All of the 
recording items on their persons were “sanitized” when brought to the local police station.  
OSCE members witnessed the attack and condemned it.
322
    
Social media has also been a decisive tool in proving the participation of the Russian 
military in the conflict.  For all the OPSEC practiced and preached by the Russians in 
Ukraine, there have been critical errors that make their involvement an indisputable fact.  
Russian soldiers have constantly posted social media content on Vkontakte, which is the 
Russian equivalent of Facebook.  Much like Facebook, Vkontakte geotags their coordinates, 
leaving a fingerprint of their exact location at the time of the posting, and some even brag 
about where they are going and what they are doing.  Families and friends in their virtual 
social circle are very valuable in augmenting information about where their sons are being 
sent and what has happened to them.  Mothers and wives will post eulogies of their deceased 
sons or husbands saying what time the funeral will be held, and where.  The FSB makes 
every effort to remove the posts as quickly as they happen.  Generally, the Russian 
government removes these posts are quickly, but screenshots were and still are saved as 
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evidence by people like Boris Nemtsov and organizations like the Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers of Russia who have wanted prove that the Kremlin and Putin are lying.
323
 
The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia holds a special place in Russian 
military society as being a connection between the military and families of soldiers, and was 
a respected bond even during the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan.  The fact that the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia was able to operate openly in such a closed-media 
state like the Soviet Union shows the amount of respect this organization has been given.  
The organization has been active in both Chechnya wars, and is active right now in protesting 
the return of their sons’ and husbands’ bodies under ambiguous circumstances.  Ella 
Polyakova is the head of the organization, and says she had been informed of 100 soldiers 
being flown into a military medical hospital in St. Petersburg.
324
 Polyakova also estimates 
that there are 10,000 Russian soldiers in Donbass, and accuses Putin and the Russian High 
Command of not letting them know why their sons are dying.  Chairwoman Valentina 
Melnikova, who has been involved with the organization since the “river of the dead” took 
place during the Soviet Union’s involvement in Afghanistan, knows all too well what the 
sealed zinc coffins that are being sent back indicate, and she is furious with her government.  
She never thought she would see the day her government would have the audacity to do such 
a thing ever again.  Melnikova has also heard that the conscripts are forced to sign contracts, 
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and on the off chance that they do not, their commander signs their documents for them.
325
  
Despite doing nothing different in their role from either the wars in Afghanistan or 
Chechnya, Putin and the Kremlin have deemed the Committee of Solders’ Mothers of Russia 
to pose enough of an obstruction to their narrative to assign them the stigmatizing “foreign 
agent” moniker on August 30, 2014.
326
   
Families of Russian military members who are killed in action are given generous 
monetary benefits.  For the Ukrainian conflict, the important caveat that they must abide by 
to keep their benefits is simply and bluntly to keep their mouths shut about how it happened.  
Families of the deceased cannot talk to journalists or continue to inquire about circumstances 
in which they were killed.  Otherwise, they risk losing their benefits.  The stipend that 
families of deceased Russian soldiers receive is a very large sum by Russian standards: about 
$90,000.
327
  The incentive is high to keep quiet and not discuss the circumstances of the 
death of loved ones with media.  Pavel Zhilin’s family (who knew their son’s body was not 
the headless one with the wrong shoe size) refused compensation because they wanted their 
child and not someone else’s.
328
  
The ethnic and cultural diversity of many of the soldiers who have participated in the 
annexation of Crimea and are currently in the Donbass are a dead giveaway as well.   Russia 
is a nation made up of 185 different ethnicities and races.  While the Slavic people may be 
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the most predominantly recognized when someone thinks of Russia, there are many Asiatic 
peoples as well, especially in central and eastern Russia.  However, there are very few 
Asiatic people in Ukraine.  Very few Buryat, Chechen, Uzbek, or Kazakh citizens live there.  
Many of the “separatists” fighting the Ukrainian military have a very distinct Central Asian 
complexion.  For instance, the Russian-led offensive at Debaltseve was primarily led by a 
Buryat tank unit.  It was incredibly suspicious that so many Central Asians showed up and 
claimed to be citizens of Ukraine.    
Caught In the Act 
The most important evidence to date of Russian involvement in Ukraine was the 
capture of Spetsnaz GRU operatives Sergeant Alexander Alexandrov and Captain Yevgeny 
Erofeyev early in June 2015.
329
  Both were too injured to move when found by Ukrainian 
forces, and the Ukrainian military account said other Russian troops tried to kill them with 
mortar fire to prevent them from being taken alive.  Alexandrov’s wife appeared on Russian 
news and said that her husband had been out of the military for a year despite his assertions 
otherwise.  He said he had signed a contract with the Russian military that was still valid.  
Alexandrov is especially angry that his wife was used to lie on his behalf: “They said I was 
no longer a Russian serviceman.  It is a bit hurtful, especially when they do it through your 
family, through your wife.  That crosses a line.”
330
 He says his wife always answered his 
phone calls, but that since his capture, she is no longer in contact with him.  Both soldiers 
want to go back but think it would be unsafe for themselves and their families.  A third 
Russian was captured in Donbas on July 26 2015, a major in the Russian military named 
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Vladimir Starkov, who said he was attempting to supply DPR and LPR separatists with 
ammunition.  Starkov stated to the SBU that he is merely a clerical officer and not a combat 
officer.  Starkov implored that, “I’m not a terrorist. I didn’t come here to kill anyone. Before 
my detention, I didn’t put up any resistance because I knew that officially, we weren’t 
enemies.”
331
   He has publically appealed to Putin for help with his release. Moscow has 
since disowned him and the other two men and apparently will leave them to their fate in 
Ukraine, which will likely be terrorist charges consisting of lengthy prison terms. 
All of these instances have become public knowledge thanks to opposition journalists 
and organizations like the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, and even Russian 
captured soldiers.  Despite this, the Kremlin still denies categorically its involvement in 
Ukraine.  Putin has even signed legislation that has made the death of Russian soldiers during 
peacetime a state secret.
332
  Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has since said this move was 
made to “protect Russian interests” and insisted that the press direct any questions about the 
military to the Ministry of Defense.  Cracks are developing in the Kremlin storyline.  There 
are only so many holes that can be plugged before the Russian people are eventually exposed 
to what their government has been doing.   
The United States and Europe now know how badly they are being beaten in the 
information environment.  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made it clear that 
we are in an information war and that we are losing.  Mrs. Clinton states, “We are paying a 
big price for dismantling international communication networks after the end of the Cold 
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  United States Secretary of State John Kerry emphasizes that “Russia has engaged 
in a rather remarkable period of the most overt and extensive propaganda exercise that I have 
seen since the height of the Cold War.”
334
  NATO General Breedlove reinforces this saying 
that Russia is waging “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in 
the history of information warfare.”
335
  Breedlove states that “this is what we need, as a 
Western group of nations, or as an alliance to engage this informational warfare.  The way to 
attack the false narrative is to drag the false narrative to light and expose it”
336
.  The United 
States and Europe have a long way to go in this regard.  Russia Today’s annual operating 
budget alone runs at two hundred forty one million USD.  The Ukraine government has 
responded by banning all Russian-state channels.
337
 This is a simple and effective way to 
make sure that on the front lines the Ukrainian government can stem the flow of 
disinformation.  On August 29th 2015, Ukrainian President Poroshenko posted on the 
Ukrainian government website a comprehensive directory from their own intelligence 
collection and analysis.  It included order-of-battle (ORBAT) specifics as well as troop 
numbers, units, and commanders at the front.  According to their impressively detailed 
intelligence report, forty percent of the separatist troops are locals.  The rest are Russian 
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military and contractors to make up enough of a deterrent for Ukraine to not consider another 
offensive.
338
   
The mountain of evidence needs to be highlighted and showcased as many times as 
the Russians deny it for the sake of getting at least equal footing with them in the information 
campaign.  This is reinforced by Leonid Bershidsky, a Bloomberg columnist and Russian 
dissident who claims “if it looks like Kremlin shit, smells like Kremlin shit, and tastes like 
Kremlin shit, then it is Kremlin shit.”
339
  The Kremlin’s credibility is increasingly undone 
when more and more people from the Russian public see that their soldiers are dying in large 
numbers in Ukraine even as their leaders deny it.  There is also the common decency of 
pushing back on the blatant fabrication of information regarding the downing of MH17 for 
the dignity of the families who lost loved ones killed by a Russian-operated BUK missile 
system.  Finally, Western media must do a better job of dispelling the Kremlin narrative that 
Ukraine is now run by a “fascist junta”.  These are very specific instances in which the 
United States and Europe have done a woefully inadequate job in addressing Russian 
fabrication of important events.  If the West wants any chance to find a critical node to 
exploit in the Russian maskirovka campaign, it would be here.  It puts into question the 
integrity of their government from top to bottom including the media, their military leaders, 
the duma, the Kremlin, and Putin himself.   
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 It would be inconceivable for a former KGB operative to not utilize maskirovka in his 
decision-making process.  It is clear that Putin is a student of a philosophy that is as crucial to 
Russian strategy and policy making as it was during the Cold War.  This makes the job of 
assessing and predicting an adversary like Putin all the more complicated for the intelligence 
analyst.  Putin is a master manipulator and strategist who uses deception and misinformation 
against Western leaders as arguably his most potent weapon, and world leaders are finding it 
a daunting task to counter the intelligence-operative-turned-world-leader in an effective 
manner.  We cannot predict such a complex leader’s every move, but if policymakers and 
intelligence specialists look at Russia’s history, its complicated relationship with Ukraine, the 
political minds with whom Putin has surrounded himself, and recent behavior toward other 
former Soviet states they can develop a satisfactory assessment (and reasonable alternate 











CHAPTER III: ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
WHAT IT ALL MEANS: PUTTING EVERYTHING TOGETHER 
In this final chapter, we will arrive at key assessments and conclusions that emerge 
based on an understanding of Russia’s history; the profile of the key players involved; their 
methods of deception (maskirovka); and the climactic events of the Euromaiden, annexation 
of Crimea, and the unfolding situation in Donetsk and Luhansk.  Since Putin’s third 
presidential term, Russia has come out of its cordial posture of humility into a campaign of 
outright confrontation defending its strategic interests.  This sort of behavior should come as 
no surprise to anyone.  Russia has always been a difficult country to deal with for policy 
makers dating back to the First World War and the founding of the Soviet Union.  In 1947, 
George Kennan spoke of Russian diplomats, saying, “basically, the antagonism remains, and 
from it flows many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin’s conduct of 
foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary 
suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose.”
340
  From a grand strategic view, it is 
important to evaluate the Kremlin’s centers of gravity and how firm their foundations are.  
This can be evaluated through the use of the DIME methodology, which focuses on the 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of a nation’s grand strategy.  Bobo 
Lo states that, “according to the Kremlin, true power comes from the ruthless deployment of 
political, economic, and strategic assets.”
341
   
Diplomacy 
The first place to examine the strength of the Kremlin’s effectiveness in 
implementing their grand strategy is the diplomatic realm.  James Sherr believes that the 
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Kremlin’s equation of soft power is a combination of soft coercion and hard diplomacy.  In 
any diplomatic engagement, the Kremlin is always looking to gain and hold an advantage at 
some level, or to obtain some sort of favor in return for its cooperation, and the Russian 
leadership has been very effective in this respect.  Competitive relations are primary, and 
anything cooperative is secondary.  Putin searches for weak points he can exploit.  He is also 
a zero-sum diplomat with a zero-sum mind.  Putin has made it very clear that while he is in 
charge, Russia will no longer retreat or stand down.  This viewpoint is not just shared by 
Putin, but by Russian diplomats past and present.  The prevalent Russian belief about 
granting concessions is that it is the result of a position of weakness.  The Russian center of 
strategic culture is akin to the ultra-realist interpretations of Thomas Hobbes.
342
  To Putin, the 
world is an alien and hostile place, which encourages the besieged fortress mentality.  The 
strong must prosper, and the weak will be beaten.   He only sees triumph or humiliation.  No 
in-between.  No compromise.  Internally, Putin must feel heroic.  A heroic self-assertion 
turns into victimization.   The more that “inferiority” and “victimization” can be overcome, 
the greater is the hero.  What emerges is a narcissistic leader, and any time his authority is 
questioned, it represents a personal attack.  Finally, military power guarantees respect around 
the globe.  As discussed earlier, Putin and the Kremlin demand an equal diplomatic platform 
with the United States.  They demand to be treated like a world power and respected as a 
world power.  It is not lost on Putin when President Obama never misses the chance to refer 
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to Russia as a “regional power”, and the belittling rhetoric that is a not-so-subtle jab at 
Putin’s machismo.
343
   
The Kremlin sincerely believes in the danger of “external threats” and Lenin’s 
“besieged fortress syndrome.”
344
  This national psychology comes from the Mongol, 
Napoleonic, and Nazi invasions along with many others.  Foreign invaders have killed 
millions of Russians, and one could easily sympathize with their fear that it might happen 
again.  Russia has been the target of invasion throughout its history, and if we were to look at 
the country as an individual, the behavior traits are the result of stimuli from negative re-
enforcement over a sustained period of time.  Putin is hypersensitive about national and 
personal inferiority and losing the Cold War to the United States.  The perceived treatment of 
Russia by the United States and Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when 
Russian fortunes were at their nadir, only increases his anger.  Moscow believes that the 
West robbed Russia of influence when the country was at its weakest, especially in the 
Baltics.  Russian leaders dislike Western interventionism and encroachment on their “special 
interests”, especially in post-Soviet states.  Russians hate American exceptionalism but also 
display their own brand of exceptionalism toward other nations as well, particularly nations 
they deem to be inferior.  It is a double standard that the Kremlin is not reminded of often 
enough.   
Part of its defense mechanism against “besieged fortress syndrome” would also be to 
pose itself as a great power and “man.” Any questioning of Russia’s (or Putin’s) strength is 
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thus an outright attack on its status in the world, and at the level of the leadership, on their 
manhood.  As such, Russia perceives that the best way to protect itself is to have a buffer 
zone of friends in their “near abroad”.  These near abroad nations must be friendly to Russia 
and act only with the good graces of the Kremlin.  According to Sherr, Russia “sees 
neighbors that are corrupt and ill-governed as worthy partners as long as they acknowledge 
its pre-eminence.”
345
  The near abroad is also an extension of territory Russia has felt it lost 
unfairly. For Ukraine in particular, given Putin’s time there with the KGB, Putin felt insulted 
as a man and it was a major blow to his self-esteem, so to look like a strong man, he felt that 
he needed to act.  This pressure to project manhood is not lost on other world leaders.  
German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave her own damning account of Putin’s behavior in 
Ukraine when she said, “I understand why he has to do this.  He has to prove he’s a man.  
He’s afraid of his own weakness.  Russia has nothing; no successful economy or politics.  All 
they have is this.”
346
   Despite this psychological diagnosis, the phobia ingrained in the 
Kremlin’s grand strategic psyche does not excuse it from taking out its paranoid aggression 
on family, friends, or a little brother like Ukraine whose geopolitical torment is arguably 
greater than that of Russia itself. 
Putin is likely also falling in to a psychological trap that many absolute rulers arrive 
at after a prolonged period of time in power.  The old saying that “power corrupts, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely” applies perfectly to Putin.  He could be convincing 
himself of his own power and his own destiny.  Putin now believes that he can say or do 
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whatever he wants without consequence and move to even more egregious violations.  
According to one analyst, “Putin has become more self-confident and less inhibited, making 
riskier choices, and has reduced capabilities of complex social reasoning and moral 
judgement.”
347
  The same analyst believes Putin could be psychotic and may be losing touch 
with reality.  In this sense, he is like a child who does not like being scolded or told what to 
do.  Because of this aura of being all-powerful, diplomats note that Putin often speaks for 
long periods of time and out of turn, which reinforces that possibility.  He is also not affected 
by the opinions of others, where he showed signs that he did earlier in his reign.  He is “self-
reinforcing”.  Recent Russian deployments to and combat actions in Syria appear to support 
this idea of increasing self-confidence. 
Putin himself may also feel at least some degree of guilt knowing that his corrupt 
system of government is inherently immoral because it takes advantage of poor Russians 
who live in such poverty, especially due to sanctions.  Sherr agrees with this when he says 
“Putin must know that his anxiety comes from the fact that his political scheme is immoral, 
whether conscious or unconsciously.  To preserve this legitimacy, it must ensure that no 
alternatives take root on its doorstep.”
348
  However, there are multiple indicators that Putin is 
not interested in the Russian people at more than a superficial level.  He simply wants to 
remain in power, and he is aware that he has to at least show a superficial level of 
compassion to maintain that power.  He sends his military and contractors to the battlefields 
of Eastern Ukraine to die and refuses to acknowledge their existence when their mangled 
bodies are brought back in Cargo-200 transporters.  He makes his friends some of the richest 
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people in the world when giving generous contracts for infrastructure projects that they keep 
themselves.  He imprisons people who disagree with him on charges that are often 
completely false.  He will even have political dissidents executed right next to Red Square.  
If he is a true Orthodox Christian, this double standard may eat at him at a psychological 
level as well.  Nonetheless, he also knows that even if he releases the reins on his system 
even a little, Yanukovich is a living reminder of what could happen (and given the Russian 
history of revolutions, that is a best-case scenario).   
It is also important to understand the Kremlin’s diplomatic viewpoints, which shape 
its grand strategy and seek an ideal outcome for itself.  Putin views the United States and its 
Western allies as nations in decline due to liberal excess and cultural deviation.  He would 
point to examples of nations in or close to default such as Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and Ukraine as the first indicators that the EU is crumbling (neglecting the fact that 
Russia’s own economy is much more unstable).  Russian leaders would also point to the 
ballooning national deficit of the United States, which is approaching $19 trillion and shows 
no signs of letting up.  The Kremlin would also point to weak US and EU response to and 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan to validate their thought process that the West is timid 
and in decline.  Putin and the Kremlin respect the United States, but only to a degree.  They 
view the West as both a resource and a threat.
349
  They hope that if they repeat this Dugin-
induced narrative enough times, more nations will buy into it.  To Putin and his allies, it will 
be only a matter of time before Russia passes the declining nations of the West in 
international influence.  Putin and the Kremlin believe the future of the world economy lies 
through BRICS, an economic union of developing nations including Brazil, Russia, India, 
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China, and South Africa.  BRICS also encourages the philosophy of multipolarity, but 
despite the Kremlin’s best efforts here, few other BRICS members have bought into this 
mindset.    
A sore subject that affects Russian strategic culture to the core is why so many of the 
former Soviet republics are so unwilling to keep good relations with them in the absence of 
Russian coercive measures.  It sincerely bewilders them that Orthodox Christian and even 
Slavic countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltics do not want to maintain 
closer ties.  They have a mental projection that insists that the future of those countries is 
with Russia.  It would be preposterous, in their worldview, to suggest anything else. 
The Kremlin also extends its influence through the United Nations, in which it uses a 
coveted veto privilege to negate any vote in the U.N. Security Council.  They have used this 
veto on many occasions to work against Western interests, such as their veto of the symbolic 
vote to condemn Serbia for its involvement in genocide.  Russia has appealed to international 
law for condemnation of the invasion of Iraq and the bombing of Syria, but when the same 
body condemns it for its actions in Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya, the 
United Nations somehow becomes an agent for the West to meddle in its affairs.  Putin 
constantly evokes history to replace the norms that apply to international law.  Lo says that, 
“Moscow’s frequent resort to international law is motivated by a mixture of self-interest, 
moral relativism, and basic instinct.  At the most existential level, it reflects opposition to the 
idea that grassroots democracy movements may be considered legitimate sources of regime 
change.”
350
  Russia is truly in it for its own benefit, and no one else’s, yet wants to remind 
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many other countries and their leadership that they cannot accomplish what they want 
without Russia’s approval.  Most importantly, after Iraq, Russia has re-affirmed its own 
doctrine that it will use a pre-emptive strike if it benefits Russian national interests.  
According to Lo, “Russia must be indispensable in world affairs, and its greatness must be 
recognized.”
351
  This recognition of greatness and its irreplaceable role in the world must 
remain, and Russia must fulfill its “burden” to the international community.  Putin and his 
lieutenants want to be intimately involved yet Russian diplomats often act snidely, treating 
occasions like the G-20, APEC, and the six-party Korean peace talks as unwelcome burdens.  
According to Sherr, “Russia demands the right to be included yet also a right to stand apart as 
unique.”
352
  It is all part of the grand diplomatic spectacle.  It is Neo-Hobbesian and self-
fulfilling gratification and self-assurance at its finest.   
The final piece of the Kremlin’s diplomatic agenda lies in ensuring that the system of 
“sovereign democracy” is viable for their own government and their near abroad “privileged 
area of interests”.  According to Sherr, “the equation between democracy and chaos, 
elaborately fostered by Vladimir Putin, is not without resonance in other new post-Soviet 
democracies burdened by predatory capitalism and incompetent public authorities whose 
overriding preoccupation is private gain.”
353
  This applies to all member states of the former 
Soviet Union but is especially true in Ukraine where Putin has worked hard to spread this 
idea.  Losing Ukraine to a color revolution was devastating to him, and like the Russians did 
with Georgia in the past, they are putting a concentrated effort into upending the notion that 
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Western democracy can succeed in their backyard.  The ultimate objective is to make sure it 
does not happen in the Russian Federation.  Following the protests ushering in Putin’s third 
term, he explicitly set a standard when he said “we must do all that is necessary so nothing 
similar happens in Russia.”
354
  Lo says that “there are some countries, like Ukraine, which 
Russia believes have a duty to closely coordinate their policies with Russia.”
355
  It would also 
be a direct threat to Russian national security should Ukraine prove successful in its turn 
toward the West.  To Putin, the success of the Baltic States is bad enough.  According to Lo, 
“The Putin elite fears that the democratic contagion of the Arab Spring and Ukraine could, if 
unchecked, spread to Russia and other places of post-Soviet space.”
356
  When discussing the 
priority level of Soviet states, Lo categorizes the priority level of importance into three 
separate levels.  Level three (the lowest importance) belongs to Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.  Zone two belongs to Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.  
The highest-priority (level one) nations to the Kremlin are Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus.
357
 The priority level correlates with the level of interest Russia has in a given state 
from the standpoint of its own national security and national greatness.  For example, 
Moldova could jump to a priority one state should it do something that threatens Russia’s 
national security and perceptions of national greatness.  Georgia already has had that 
indignity heaped on it.  Russia sees all of these nations as quasi-states.  However, it does not 
necessarily want to conquer the Commonwealth of Independent States, but rather exercise de 
facto control over them.   Ukraine is the most important because of the historical and cultural 
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connections as well as the country’s deep historical ties to Russia, large population and 
natural resource base, and strategic location as a buffer to an invasion of Russia from the 
west.  According to Lo, “Ukraine occupies a central place in Russian concepts of identity, 
culture, and history.  For Putin, and arguably most Russians, the notion of an independent 
and separate Ukraine has no meaning.”
358
   
The geopolitical stakes for Russia’s involvement inside Ukraine, and its actions there, 
made the Western response predictable.  At a diplomatic level, they likely “red teamed” 
potential Western responses, and likely judged that soured relations and sectoral sanctions 
were worth not losing influence over Ukraine while also gaining Crimea through annexation.  
The Kremlin likely reached the conclusion that Ukraine is not a high enough foreign-policy 
priority to risk a destabilizing broader conflict, and their assessment was obviously correct.  
However, to the Kremlin, making sure that Ukraine remains a vassal state is one of the most 
important pillars of Russian strategic interest.  According to Ivan Krastev, “from their 
(Russian) perspective, the Ukrainian revolution is all that is wrong with today’s Europe.”
359
  
The Kremlin will continue to use a blend of active and passive measures to forward 
their diplomatic agenda.  They took advantage of the war fatigue of the United States and 
Europe and their short attention spans to emerge diplomatic victors.  Lo describes Russia’s 
current diplomatic strategy toward Ukraine as “an odd maligning of mystical vision, 
historical geopolitical anxieties, feelings of strategic entitlement, gut instincts, and tactical 
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  No doubt, it can be summed up as all of those things, and it shows just how 
important it is for Russia to have strong influence over Ukraine.  It is important for the 
Kremlin to portray the current Ukrainian government as incompetent and unable to lead 
without Russia, and also to maintain the drummed up narrative that Fascists and Nazis took 
charge to create the unpalatable situation in Ukraine.  It is as important for the international 
audience as it is their domestic audience to keep them pacified about the catastrophic 
alternative vision and path that their “little brother” has chosen.  They will also use all the 
soft coercion tools in their dirty bag of tricks to make sure that “controlled instability” 
continues, including bribery, blackmail, and other forms of political penetration.   
The current loosely-knit ceasefire that both Ukraine and Russia are abiding by are the 
Minsk II Accords, which neither side believes the other will implement in good faith, though 
the DPR and LPR like to propagandize their success in the conflict.  According to one DPR 
newspaper, ‘following our victory, we have achieved diplomatic victory In Minsk: we have 
become de facto independent.”
361
  Continuing praise of Putin and their not so subtle pleas to 
join Russia, the paper’s narrative continues, saying, “a man like Putin is born only once in a 
thousand years.  The day will come when he will also be our president.”
362
  A high-
confidence assessment should be given that Russia will use this relative gradual lull in 
conflict to further shape the terms of the ceasefire in ways that suit the Kremlin.  According 
to Sherr, “Russian derzhavniki (ideologists of great power) distrust any form of consent that 
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is not underpinned by hard guarantees.”
363
  Putin does not see Poroshenko as facilitating the 
process, but the Russians would not fulfill their parts of the ceasefire either.  Ukrainian 
soldiers returning home in coffins have been commonplace since the ceasefire was signed in 
Minsk.   
The viewpoints and actions of the United States are of strategic importance to any 
nation in the international community.  According to Sherr, for Russia, “the United States 
remains the basis of threat assessment and the ultimate standard against which its own power 
and influence are measured.”
364
  Putin relishes these tests and constantly puts his diplomatic, 
military, and intelligence teams to the task to keep them up to this standard; a standard to 
which United States policy makers may well not hold themselves.  From the United States 
standpoint, the “Russian reset” has been nothing short of an abysmal disappointment and a 
comprehensive failure in foreign-policy efforts regarding Russia.  Putin can be appeased 
through niceties, but this only motivates him further and thus exacerbates situations such as 
what happened in Donbas and Crimea.  He only understands the strength of a leader who 
follows words with actions.  While no public comments have been made, body language 
experts have field days with the awkward interactions between President Obama and 
President Putin.  It has become abundantly clear over the past seven years that they are not 
fans of one another.  It would also seem that the Russian president has very little respect for 
President Obama, though his predecessor President George W. Bush was not much more 
successful in coaxing Russia out of its aggressive posture.   
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Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are the Russians’ current “red lines,” and according 
to retired Soviet General Evgeny Buzhinsky, who served with the Soviet General Staff from 
1982-2009, “when Kremlin draws a red line, they mean it.”
365
  According to Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Shoigu, “The United States and its allies have crossed all possible lines in 
their drive to bring Kiev into their orbit.  That could not have failed to trigger our 
reaction.”
366
  If Western diplomats and policy makers are unwilling to say what they mean, 
or to do what they say, Russia will kick up dust over their red lines and move across them as 
was previously observed with Syria when Syrian President Bashar Al Assad used chemical 
weapons against his own people.   Because of the weak Western response to Syria, the 
Russians know how to cross an American red line: very slowly.  Equally important, they are 
able to assess with a high degree of accuracy when the current US administration will fail to 
uphold its own “red lines.”  According to Max Fischer, “Russia knows to cross the red lines 
just a little bit at a time, inching across it over weeks and months, rather than crossing all at 
once.  Then Western nations will get red line fatigue and lose interest by the time they 
cross.
367
  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov achieved a victory there that has had repercussions 
to this day on multiple domains, no doubt achieving a comprehensive diplomatic victory over 
the United States.  If Russian leadership and diplomats are given this level of opportunity and 
freedom of action to forward their agenda, they will.  If the United States and Europe wish to 
counter Russia, Lo advises that our leaders remind the Kremlin that “in today’s new world of 
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disorder, a divine right of great power is no longer tenable.  Simply demanding respect and 
talking up indispensability do not come close to demonstrating relevance.”
368
   
Western powers are most guilty of not peering into the Kremlin’s strategic culture to 
develop a cohesive diplomatic strategy.  Sherr describes strategic culture as “the sum total of 
ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of 
the national foreign policy community have acquired through instruction or imitation or share 
with each other.”
369
  It emerges in response to particular conditions, a historical experience, 
and lessons drawn from it.  Russia’s headers have made it clear that they regard this 
historical experience as a source of legitimacy and inspiration for their state.  Simplifying 
this description, Russians have historically behaved a defined way in diplomatic history, and 
our leadership should have been able to anticipate what they will do.  They have seen it 
before in Georgia, and the fact that Western powers were so oblivious to the signs is a serious 
offense, even more so if they actually knew of the events yet continued to do nothing about 
them.  Russia’s behavior is not set in stone, but it is a unique country with unique 
experiences that have shaped its leadership’s behavior toward Ukraine.  Russian diplomats 
are well versed in understanding the strategic cultures of those they meet with at the 
diplomatic table.  Lo says that, “when Russian policy makers engage their Western 
counterparts, they resort to a well-rehearsed repertoire of behaviors, negotiating tactics and 
policy positions.”
370
  They are well prepared for ours, but events make it clear that the 
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Americans and Europeans are not as prepared as they could and should be.  Policy efforts 
forged and carried forward in a contextual vacuum are almost always unsuccessful. 
The Kremlin utilizes strategic culture to its advantage.  It is something of an art form.  
Part of Putin’s diplomatic game is to show up other world leaders.  Upon learning that 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel had a fear of large dogs, at their next meeting Putin 
brought a large dog with him.  Merkel was obviously shaken as photographs of the meeting 
indicate.  On another occasion, Putin wanted to use an opportunity during a Victory Day 
ceremony to say that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made sense from a Russian standpoint, 
and that Poland was a victim of its own policy when it tried to pursue improved relations 
with European countries.  On May 10, 2014 Putin stated that, “the pact made sense from a 
standpoint of security of the Soviet Union.  It so happened that after the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact and its partition, Poland itself became a victim of the policy it tried to pursue in 
Europe.”
371
  It should also be noted that United States and European leadership boycotted the 
2014 Victory Day anniversary festivities, which made Putin furious.  Another notable 
example occurred against Michael McFaul, the United States Ambassador to Russia, who 
was put under a concentrated level of coercive harassment during his time in Moscow.  He 
was vilified and harassed in the media as soon as he took the post.  The Nashi would chant in 
front of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, calling him a pedophile, and would follow him and 
show up at his children’s soccer games.  In one diplomatic meeting with Putin and Secretary 
of State John Kerry, Putin accused McFaul point blank that he was working with the 
opposition to overthrow him. McFaul said, “Putin didn’t want to go into details.  He stared 
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right at me with that kind of we will prevail look.”
372
  Putin snarled at him and demanded 
that the United States cede influence over the former Soviet States to Russia.  Former 
Secretary of State and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton says of Putin, “He is 
not an easy man, but I do not think there is any substitute other than constant engagement.”
373
  
If current U.S. election polls are any indications, she could be having many conversations 
with Vladimir Putin in the near future. 
 Just because the United States has not come up with a coherent strategy for dealing 
with Russia in Ukraine, it has not come without the forewarning of vocal dissidents who 
believe the Americans could have done much more to help Ukraine.  In the run-up to the 
2012 presidential election, when Republican candidate Mitt Romney was asked who the 
biggest threat to American national security was, he unhesitatingly said Russia.  It was an 
answer scoffed at by President Obama and many mainstream media outlets in the United 
States, but Mitt Romney was right in this regard, although he probably takes no pleasure in it.  
American general officers have also lined up, saying that Russia is indeed the greatest 
strategic threat to the United States, and it is a train of thought that is gaining traction in our 
diplomatic and military policy-making community.  
Information 
The informational campaign has already been discussed extensively in the previous 
chapter.  Russia’s utilization of maskirovka abroad and at home is a masterpiece, especially 
given that Western nations seem less than willing to engage Russian rhetoric bluntly on the 
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international stage.  According to Khodorkovsky, “The Kremlin uses hostile rhetoric towards 
the west as an intentional tool to keep people in fear so they can stay in power.”
374
  This 
gravitates back toward the discussion of the utilization of soft power, which the Kremlin 
employs to gain influence over other nations’ governments, funding of synthetic political 
parties at home and sympathetic political parties abroad, and propaganda through a carefully 
orchestrated narrative that makes the Russian Federation take the role of an agent of good in 
the world against a hypocritical and hegemonic West.  When internal issues and threats begin 
to mount, the Kremlin tries to replace them with external ones.  This is a buffer to maintain 
the current regime’s grasp of power by, in part, distracting the Russian people with various 
external crises.  
To Russia, human rights and democracy have the sinister narrative of regime change 
and instability, and they view the “color revolution” to be the West’s favorite tool of 
instability, so their home front is the most important place to make sure they are winning the 
informational campaign.  The Kremlin has begun a gradual clamping down on civil rights 
and freedom of speech while all eyes are on Ukraine.  According to Marvin Kalb, “Putin and 
his closest allies live in a state of constant fear that one day sooner rather than later, the 
people will rise against the regime, and in a spasm of violence, overthrow it.”
375
  They also 
believe that it is the intention of Western powers to dissolve Russia even further so it 
splinters into smaller countries. This is ridiculous if only because it would be a nightmare for 
Western nations to keep track of all of Russia’s nuclear weapons, much less be certain that 
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they are under positive control, and having a land mass of that size destabilized is something 
no Western diplomat wants to see.   According to Dugin, “it is extremely important for the 
west to break up Russia and turn it into a fragmented zone, an intention expressly stated by 
Brzezinski.  The battle for Russia is in full force.”
376
  Moscow views itself as the bastion of 
the multipolar views expressed by Eurasianism and seeks to ensure that there is a strong 
alternative view to any narrative provided by the United States.  The Kremlin would say that 
their way of thinking is no way inferior or less valid than that of the United States and the 
European Union.  They will use any means at their disposal to be an alternative and, 
whenever necessary, an obstructive voice and presence as a counterbalance.  The Russian 
leadership believes that such a course of action is good not just for Russia, but also for the 
international community. 
When confronting Russian propaganda about distorting the facts of events playing out 
on the ground in Ukraine, the West has done an extremely poor job in providing a 
counterpunch to outright lies that should be easily disproven.  Europe and the United States 
complain about the distortions and call the Russian narrative a lie, but they have not pushed 
nearly hard enough.  They did not put the passion into their pushback that Russia did.  
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has even called them to task for it.  Lavrov implores 
his peers, “I say every time; if you allege this so confidently, present the facts.  But nobody 
can present the facts, or doesn’t want to.  So before demanding from us that we stop doing 
something, please present proof that we are doing it.”
377
   It is unfortunate that when Russian 
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diplomats dangle red meat in front of NATO, the EU, or the United States to call a bluff, they 
decline to pursue that opportunity to discredit Russia. 
Military 
Putin recognizes the need for his nation to have a strong, robust military that can 
justify his rhetoric and provide a strong deterrent to perceived threats such as NATO.  
According to Kalb, “modern warfare depends heavily on tanks and websites, and Russia has 
spent heavily on building and developing both.”
378
  Putin constantly talks up the strength and 
might of the Russian military, and does not hesitate to use them as a backdrop for political 
speeches (not much different than the United States in that sense).  Putin needs to make sure 
that if things go sour domestically, his military has his back.  This is part of the reason why 
Putin’s “Russia 2020” military modernization project is going full speed ahead without the 
drastic cuts across the board that social programs have experienced. Project 2020 upgrades 
will cost $1 trillion.
379
  This will include new ships for the Black Sea Fleet, state-of-the-art 
weaponry for its Spetsnaz units, PAK-DA fifth generation stealth fighters, and T-14 Armata 
tanks, which some experts believe are the best in the world.  This will go ahead despite 
sanctions, paying for operations in Ukraine, inflation, and the World Cup eating at the 
budget.  At current spending rates, even Russian financial experts see this as infeasible, but 
there is no doubt Putin will pull out all the stops to make it happen. 
The Kremlin knows it cannot match the military might of the United States outside of 
the nuclear-weapons arena, so their military has developed “hybrid warfare” that is designed 
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to push the patience of the international community just enough so that it does not trigger a 
military response, but works to get the results they want.   By the time their adversaries 
attempt to devise countermeasures and what they deem to be an appropriate response, 
Russian forces are already well on their way to accomplishing their strategic objective.  
According to Sherr, “it is a model of warfare designed to slip under NATO’s threshold of 
perception and reaction.”
380
  They do this through assassinations, orchestrating riots, and 
arming separatists who are willing to do the fighting for them.  It is also a friendly strategic 
method from a financial standpoint because it does not use a full military effort, which would 
require a major logistics effort and mobility on a much grander scale than when using hybrid 
warfare.  While there have been costs to maintaining the conflict in eastern Ukraine, they 
have not been nearly as great as they could have been if the force was of the size and 
logistical strength required to wage a major conventional war.  Hybrid warfare also gives the 
Kremlin deniability as far as having any direct involvement and gives their diplomats an 
extraordinary degree of elasticity that is valuable to them in forums like the United Nations.  
Due to Gerasimov’s methods being so successful in Crimea and the Donbas, they will likely 
be employed in the future if any other former Soviet republics attempt to move further from 
Moscow’s orbit. 
The biggest pitfall of the Russian military lies in its dilapidated navy.  This can be 
symbolized with one ship; the Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, which is barely 
seaworthy.  While some would argue over the strategic relevance that aircraft carriers 
provide in twenty-first-century warfare, the symbolism itself of the nation’s one aircraft 
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carrier breaking down constantly and needing a tug boat to rescue it speaks volumes about 
the state of the nation’s navy.  Much of the navy is dependent on infrastructure and parts 
made specifically in Ukraine, which has ceased to provide these parts following the Russian 
invasion.  Russia dreams of building the largest aircraft carrier in the world, which would 
weigh over 100,000 tons and stretch 330 meters in length.  The problem is that Russia needed 
help from France to develop these two Mistral-class vessels because they could not build 
them in their own shipyards.  Consequently, France has held these two ships indefinitely due 
to the current sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine.  While its submarines maintain a 
strong strategic nuclear threat at all times, its fleet still needs a massive upgrade to be 
considered a seaworthy blue water force.
381
 
Russia is also one of the largest military arms dealers in the world and has already 
signed many purchase deals for aircraft, tanks, ships, air defense systems, and other 
armaments with clients like Iran, China, India, Venezuela, and others.  Some of these 
purchases have been delayed indefinitely because many of the parts required for their 
weapon systems are built in Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv, Odessa, and Dnipropetrovsk.  
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thirty percent of Soviet military industry was 
based in Ukrainian cities.
382
  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin says that 
Ukrainian components were used in the production of 186 types of Russian military 
equipment.
383
  Ukraine has since ceased their production line of these products, and Russia 
has begun to move these elements of their defense industry inside their own borders.  
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Meanwhile, however, this means no engines for MI-26 attack helicopters, no turbines for 
Russian frigates, no rocket propulsion systems to put Russian satellites in orbit, and complete 
halts in productions in transport planes like the AN-26, to name but a few serious impacts.  It 
will be a significant blow to the Russian military and Russian military sales.  It will take time 
before they are able to build necessary parts for critical components of their armor and air 
power, and their customers abroad will grow impatient that their orders will not be completed 
on time because it affects their military readiness as well.
384
  
Despite these problems with armaments sales, the Russian Federation maintains a 
continuing strategic advantage by employing its very effective intelligence community to 
gain influence within all aspects of the DIME and the grand-strategic advantage such an 
accomplishment generally conveys.  The SVR, FSB, and GRU are pieces to a puzzle that 
aids Russian policy makers to help them shape their grand strategic doctrine.  There is 
strength in having one person in power; namely, that intelligence officials will not have to 
worry about adapting their doctrine every four or eight years, and it benefits them to work to 
a goal that everyone understands.  It gathers many like-minded people who are passionate 
about working toward the same goal.  However, there are two downsides that should be clear 
to anyone who works in the intelligence business—stovepiping and group-think.  It 
encourages a practice of telling policy makers exactly what they want to hear regardless of 
the intelligence available to them.  Any analysts who deviate from popular assessments are 
accused of fearmongering, and that could be damaging to an intelligence analyst’s career.  
This has been prevalent in the United States in the past fifteen years, so one can only imagine 
an analyst giving an alternate assessment in an authoritarian climate like Russia’s.   






There is a glaring weakness in Russia’s grand strategic center of gravity that remains 
as true today as it did during the collapse of the Soviet Union: the economy.   Sherr mentions 
that, “Russia has shown willingness to sacrifice short-term commercial considerations for 
long term geo-economic or geopolitical benefits”.
385
   If there is a part of the DIME that 
Western policy makers should engage, it is the economy.   It has been the one area of policy 
in which Western leaders have found any tangible success.  Ever since the European Union, 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and other allies passed comprehensive personal and 
corporate sanctions because of Russian involvement in Ukraine, the Kremlin has desperately 
been looking for ways to adapt and overcome.  Russia has depended too much on fossil fuel 
economics to keep its economy up and much of their budget has been based on the 
assumption that oil prices would stay around $120 per barrel.  Following the annexation of 
Crimea, a concerted sectoral sanctions effort combined with the oil shale boom in the United 
States has seen oil prices plummeting to close to $40 per barrel.
386
   
The effects have been devastating to the Russian economy, whose ruble was 
approximately 30 to the dollar prior to sanctions and the collapse of the price of oil.  Oil 
production, which is currently 10.5 million barrels a day, finances approximately 45 percent 
of the Russian state budget.
387
  As of October 2015, the ruble is approximately 65 to the 
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dollar, and has dipped as low as 80 to the dollar.
388
  It is currently one of the most volatile 
currencies in the world.   The economy has shown nothing resembling growth, stability, or 
diversity since the sectoral sanctions were put in place.  The collapse of oil prices and the 
sanctions show that Russia is anything but a stable market economy, and it is paying the 
price for not diversifying its economy in areas like technology and infrastructure when the 
economy was doing well.  The sectoral sanctions have proved thus far that Russia cannot 
produce enough capital to be food-independent or create a manufacturing or technological 
base.  Though previously discussed, the current corruption practices doomed any attempts of 
diversifying as Kremlin officials would be sure to skim profits from any successful business.   
 The Kremlin has historically used oil pipelines as economic weapons against Europe.  
Lo calls this “resource diplomacy.”
389
  Any time Russia wants something from Europe or is 
not happy with current business or diplomatic practice there, it squeezes the oil pipes to show 
its disdain.   Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told Moldovan diplomats after 
they signed a European Association Agreement, “energy supplies are important in the run up 
to winter.  I hope you don’t freeze.”
390
  This is especially true of their near abroad neighbors 
whose economies are still highly dependent on them, and more often than not it produced the 
behavioral results that the Kremlin was looking for.  The immediate response was to look 
eastward toward energy-thirsty China.  China and Russia had been gridlocked in oil pipeline 
negotiations regarding a pipeline intended traverse through Siberia and Far East Russia to 
China once an acceptable fee for both parties was agreed on.  Searching for a market outlet 
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for the future that would ensure they would not have to depend on European consumers for 
their fossil fuel, Putin jumped at the chance to access a new market.  Both parties agreed on a 
contract worth $400 billion for thirty years.  Russia has begun the construction of the ESPO 
pipeline (Eastern Siberia Pacific Oil) to China, and both parties hope that it will begin 
pumping oil to China by the end of the decade.  The construction of the pipeline was initially 
projected to be $11.2 billion, but it has presently ballooned to $65 billion.  It was trumpeted 
as a victory for Putin, but since the deal was agreed upon based on a set value for the Ruble, 
which has since plummeted, it looks like China got away with highway robbery at the 
expense of a desperate Russia.  Presently, Russian energy consultants project that it will be 
forty years before a profit is gained from the ESPO pipeline project with China.
391
   
The fracking revolution in the United States and Saudi Arabia’s major increase in 
production to try to slow it by collapsing the price of oil were two of the biggest movers in 
causing fossil fuel prices to plummet at a time when Russia needed the income most.  
American dependence on petroleum imports has been greatly diminished because of new 
fossil fuel extraction technology for oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), which struck big in 
west Texas and North Dakota.  For Russia, even more frightening is an oil shale bed beneath 
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine that has the capacity to produce an even higher yield than 
anything in the United States and would provide Eastern Europe with desperately needed 
fossil fuel reserves that would encourage less reliance on Russia to keep them warm in the 
cold winters.
392
  Discrediting oil-shale extraction among Europeans is something Kremlin 
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propagandists work on overtime to make sure the environmentalists have their day and 
prevent such an advantage from ever taking place.  Luckily for Russia, thus far a much more 
environment-conscious Europe has been up in arms about utilizing fracking technology to 
extract the oil because of the anticipated environmental impact.  Oil companies must put 
forth a five-year plan including a comprehensive environmental impact study before they can 
drill.  Russia works the propaganda angle by providing generous funds to environmental 
groups lobbying Polish and Romanian legislative bodies.  According to Sherr, “some 
Gazprom insiders boast about their attempts to manipulate environmental movements and 
sabotage EU energy policy.”
393
  Russia has no concern about the environment; only the 
geopolitical angle that would keep Europe energy-dependent on the Kremlin. 
The sectoral sanctions have also hurt Russia’s potential to harvest its own oil shale 
beds.  Western Siberian oilfields are losing their harvesting yield, and some fields in east 
Siberia will be far more difficult to harvest optimally without the technology and expertise 
provided by companies like Shell, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, and others.  Shale 
extraction in these pristine wildernesses would be an environmentalist nightmare for the 
region (or so environmentalists and the Russian government—the most unlikely of allies—
would want us to believe), but harvesting precious resources has not stopped the Russian 
government from making a mess of the environment before.  The double standard by which 
Russia has been so willing to use fracking technology while pushing an offensive about 
environmentalism and the harmful effects of fracking in Poland, Romania, and Ukraine 
should be telling about Russia’s true geopolitical intentions. 
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Russian leaders have also been proactive in making sure that they have an energy 
market monopoly in Europe by ensuring that nations in their “sphere of privileged interests” 
do not interfere.  This includes the oil-rich nations in the south Caucasus Mountains and 
those bordering the Caspian Sea.  The proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline, which would stretch 
under the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Baku, bypassing Russia, could be a lucrative 
source of oil to Europe.  No doubt, Russia has opened up its soft-power playbook to make 
sure that it is discouraged.
394
   
The Kremlin has also taken other economic defensive measures that go beyond 
“resource diplomacy.”  Russian gas giant Rosneft has asked for a $41.6 billion loan from the 
duma to weather the sanctions, and the Duma awarded it to them.
395
  It was taken from the 
nations Sovereign Reserve Fund.  Capital controls have been discussed to protect the ruble 
against further volatility, but Russian leaders currently have decided it best to let the ruble 
float with international markets.  The ruble has somewhat stabilized, though losing 
significant value to the dollar since sanctions went into effect.  The Russian central bank has 
attempted to stabilize the ruble by buying large numbers of precious metals to fortify the 
currency’s stability, and now Russia currently possesses the third-largest gold reserve in the 
world.
396
  It has also bought up a sizeable trove of foreign currency because Russia secretly 
has little faith in its own currency.  This does not change the fact that despite being illegal, 
Russian rent is still paid for largely in U.S. Dollars, which is the preferred medium of 
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exchange for business transactions in Russia.  No matter how much Russia tries to break free 
of the dollar, its dependence on it is humiliatingly obvious.  For all the talk of Putin trying to 
create an alternative world currency to move away from the dollar, it has been a futile 
endeavor that the Kremlin wishes would go away.  The Russian Central Bank has also 
attempted to prop up the value of the ruble using money from the nation’s Sovereign Reserve 
Fund, appropriating $88 billion to fortify the ruble, but this has had no effect whatsoever.  
Before the sectoral sanctions and oil price collapse started, the Russian Federation Sovereign 
Reserve Fund, which was stood up for emergencies using funds for the country’s pensions, 
had an initial value of $490 billion, but not even Russian financial experts can sugar-coat the 
strong possibility that if the current market stands and Russia continues government spending 
at the current rate, the funds could run out by the end of 2016.
397
   
At current spending rates, Russia is spending itself into penury.  Despite advice from 
finance ministers, Putin has hiked pay for the military, police, and retirees.   State workers 
like teachers and government officials have had to go on forced vacations and sometimes go 
months without being paid. Putin will now have to pay for Crimea, the Donbas incursion, and 
the intervention in Syria.  He has spent money sorely needed for infrastructure on vanity 
projects like the Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 World Cup.  In that timeframe, credit 
agencies have downgraded Russian bonds to junk status.  If Russians want to turn their 
economy around, they must make a fundamental transformation of self-reliance and self-
production of goods that rival Western quality, which they have not come close to doing.  
They also must provide an environment for small businesses to succeed by ending the current 
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mountains of red tape, inspections, and the obligatory kickbacks to local officials.  Currently, 
starting up a small business in Russia is more trouble than it is worth.  Tax laws are drawn up 
so loosely that if the government wants to drum up charges of tax evasion, it will.  People do 
not want to go to jail for not paying the right official the right bribe amount in order to 
operate their business. 
Regular Russian citizens have suffered significantly from the sanctions.  It is not just 
luxury items that they have grown accustomed to that they have to do without.  Often, fruits 
and meats are too expensive for them to afford.  Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg 
struggle, but they at least have some degree of diversified economies to adapt in order to deal 
with the economic circumstances.  Sanctions have hit villages and towns especially hard in 
cases where they have one or two factories upon which the whole town depends.  The 
products produced at these factories are generally of poor quality and not economically 
sustainable because it costs more to pay workers than the profit value of what they produce. 
Many youth cannot find work in places like this, and join the military as the only hope for a 
job, while their families worry about them getting sent to Rostov where “field training 
fatalities” are all too common these days.  Despite these hardships, the populace remains 
remarkably passive because when the efficiency of the economy decreases, the propaganda 
increases. 
The government has tried innovative methods to stimulate their nation’s economy, to 
no avail.  During his brief presidency, Medvedev attempted to build a technological 





  Instead, it has become a Potemkin village and a waste of billions of dollars.  Putin 
has pleaded with Russian oligarchs abroad to come home with their incomes, and has passed 
legislation that if they are abroad and afraid to come home because of tax evasion that those 
who return would come back with a clean slate.
399
  However, this rally has not had much of a 
return because Putin has had a track record of bending Russia’s judicial system in favor of 
the Kremlin on multiple occasions.  An economic transformation will likely not take place 
under Putin or any other leader with his style of leadership because he knows he will upset 
his siloviki and oligarchic power base when the system of kickbacks comes to an end.  Putin 
will not end the kickback system that his fraternal allies exploit for their own financial gain.  
The Russian Federation always ranks badly in corruption and graft statistical indexes (113th, 
between Nigeria and the Comoros Islands) and ranks 87
th
 in measures of a free society.
400
  As 
such, the economy will remain a point of weakness for Russian grand strategy, and it is a 
critical node that Western countries know how to exploit. 
If the desire and willpower were strong enough to respond with a firm hand, the 
United States and European powers could potentially have brought the Russian economy to 
collapse in a year by removing the Russian Federation from the international banking 
transaction system called SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications).  SWIFT is the bloodstream of the world financial network, and a vast 
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majority of the world’s international business transactions flow through SWIFT.
401
  Without 
being connected to SWIFT, Russia would not be able to pay for imports or receive payments 
for oil or gas.  It would also not be able to pay off debt.  It would effectively create the same 
financial environment in which Iran currently operates.  The entire process would have been 
an unmitigated disaster that would have forced the Kremlin to the negotiation table.  The fact 
that the West did not respond so strongly after an outright invasion of a European country is 
embarrassing.   
DIME in Ukraine 
Ukraine has faced the full force of the Kremlin’s DIME grand-strategic approach.  
According to Kalb, “Ukraine is a witch’s cauldron out of which has recently arisen deep 
concerns about Russian insecurities and Western misjudgments.”
402
  Putin has made his bed 
with Ukraine. He cannot withdraw from Crimea or Donbas without looking like a 
backtracking coward.  He wants to continue portraying the brotherly relationship that Kiev 
and Moscow have.  He believes Novorossiya was stolen from Russia on historical grounds 
by Lenin, who drew up quick borders of Ukraine that included Kharkiv, Kherson, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Mariupol, Luhansk, Donetsk, and other cities and towns of south 
and east Ukraine.
403
   Putin recently said “I have said many times already, we are one people.  
Kiev is the mother of Russian cities.  Ancient Rus is our common source, and we cannot live 
without each other.”
404
  He knows he has to stand by the decisions he made here whether he 
wants to or not, so the fact that he has already made his move means that he has to continue 
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this high-stakes game of chess.  Putin and his men in the Kremlin are going to be patient with 
Ukraine and use maskirovka and other soft power methods to ensure that the current 
Ukrainian government seized through popular dissent is unsuccessful.  They will be in this 
for the long haul, and the Donbas will be a key focus.  The Russians need Ukraine to fail 
because they cannot have their little brother being a successful Western-style democracy on 
their doorstep.  They want them to remain submissive to Russia and to continue living within 
the corrupt Russian political, juridical, and economic system. We know that the Kremlin still 
secretly harbors the dream of a Eurasian Customs Union.  The creation of Donbas as a frozen 
conflict was carefully picked because it has just the right amount of political Russian 
sympathizers and a history of organized criminal activity that made it a gamble, but one that 
paid off.  Russia now has its own “Transnistria” on the eastern Ukrainian border, which is a 
sliver of territory that can be used to exert pressure on Ukraine at any time it desires. A 
campaign of deniability of Russian involvement is an alibi that they can us to wiggle 
themselves out by lying to the international community.   
If we examine the prospect of the conflict becoming hot again, there are a few things 
that Russia could do.  One appealing option for Russia would be to move to the city of 
Kharkiv, which a mere 25 miles from the Russian border and has already seen episodes of 
unrest.  Odessa could see weapons smuggled from Transnistria (which has one of the largest 
stockpiles of weapons in the world) into the city with the help of Russian intelligence 
operatives to cause more controlled instability.  The separatists also see the Schastya power 
211 
 
station north of Luhansk as a vital objective to provide power to the city.
405
  The most likely 
Ukrainian city that is ripe for more conflict is the port of Mariupol, whose residents live in 
fear every day that the conflict could move onto their doorstep the moment Putin “gives the 
signal.” This city lies a mere 20 miles from the current line of contact.   
Western diplomats have made Mariupol their new red line.  The “Mariupol Test”, 
which was discussed in the New York Times March 15, 2015, is the straight-forward concept 
that if Russian-led separatist forces move into Mariupol, it would be a trigger for much more 
drastic economic measures.  The most severe of these would be removing the Russian 
Federation from the SWIFT, which most policy makers and diplomats consider to be the 
economic nuclear option against Moscow.  It would also make Western nations more 
inclined to arm the Ukrainian military with lethal military aid.  If Russia moves forward to 
Mariupol, it will likely be an indicator of something much bigger
406
. 
However, such a move would also mean the Russian military and any separatists 
involved would have to maintain control of more territory.  When tensions were at their 
highest in Ukraine and the Kremlin was moving massive numbers of troops and heavy 
weapons to the Ukrainian border, Putin told European Commission President Hose Manuel 
Barroso that he could take Kiev in two weeks.
407
  STRATFOR gives two alternate 
assessments that Russia could push for in an invasion.  The first would be an attempt to 
create a land bridge to Crimea.  Russia would push to the Dnipro River as fast as possible to 
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secure the peninsula’s water supply.  The Dnipro River would also function as a defensive 
fighting position.  The Russian line would be stretched 250 miles and would require new 
defensive lines and fortifications.  STRATFOR estimates the force necessary to complete the 
task could be 36,000 Russian regular troops and would be a six-day task, but they also have 
to worry about the population of two million that they have invaded.  Insurgency would be 
likely, and they would need a residual force of 42,000 as counterinsurgency operations 
personnel.
408
   
The second STRATFOR scenario assumes Russia wants to take all of Novorossiya 
and push through Odessa and to Transnistria. Polish intelligence assesses this would be 
economically appealing because the oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, and Odessa 
would be profitable annexations.  Donbas alone would not but would be necessary for 
bringing in the rest of Novorossiya once again under Russian sway.   Russian forces would 
need to be at least double that of the land bridge force, and at least 40,000 troops would be 
required to control larger cities like Mariupol, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odessa.  They also 
estimate it would take 23-28 days with approximately 80-120,000 Russian troops.  Crossing 
the large Dnipro River would be logistically difficult but would cut off Ukraine completely 
from the Black Sea.  The Russians would need a residual force of 240,000 to control a 
population of six million Ukrainians in a region covering 87,800 square miles.  Russia’s 
current military strength of 280,000 would be stretched to its limit.  Such a massive mobility 
effort would raise NATO alarms instantly, and the Russians would have to contend with the 
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possibility of a NATO military response.  This does not even cover the incredible fiscal and 
military expenditures that would be required to undertake the task.
409
  
The Ukrainian military and its militias would likely revert to a guerrilla style of 
insurgency warfare (which they arguably should have been doing sooner).  The Azov 
Battalion has confirmed they would resort to such tactics if the Russian-led separatists move 
further into Ukraine’s territory.
410
  The Ukrainians would be less willing to wear uniforms 
and would try and blend in with the population and move behind enemy lines.  A campaign 
of assassinations against high-value targets like Russian officers or pro-separatist political 
figures would commence.  Armored personnel carriers and tanks would become easier 
targets.  In this scenario, the Ukrainians know that time is on their side and they could bleed 
Russia dry financially at an even quicker pace than they are now.  Russian casualties would 
increase, and the amount of dead could no longer be kept a classified state secret.  Czech 
Republic president Milos Zeman does not believe there will be any invasions for the same 
reason other military and intelligence experts give.  Zeman states “I don’t think it would be 
possible to invade Eastern Ukraine simply because it has been destroyed by civil war and 
Moscow would have to feed tens of millions of hungry mouths, and for that, their economic 
capacity is insufficient.”
411
  It is an even worse idea given polls that have asked Russians if 
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they would support sending the military openly into Ukraine. Only five percent said they 
would.
412
   
Putin’s ultimate objective in Ukraine is not to invade, but to foster the conditions for a 
frozen conflict.  Putin told media at a press conference “you want the Ukrainian central 
authorities to annihilate everyone there, all of their political foes and opponents? Is that what 
you want? We certainly don’t and we will not let that happen.”
413
  If Putin wanted to move 
further into Ukraine, he would have done it by now.  He is completely aware that he will be 
stretched to pay for Crimea and his mercenary force in Donbas let alone that of all of 
Novorossiya or the whole of Ukraine.  The Syrian adventure is also weighing on Russia.  
However, they will maintain a residual presence near Rostov for the foreseeable future and 
will not relinquish their influence in Donbas.  According to Kuzio, “Russian plans are to 
establish a unified DPR-LPR force consisting of seven infantry brigades, one artillery 
brigade, one tank brigade, and one special-forces battalion.”
414
  This way there can be a quick 
reaction force (QRF) that can apply pressure to Ukraine at a moment’s notice should the 
Kremlin deem it to be necessary.  They would also like to use Russian “peacekeepers,” 
which would be a de-facto occupying force much like Transnistria.  The Kremlin insists that 
Ukraine should be on the hook for rebuilding the Donbas, which has for all intents and 
purposes collapsed socially and economically.  They have no effective government, no jobs 
for the people, and no support structures in place.  Current estimates are that it will cost $2 
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billion to rebuild infrastructure in Donetsk, Luhansk, and other towns within the Donbas that 
are currently occupied by the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
415
 
But does Ukraine even want the breakaway territories back?  The answer might be 
surprising.  Anti-Donbas sentiment has been growing in Ukraine.  The Ukrainian people are 
tired of war, and a sizable demographic has come to the conclusion that if the residents of the 
Donbas want to be independent of Ukraine, or part of Russia, they should let them.  On May 
15, 2014, a poll showed that 61.8 percent of Ukraine would give up the occupied territories 
for peace.
416
  From the same poll, only 22.9 supported the continuation of military operations 
until the occupied territories are liberated.
417
  The Rada has cut off all pensions and subsidies 
to the DPR and LPR.  Politicians are more willing to call the bluff of the breakaway republics 
and say that they should prove that they can govern effectively.  There is no confidence that 
they can.  For Ukraine, it could end up being a smart move if they decide to abandon their 
occupied territories, as they have been an economic black hole since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. 
The ideal endgame for the Kremlin is to portray Ukraine as a dysfunctional failure 
that was the result of the Euromaiden riots and perhaps bring them into the fold of the 
Eurasian Customs Union.  The Eurasian Customs Union is a dream Putin still clings to for an 
economic bulwark to the European Union where in theory Russian-made products would be 
purchased within this sphere of influence.  Economically Russia fears superior quality and 
                                                          
415
 Richard Balmforth, “Ukraine threatens to retake territory from defiant rebels”, Reuters.  Last updated July 
09, 2014.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/09/ukraine-crisis-idUSL6N0PK3US20140709.  
416
 Alexander J. Motyl, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues: Anti-Donbas Sentiment Growing in Ukraine”, World Affairs.  






better value goods from Europe that would push its own manufactured products out of the 
Ukrainian market and then making their way into Russian markets.  The Eurasian Economic 
Union should be nothing more than a distant dream at this point, but who knows how 
valuable Dugin has made Ukraine seem to be to Putin, and what means political technologist 
Vladislav Surkov will use to make that ideal endgame happen.  However, at present this is 
the endgame that Russians will continue to work for until they get an alternative choice that 
forces concessions. The Kremlin sincerely believes that it can achieve that goal. 
 Russian leaders will not make it easy for Ukraine now that it has chosen to take a pro-
Western path, and they will make the people of Ukraine suffer in any way they can.  
Currently, Russia is getting away with anything they can despite warnings from Europe and 
the United States to not interfere with the Ukrainian democratic process. The easiest way that 
they can accomplish this is through resource diplomacy.  By 2019, Russia will stop gas 
delivery through Ukrainian pipes and divert that oil to a Turkish pipeline currently under 
construction when the current Gazprom contract expires.
418
   Ukraine will have to work 
diligently to develop their oil shale infrastructure or find other sources of energy to keep their 
population warm during the cold winters.  Due to the diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic harassment from the Kremlin, Ukraine will likely have to depend heavily on 
Europe in the coming decade not just for energy but for economic support in general.   In 
totality Ukraine’s GDP fell five percent from 2014 to 2015.
419
  Merkel has recognized this 
urgency, and has called on allies to help pay down Ukraine’s gas debt.  Europe will have to 
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be involved for the long haul because Ukraine will be desperately clinging to them for help 
as long as Russia tries to beat them into submission using all of the tools they have at their 
disposal.   
 Ukraine is also working diligently to make sure that its border will be better fortified 
against any potential future incursions.  The most recent move passed through the Rada was 
building a “great wall of Ukraine”, which is exactly what it sounds like—a wall that extends 
along the Ukrainian and Russian border.  This wall will have watchtowers, trenches, barbed 
wire, a “no man’s land”, tank detachments, sophisticated surveillance equipment, and an 
actual steel wall that stretches along the 1,200 miles of border shared with Russia.
420
  It will 
not just be defensive, but also stop illegal immigration, smuggling, and help with visa-free 
credentials to move Ukraine forward into the European Union.  Construction for this project 
began early September 2015 near Kharkiv, and it is projected to cost $100 million.
421
  The 
mayor of Dnipropetrovsk has offered $10 million of his own money for the wall, and says it 
will help with employment and get people back to work.
422
 
 Ukraine needs to succeed not just from a practical standpoint for its citizens, but from 
a security standpoint.  There are now thousands of Ukrainians who have fought and who 
have had friends die fighting against Russian-led separatist forces in Donbas.  If these militia 
and military members feel that their president and their government in the Rada do not work 
for them, the guns could be pointed back at the Maiden.  A militia of Dnipro-1 commander, 
Vitaliy Feschenko, said that a coup is possible if they do not see improvement in the next 
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DIME in Crimea 
Putin made the decision to annex Crimea while the world was watching skiing, ice 
skating, and bobsledding in Russia’s illustrious Sochi Winter Olympic Games, when the eyes 
of the world were fixated on Russia just as Putin wanted.  In annexing Crimea, the Kremlin 
recovered land that was not just strategically important, but culturally sacred to them.  Soon 
after annexation, Putin referred to Crimea as being as dear to Russia as the Temple Mount is 
for the Jewish people in Israel or the Muslims in Palestine
424
 (a loaded term given how much 
blood and violence has been shed by various peoples over the Temple Mount).  Despite the 
narrative the Kremlin portrayed of protecting ethnic Russians, there was no turmoil there 
prior to the Euromaiden.  There has been much more friction in the Russian Caucasus since 
the Soviet Union’s breakup than there has been at any point in the Crimean peninsula.  
According to Grant, “the Ethnic Russians in Crimea were never at any point in a position 
where they had to fear for their lives.  Not one incident of such violence was recorded even 
during the Euromaiden protests.”
425
  Crimea was a sticking point for Russian leaders since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but they were in no position to act diplomatically, let 
alone militarily to give a response that would have been deemed appropriate to them.  Grant 
emphasizes that, “Russia has made it clear that it will exert its power to expand its territorial 
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sphere beyond its recognized border.”
426
  To Russia, the annexation of the peninsula righted a 
historical wrong.  Cities like Simferopol and Sevastopol have always been Russian since the 
times of Catherine the Great.  But the strategic implications alone were incentive for Russia 
to grab Crimea.  The Duma even passed legislation rescinding Khrushchev’s declaration to 
give Crimea to Ukraine after the annexation had already happened.
427
 
Crimea is important strategically for a number of reasons.  First, it projects power into 
the Black Sea in a way that Russia would not have without it.  The Kremlin also wanted to 
ensure they had total control over their navy’s only warm-water port that remains ice-free 
year round without having to tell Ukrainian port authorities of their troop numbers or paying 
a rental fee as required by the Kharkiv Accords.  The peninsula also gives an air defense 
capacity that will cover a radius of forty percent of the Black Sea.
428
  It also gave Russia 
territorial rights to an area of the Black Sea that potentially holds billions of dollars in oil 
once drilling is authorized by Russia
429
 (that is if Russia gets sanctions lifted so they can hire 
companies with deep-water drilling technology).  It gave further validation to the Russian 
masses and legitimacy to a strong leader who most Russians think knows what he is doing.  It 
also gave the Russian military and intelligence structure an opportunity to show that is back 
in force as an international player.  It basically tore apart the Budapest Memorandums and 
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any trust that was attached to them on behalf of Russia, reinforcing the notion that the 
Kremlin only applies international law when it fits Russian grand strategic interests.  
But it is not a completely rosy picture for the Kremlin.  There have been significant 
problems that Russia will have to adapt to, including inevitable expenditures that come with 
updating the dilapidated infrastructure that is currently in place.  Russia also has to integrate 
the peninsula’s two million people, including many older pensioners, into the Russian 
government.  There is also the fact that not all of the Crimean peninsula’s populace was 
happy with the annexation, most notably the Tartars.  Despite the Russian narrative that 
ethnic Russians had been persecuted on Crimea, the OSCE did not observe one instance of 
ethnic hostility toward the Russians living there.  They did, however, take note of multiple 
accounts of Tartar harassment.  The Tartars are still very dissatisfied with the political 
clampdowns following the annexation, and while some have made their disdain known 
recently by setting up roadblocks at the north end of the peninsula, others have simply moved 
to the Ukrainian mainland to avoid living under Russian rule again (many to Lviv). The ones 
who have remained have been forced onto un-arable land and live in shantytowns because 
the new Russian authorities have confiscated the arable and highly desirable coastal real 
estate
430
. Russian Cossacks have been used to harass them off of their land.  Russia has also 
removed Tartar and Ukrainian radio.  One brash member of Crimea’s parliament attempted 
to justify the Tartar genocide during Stalin’s deportations saying “in order to save the Tartar 
people, they were deported from Crimea.  Why? The presence of these criminals would 
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inevitably have led to civil war.”
431
  It is becoming obvious to the Kremlin that this issue is 
not one that is going away any time soon, and will not do so unless the Tartars are no longer 
marginalized or persecuted by the new Russian government in charge.  For all intents and 
purposes, the Tartars follow a moderate view of Islam.  They have also showed an incredible 
amount of restraint to the persecution that is directed at them.  That could easily change to 
Islamic fundamentalism and Tartar nationalism if this sort of humiliation continues. 
There has also been rampant corruption on the peninsula since it came under Russian 
rule, and the degree is high even by Russian standards.  Many of the men who took power 
during the annexation as part of the shadow government-turned puppet government were 
heavily involved in organized criminal activity on the peninsula, and the FSB is having a 
hard time reeling in these officials.  Hooded gunmen have evicted families and businesses 
from property on a regular basis for not paying “security fees” to racketeers, as was common 
in Russia during the wild 90’s.  There is also a lack of accountability by the local 
government.  Following the invasion, Putin and the Duma set aside $18 billion to improve 
Crimean infrastructure and other construction projects to improve the standard of living for 
their new citizens (infrastructure money that was initially destined to Siberia and the Russian 
Far East, a fact not lost on them).  Kremlin auditors reported in June, 2015 that two-thirds of 
the money Moscow sent to Crimea has not been accounted for.
432
  Crimean Governor Sergey 
Aksyanov reacted angrily to these accusations, despite having fingerprints all over the 
criminal underground that existed in Crimea under Ukraine, and still remains today.  Putin 
                                                          
431
 Ibid p. 275-275. 
432




initially did not care about who was in these posts, he just wanted pro-Russian bodies in 
government positions, but now he realizes that they are out of control.
433
   
There are also other logistical and infrastructure issues to take into account as part of 
the challenge of bringing Crimea into the Russian Federation. Because of sanctions, credit 
and debit cards cannot be used.  The Crimean tourism industry that the peninsula depends 
upon, which was growing in popularity, has been pulverized. Crimea is also water and 
energy dependent from the Ukrainian mainland, and the Ukrainian government could shut off 
that supply at any time.  Road construction has not even begun because of the funds that have 
not been accounted for.  Finally, the peninsula can only be accessed by a ferry system from 
across the Sea of Azov in Kerch, which is a long and time-consuming wait to cross.  The 
only other access is through Ukraine, which has blocked road and train access from the 
traditional land route that existed before the annexation.  The solution has been to authorize 
spending for a bridge that will cross the Kerch Strait and allow vehicle and train access to the 
peninsula.
434
  Funding for the bridge passed through the Duma quickly because Putin wanted 
to give the contract to his siloviki judo partners, the Rothstein brothers, who were named in 
individual sanctions of Russians and it was a quick way to get them money after having their 
accounts frozen by the West.
435
   
Additional Distractions and Open-Ended Problems 
Putin will continue to take advantage of opportunities that will take the world’s and 
Russians’ eyes off of Ukraine and make them forget about it.  The most recent opportunity 
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came about when Kremlin leadership deemed that if they did not move in to help Syrian 
President Bashar Al Assad right now, he would fall.  On September 29, 2015, they began an 
air campaign to strike Syrian rebels backed by the CIA as a primary threat, and ISIS militants 
further afield as secondary objectives.
436
  Russian “volunteers” have moved in with heavy 
armor and equipment as well as sophisticated air defense systems.
437
  Russian pilots are also 
demanding that Syrian airspace be kept clear while they complete their missions.  Russia has 
also reached out to North Korea to improve relations, and while in previous decades Russian 
leaders have sincerely worked to keep North Korean belligerence under control, they could 
now use North Korea as an agent of mischief to show their disdain toward Western sanctions 
and treatment of the Kremlin.  In the meantime, Russian separatists patiently wait for the 
order to make further moves and could do so when Ukraine and the West least expect it.  
They want war and the incorporation of the Donbas region into Russia. 
In spite of all of this outreach and showing how important Russia is to the 
international community, Russia struggles for friendship.  Russians will only be international 
players for a common good if it benefits them.  According to Lo, “few countries see the 
Russians as serious contributors to the international good.”
438
 This polling of unfavorable 
views extends even to Russia’s celebrated BRICS community, as citizens of India, Brazil, 
and South Africa have a majority negative view of Russia.
439
   European countries do not see 
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it as European.  Asian countries do not see it as Asian.  Turkey might be the only close 
comparison, and even their strong relationship is being strained by the recent Russian actions 
in Syria in late September, with Turkish airspace violations by Mig-29s and cruise missiles 
skirting the Turkish border en route to their intended targets.
440
   
In turn, Europe and the United States desperately want Ukraine to succeed despite 
more being done through words than actions.  On August 27, 2015, Ukraine received aid 
from the International Monetary Fund, EU, private investors (most notably George Soros), 
and United States totaling nearly $50 billion.
441
 The United States and Europe know there is 
no more effective weapon against Russia than seeing a successful Ukraine, which is by no 
means a foregone conclusion.  In fact, there are many obstacles caused by internal 
corruption, which the Rada is trying to clean up on its own.  In order to hit IMF “triggers”, 
that is, the circumstances that will allow Ukraine access to these desperately needed funds, 
the Rada must pass legislation that ends corrupt practices.  It also has to make hard decisions 
in order to meet the criteria laid out by the Minsk II Accords, and on August 31, 2015 passed 
a controversial bill through the Rada that created conditions for decentralization of powers 
and gave more power to regional and local governments.
442
  President Poroshenko has 
continued his tough acts of defiance, making sure to maintain the moral high ground over his 
Russian counterparts, which has been a thankless task for the level of support given to him 
by Europe in particular.  Poroshenko did make a surprising move on December 23, 2014 
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when he and the Rada rescinded Ukraine’s nonaligned status and made their intentions 
known of joining NATO; an unwelcome surprise for some NATO members.  Poroshenko 
spoke in front of the Rada and said “today it is clear that the nonalignment status Ukraine 
proclaimed earlier in 2010 could not guarantee our security and territorial integrity.  The 
position led to serious losses.  That is why we have decided to return to the course of NATO 
integration.”
443
  Currently, Ukraine is hoping for NATO and EU status by 2020, which many 
consider an optimistic outlook at best, especially regarding NATO membership.
444
  Nations 
like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and others are worried about upsetting Russia and believe 
their primary objective should be stemming the massive flux of migrants crossing over from 
North Africa and Turkey.  Eastern European nations with a shared history are much more 
sympathetic to the plight of Ukrainians.  After the past few years of turmoil in Ukraine, they 
say, no one can blame Ukraine for its recently stated intentions and strategic objectives. 
Western nations should also be doing more to strengthen the Ukrainian military and 
intelligence communities.  If Poroshenko and other Ukrainian policy makers have a well-
versed and well-functioning intelligence community, they will be in a much better position to 
combat the Russians and what they are trying to do in Ukraine.  They have already produced 
some impressive results that were discussed in previous chapters, so that is a cause with 
much more potential upside than the American expenditure of $500 million on four or five 
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Syrian rebels; a fee taunted by Putin as a total waste of money
445
 (and in the opinion of many 
diplomatic and political pundits, he is exactly right).   
Both Western nations and Russia should also be painfully aware that after being 
invaded, Ukraine could conceivably build its own nuclear deterrent.  They have the 
infrastructure, technology, and know-how to build up rapidly, and it would not be without 
good reason.   Ukraine could perceive a combination of a Russian threat and lack of Western 
military support that make it necessary for them to ensure their own security, and developing 
a nuclear arsenal becomes a great equalizer against the Kremlin.  While nations would likely 
discourage it, no one could make a firm argument against it if they decided to go that route. 
Despite all of the pressure that Russia will inevitably cause in the coming years, 
Ukraine has the capacity to be a strong economy and a magnet for European companies 
looking to expand into the country.  Ukraine has an educated population of 45 million people 
comprising a cheap labor force that would relish the chance to see an increase in pay that 
could be provided by companies from the European Union.  They have also brought in bright 
economic minds to help implement reform, perhaps most notably Mikheil Saakashviki, who 
is now the mayor of Odessa, much to Putin’s disgust.
446
  Ukraine also has vast tracts of 
arable land suitable for agriculture.  The most difficult transition will be in the South and 
East of Ukraine, whose industry has depended heavily on Russian consumers for its products.  
It will not be an easy transition, and the culture of corruption and graft within their own 
country will need to be successful if Ukraine is to be successful in meeting the criteria to 
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move into the European Union.  It will be a long struggle and something that will not be 
accomplished overnight.  It will take a long and concerted effort if Ukraine is to be 
successful, but the Ukrainians have shown that they have the willpower to fight and make it 
happen. 
With its actions in Ukraine, Russia has set a dangerous precedence for the twenty-first 
century.   First, the annexation of Crimea and Donbas gives validation to separatist fervor in 
the Urals, Siberia, Chechnya, Tartarstan, Karelia, Kaliningrad, and the Russian Far East.  
While the protestors in Moscow would say, “Stop feeding the Caucasus!” those away from 
Moscow chant “Stop feeding Moscow!”  It is true that Moscow takes much more from 
territories like Siberia than the Kremlin gives back, and there is considerable resentment 
because of this.  An example of this can be made with the resource-rich Siberian community 
of Tomsk, which sends 130 billion rubles to Moscow, yet receives only 10.3 billion back in 
assistance.
447
  The residents of the Russian Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad grow envious of the 
prosperity of Poland and Lithuania along their borders.  Despite Russian propaganda, many 
ethnic Russians in the Baltics are actually quite happy with their situation.  They have shown 
their disgust at the ballot box, and even Putin’s puppet political party, United Russia, polls 
extremely poorly there.  German flags have been put up ambiguously as forms of quiet 
resistance in the territory once belonging to Germany.
448
  
These regions do not feel that they are part of Russia, whose leaders are indifferent to 
their plight while their industries are shuttered and infrastructure grows more dilapidated.  
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Adding further insult to injury, infrastructure development of Siberia and the Far East has 
lost funding as a direct result of the annexation of Crimea.  This internal separatist threat 
came to a head on August 17, 2014, when a Novosibirsk separatist march supporting Siberian 
independence was banned.  Polling indicated that only 27 percent of Novosibirsk voted for 
United Russia in the 2012 election.
449
  The Russian government prohibited the march 
because it called for “unrest, extremist activities, and participation in an illegal public event”.  
The mayor of Novosibirsk re-enforced this prohibition “in order to ensure the inviolability of 
the constitutional order, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the Russian Federation.”
450
  
The organizer, Artyum Luskutov, stated he organized the rally because “it uses the rhetoric 
of our own government and their propaganda use.  They decided to tell us how great it is 
when some republic moves for self-determination.  Okay, well let’s apply this to other 
regions.  Can Siberia allow itself this same rhetoric?  It turns out it cannot.”
451
  An opposition 
journalist covering the attempted movement spoke much the same.  Olesya Gerasimenko 
stated “most Russians in the regions would not support secession, but would back greater 
economic autonomy, including measures forcing resource extraction companies to pay taxes 
in the regions where they operate rather than Moscow.  If we support the Ukrainian peoples’ 
right to federalization, why don’t we support the Russian peoples’ right to federalization?”
452
   
It was an incident that was not reported by Russian state media.  Similar clampdowns 
were placed on Karelia around the same timeframe.  In response to the attempted separatist 
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rallies, the Duma passed a law in December of 2014 that made spreading separatist views 
punishable by up to five years in jail.  What makes their separatist movements any less valid 
than those in Crimea or Donbas?  The answer is simple: They are separatist movements 
against Russian interest.  The double standard is not lost on the Kremlin, but they just do not 
appear to care.
453
   
Russia’s annexation of Crimea gives other belligerent powers justification to do the 
same.  China has been quickly fortifying their presence in the strategic Spratly Islands, 
despite the fact that the islands also have disputed claims status from Vietnam and the 
Philippines.  It would be highly ironic if China used the same justification to move into 
territory that made up “outer Manchuria” during the Qing Dynasty that includes much of the 
Russian Far East stretching west to the shores of Lake Baikal.  Chinese migrants are already 
moving into the sparsely populated, resource-rich area north of the Amur River and finding 
work in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Irkutsk.  There could come a day when Chinese 
leaders act in the interests of Chinese citizens in Russia and reclaims territory that was 
historically theirs.  It is a two-way street that appears lost on Russian leadership.  History 
should not be used to justify territorial annexations in a post-World War II world.  Russia 
could learn that the hard way in the coming decades as non-Russians do the same thing to it. 
What does this mean for other CIS states with significant Russian minorities?  Van 
Herpen believes the ultimate grand strategic objective of the Kremlin is the gradual 
absorption over time of the Eurasian countries back into Russia.
454
  The Kremlin is aware 
that the strongman leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could die any day.  Russia could 
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move in under both the guise of protecting ethnic Russians and say they are ensuring that 
Islamic extremism does not spread if either country has a volatile transition of power (neither 
has shown much interest in implementing a secure and safe transition of power).  President 
Putin has already cleverly quipped that Kazakhstan was never a nation before the Soviet 
Union drew borders for it.  This has alerted Kazakhstan’s leadership to prepare contingency 
plans.  One Kazakh official states “Crimea was our 911, it is an event that caused a lot of 
rethinking around the region.”
455
  In response, Kazakhstan ran war games January 16, 2015 
to practice against a “little green men” scenario in Northern Kazakhstan.
456
  Kazakhstan 
Prime Minister Nazarbayev also reminded Putin that Kazakhstan has the right to withdraw 
from the Eurasian Customs Union at any time.  The double standard is that many politicians 
in Russia want to rid their country of the undocumented Central Asian immigrants who they 
say steal jobs from ethnic Russians.  Russians have patience when looking to rebuild their 
empire, and their intention will likely be to be cut up Ukraine and other countries of the 
former CIS piece by piece under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians wherever they live.  
Crimea was done with one swoop, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its 300,000 citizens are 




Russia With or Without Putin 
 In Russian history books, Putin will likely be remembered as a kinder version of 
Stalin who did what was necessary for Mother Russia to prosper (unlike Western history 
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books, which will likely portray 2014 in particular as a return to the Cold War, or perhaps a 
new Cold War).  He will have returned Russia to greatness from the humiliation suffered in 
the Wild 90’s and rebuilding the military to a fearsome fighting force.  He also will be 
remembered for standing up to the bullying Western powers, and that he did not give an inch 
when it came to Russian sovereignty of its own borders and its “near abroad”.  The 
Commission to Prevent Falsification of History will ensure that his name is not tarnished in 
history, just like any other historical event of significance to Russian history.  Sherr reminds 
us that, “nations refashion their history to suit their strategic needs and this shows how 
importantly history matters.”
458
  In fact, some future Russian ruler or politician could look 
back and say that the deposition of Yanukovich from Ukraine was the biggest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the twenty first century. 
 It is not likely that Russian political opposition will have a chance to be a force in the 
immediate future.  Putin’s comprehensive campaign of shutting down opposition political 
groups and individuals is accomplished through many methods discussed in the previous 
chapter.  They can be imprisoned like Khodorkovsky, or shot in cold blood on the street like 
Nemtsov.  They can also be targeted through faulty lawsuits under vague and flimsy terms of 
Russian law.  They are often accused of tax fraud, funding “political extremism,” or stealing 
public funds.  Often, they flee to London knowing the risk of imprisonment or even death.  
Some like Pugachev are put on Interpol wanted lists by the Kremlin, and live in constant fear 
of assassination.  This is a painful form of maskirovka itself, as it strains those abroad 
psychologically by pressuring them to return home to face Russian “justice”.  It is a miracle 
                                                          
458
 James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad, (London, UK: Chatham 
House, 2013), p. 6. 
232 
 
that they are able to orchestrate protests on the scale that they do at times, but these efforts do 
not matter if they do not bring about real changes in the Russian leadership’s behavior.  If 
there is any change in the power succession, it will not likely be done through voting, but a 
predetermined pick by Putin himself of his successor.   
 Putin likes to show that he is the only one keeping Russia unified and from being 
pulled apart by internal and external actors, and that a spiraling collapse of the Russian 
Federation is inevitable if he is forced out of office.  For this reason, it is also worth 
questioning what Russia will look like following Putin.  While there have been rumors that 
Putin could step down after this term ending in 2018, there are no indications that he would 
not see out a fourth term running to 2024 either.  What sort of leader will emerge from a line 
of succession?  Russia without Putin would look, act, and function much like it does now.  
There is not much that will shift from the current political or social construct of the Russian 
people or the system that is in place.  For those hoping for a more moderate leader, they 
would likely be sorely mistaken.  Given the Russian peoples’ cultural fabric that has been 
woven since Kievan Rus and the times of Ivan III, the Russian people will only accept a 
strong authoritarian leader.  Currently, it does not seem like a true democracy is something 
that they find appealing.  Putin’s successor will thus already be in a high position in the 
Kremlin and share Putin’s grand-strategic view for Russia’s future.  Putin’s successor could 
come from the following: siloviki members like Defense Minister Shoigu; Chief of Staff 
Sergei Ivanov; additional terms of office for Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev; or a left-
field choice like Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.  They would likely veer slightly to 
the right or to the left of Putin’s current political belief system, but as has already been seen 
with Medvedev, they will be protective and even aggressive toward any infringement on their 
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sovereignty or spheres of influence.  According to Gleb Pavlovsky, “it is impossible to say 
when this system will fail, but when it fails, it will fall in one day, and the one to replace it 
will be a copy of this one.”
459
   
Would it be any different if someone outside the current Kremlin circle took power?  
Even if an opposition leader like Alexei Navalny emerged as the leader of the country, and 
he brought the hammer down on rackets and corruption upon which the foundations of his 
campaign are founded, his foreign policy tone would likely mirror Putin’s and perhaps be 
even more radical.  Navalny agrees with the annexation of Crimea, agrees in protecting 
Russia’s near abroad, and has far-right political affiliation with groups who protest the 
influence that Caucasians and Central Asians are gaining in their own country.  Navalny even 
says of Ukraine, “integration with Russia is a natural process because Ukraine is weaker and 
because we are one and the same people.”
460
  There are no indications that friendlier relations 
with the West would emerge with someone else holding the Russian presidency, even an 
opposition leader who was much further to the left than those currently in charge in the 
Kremlin.  Russians, it appears, will continue to act like Russians regardless of their political 
leanings.   
Keeping Russians Happy:  It Is Not So Simple 
The state of the Russian people themselves deserves discussion because it shapes 
what the Kremlin is currently trying to do.  According to Putin, “Russians have a unique and 
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very powerful genetic code, which prepares them for self-sacrifice.”
461
  Putin keeps his 
power by making sure his people are pacified and happy, but he also plays to the deep-seated 
motif of sacrifice for the Motherland.  He realizes the strategic necessity of integrating 
domestic policies towards desired foreign policy goals.  If he is to be successful in foreign 
policy, it all starts with how is perceived inside his own borders.  The approval rating of 
Russia’s government among foreigners is shockingly low, but Russians do not care.  Putin is 
hovering at sky-high domestic approval ratings.   Most Russians approve of the way Putin is 
handling Ukraine.  Much of the thanks goes to maskirovka efforts of the state-run media.  
Even a people manipulated through state-run media must be inclined toward a particular 
position and then swayed further in that direction with a combination of propaganda and 
truth.  When the Kremlin combines this “fog of war” disseminated by the media with friction 
of fear from the supposed hostile intent of Western powers, it keeps the Russian masses 
content.  If Putin does not maintain this fog and friction amongst the Russian people, he 
knows his control of the country will slip away.  If Putin is deposed, it will come from a 
combination of the ruling elites and popular unrest, not through the ballot box.  Historically, 
Russians have been profoundly patient with their leaders, but when their patience runs out, it 
gets bloody.  Putin surely knows this, and this is why he has put a premium on information 
warfare, using maskirovka on his own people on a grand scale, and crushing dissent quickly 
wherever it rises.   
In order for Putin to maintain control of Russia and keep it pacified, he needs to know 
the construct of people who make up his country.  Russia is a very ethnically, religiously, and 
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economically diverse country, and there are many people that need to be catered to in order 
to keep a healthy authoritarian environment.  There has been some friction among the 
populace in vital areas as far as their interests go.  First, Russia is experiencing a devastating 
brain drain.  Those who earn a reputable education through their more prestigious 
universities like Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State University are the first to 
search for work outside their own country.   The integrity of other institutions is suspect 
because it has become commonplace for more affluent Russians to purchase their degrees 
and pay people to complete necessary bodies of works such as theses or dissertations.  This 
hurts them economically because bright, educated people are the ones who start businesses, 
produce technological innovations, and bring a diversified economy to the state, not to 
mention other Russians questioning one another’s credentials regarding a degree that might 
have been bought.  Imagine having medical or dental work from someone who bought a 
degree from Far Eastern Federal University.   
Second, the economic sectoral sanctions are forcing Russians to go without 
commodities that they have grown accustomed to since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The Kremlin will appeal to Russian nationalism and that they are a tough people who has 
done without before, but the younger Russian generation knows nothing of this struggle.  
There is a sizable demographic that is accustomed to French cheeses, Australian steak, fine 
wines, I-Phones, and annual trips to Turkey.  This sort of forced struggle is new to them, and 
while patriotic duty will inevitably have some appeal to the population, it will only take the 
Kremlin so far.  The Russian government even had the audacity to destroy hundreds of tons 
of food that violated Russia’s counter-sanctions, and for hundreds of thousands of older 
Russian citizens who lived through World War II and had to live off of as little as 125 grams 
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of bread a day, the insult was not lost on them. Senior citizens signed petitions condemning 
the act and demanding that their government stop the destruction.
462
 
Third is the small but most influential demographic; the nouveau riche and oligarchs 
who have vast sums of wealth that provide taxable income to the Kremlin.  They send their 
children to private schools in Europe and have vacation flats in London, Rome, and Paris.  
However, capital flight has been a significant loss from oligarchs who do not want to stick 
around and watch their fortunes dwindle as a result of Russian foreign policy.  According to 
Russia’s finance minister, Russia has estimated that capital flight in 2015 will be $110 
billion.
463
  That is a financial gut-punch for any nation.  Combining it with the devaluation of 
the ruble, it has become something that has the capacity to be dangerous to the Kremlin itself. 
The final group is the marginalized yet significant Caucasian and Central Asian 
population that calls Russia home.  They work and live there, yet are cast as outsiders in 
many instances.  This will become an uncomfortable situation in the next ten to twenty years.  
By 2040, Russia will be a Muslim-majority nation given current birth and death rate trends.  
Simple demographic numbers dictate this.
464
  The birth rate of ethnic Russians is 
apocalyptically low, and Russian males have one of the shortest lifespans in the world due to 
alcoholism and increasing narcotics abuse.  In contrast, Caucasian and Central Asian people 
have longer lifespans and healthy families with lots of children.  It is not uncommon to see a 
Chechen family with a ten-child household, as it is important in Caucasian and Central Asian 
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culture to have large families.  The Russian military is also filling more of its ranks with 
Central Asians with the promise Russian citizenship once they serve five-year contracts.
465
  If 
in the coming years minarets rise from mosques inside the Kremlin walls, the concerns of 
Ukraine will be of little import to a Muslim-majority country.  If Chechnya becomes a hot 
conflict again, in the next ten to twenty years it will have a different identity.  Many Russians 
in the military will have a hard time fighting against their Muslim brothers when the 
demographic swing comes into full force.  Rather, the concerns of the Caucasus and Central 
Asian countries could come to a head in some unexpected ways.  It will be these growing 
minority groups that will look to right historical wrongs and engage in correcting historical 
humiliations that they experienced at the hands of ethnic Russians.    
These Russian minorities at some level are disgusted with the priority of pan-Slavism 
on display in Ukraine, and it completely discredits the historical experience of the Tartar, the 
Buryat, the Chechen, the Dagestani, and others.  No doubt, there will be some volatile 
friction within Russia during these inevitable years of transformation, and it would not be 
surprising to see ethnic Russians take a violent stand when they feel demographically 
overwhelmed.  Combine this with Kremlin involvement in Syria, which changed from covert 
support to overt support on September 29, 2015, and this sizable Muslim base could began 
rallying to the cause of the Islamic State and consider taking action in the Russian homeland.  
It has the capacity to be an explosive situation, and a high-confidence assessment should be 
given when weighing these outcomes.  Should anything happen to Ramzan Kadyrov, the 
situation in the Caucasus will explode.  It is an Achilles Heel of the Kremlin, because racism 
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in Russia has experienced a significant uptick since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (in 
part because it was finally politically and socially acceptable for it to come to the surface).   
How To Solve The Ukraine Crisis:  What Was Done Wrong And How To Do It Right 
The Ukrainian crisis must be resolved diplomatically.  It is obvious that a military 
response is in no one’s best interest, and an economic escape valve is in Russia’s best 
interests.  This requires some hard truths for both sides to accept in order to move forward.  
First, Crimea is Russian and there will be no turning back from that now.  Russia has a 
defensive position that would force an unacceptable number of casualties for any offensive 
engagement by Ukraine or some other party like NATO.  Once Russia moves tactical nuclear 
missiles onto the peninsula, it is game over.  It can bring the United Kingdom within striking 
distance of its tactical nuclear missiles, and makes ballistic missile treaties obsolete the 
moment that it happens.  It would be wise to assume that this is already a foregone 
conclusion.  That is something no one, not even the United States, can do anything about.   
The author’s proposal is twofold: first, that the United States and its allies must lift 
economic sanctions on Russia and recognize Russian sovereignty over the Crimean 
peninsula.  The separatist fighters and the political figures of the Donetsk and Luhansk 
Republics must be given immunity from prosecution, as difficult as that is to stomach.  In 
return, the Russians must promise to completely disarm the separatist movement in Donbas 
and accept Ukraine’s decision to economic relations under the umbrella of the European 
Union.  Second, Russia must also give something by explicitly rewriting ballistic missile 
treaties so that it would be prohibited from placing tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula.  
UN troops from a third-party nation must maintain observation of the ceasefire and provide a 
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peacekeeping presence while Donetsk and Luhansk are rebuilt, preferably from a nation like 
China or India.  Oil prices must also be the same as they were agreed on during the 
Yanukovich presidency, which was $235 per thousand cubic meters.
466
  Finally, an 
appropriate annual fee must be paid to Ukraine for the loss of Crimea in the sum of $15 
billion and should be tied to market inflation.  This gives Putin an escape valve and a chance 
to look victorious in front of the Russian people with an endgame he and they can live with.  
Pugachev shows the importance of this, saying “every compromise he sees is a personal 
victory.”
467
  All parties can wind down and we can get back to working on normalized 
relations.  This will take time and sacrifices that both sides find hard to swallow, but at the 
diplomatic table, it takes tough decisions and concessions from both sides to get things done.   
We must conclude that the United States and the EU have done a woefully inadequate 
job of protecting Ukraine from a belligerent foe who has put a concerted effort into making 
Ukraine fail, and this author shares Kuzio’s point of view that President Obama’s Ukraine 
policy has been an unmitigated disaster without any strategic direction. Nor has the 
administration provided a strong enough counter-response to deter future action.  President 
Obama has been torched on his foreign policy by both sides of the aisle in Congress for not 
having a cohesive strategy for defending Ukraine from Russian hard and soft power.  
Democratic Senator Robert Menendez says, “we have to give the Ukrainians a fighting 
chance to defend themselves.  We should be providing the Ukrainians with the types of 
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defensive weapons that will impose a cost on Putin for further aggression.”
468
  A bipartisan 
letter written by Senators Carl Levin (D) and John McCain (R) has requested that we provide 
Ukraine with lethal weapons.  The letter says “they (the Ukrainians) are not asking us to fight 
their battles, they are asking for the capability to fight for themselves.”
469
  House Armed 
Forces Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry says, “we are trying everything we can 
possibly think of to get it done legislatively to force it to happen.  How do we force the 
president to provide weapons to a country if he does not want to?”
470
  Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Jimmy Carter’s former National Security Advisor is also critical by saying, “we have 
signaled a willingness to accommodate.  I am not sure that at this stage, we have succeeded 
in convincing the Russians that we are prepared to deter the kind of steps they are 
adapting.”
471
   General Joseph Dunford does not mince words when he says, “Russia now 
poses the greatest threat to our national security and its behavior is nothing short of 
alarming.”
472
  He also believes it is perfectly reasonable to supply Ukraine with lethal 
weapons.  General Breedlove agrees that we currently need to be doing more to combat the 
threat.  When discussing current Kremlin activity, he states, “What we see is diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic tools being used against Ukraine.  We in the west 
should consider using all of our tools to reply.  Could it be destabilizing? Yes, but inaction 
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could also be destabilizing.”
473
 These are but a few critics of our current commander-in-chief 
who understand the gravity of our failure to act.  One could only imagine how frustrated our 
military commanders and senior intelligence analysts must feel in this situation.   If Putin 
wanted to threaten Obama overtly, all he would need to do would be to threaten a small 
NATO nation in the Baltics, use some Nashi to cause trouble, and move some battalions 
toward the border, and that nation would likely invoke Article Five of NATO.  What would 
President Obama do then?  It is something that the United States should be concerned with. 
 Our actions in previous diplomatic theaters have set the tone for Ukraine.  Russia has 
continued to move slowly across our red lines in Ukraine ever since the mockery of our red 
lines were put on display in response to Assad using chemical weapons against his own 
people in Syria.  Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk says “let me put this bluntly: 
this is a war.  The well-known diplomatic language of red lines is sometimes embarrassing 
because it seems as if we are geopolitically colorblind.  Russia has crossed ten red lines.”
474
  
A major reason the administration did such a poor job in our assessment of Russian 
intentions and actions is that it fundamentally underestimated Russian will and capability.  
According to Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “We have underestimated, for a 
long time, the magnitude of the humiliation that Russians felt with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union because it also involved the collapse of the Russian Empire.”
475
  So there were 
obviously policy makers along the chain who were aware of the Russian capacity to be 
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belligerent and act as aggressors, but these warnings were not heeded at the highest levels of 
the chain of command.   
The United States has had a strategic fixation on Al Qaeda and ISIS for the last 
fourteen years.  This train of thought is understandable given that it was started by a massive 
attack by a non-state terrorist actor on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and has 
continued from there.   We have adjusted our military and intelligence networks accordingly 
to combat this terrorist threat, and we have transformed our military, which was caught flat-
footed in part because of a Cold War playbook.  These terrorist networks are a tactical danger 
to our national security.  However, it was sorely misguided to take our eyes off of the 
strategic threats posed by belligerent nations, most importantly Russia.  Stephen J. Blank of 
the American Foreign Policy Council agrees with this, stating “this is the biggest security 
threat in the world, much greater than ISIS frankly.”
476
  His point of view and others like his 
are being vindicated with recent Russian action in Syria.   
Our responses should have been backed by actions from the onset of the crises in the 
Crimea and Ukraine.  According to Thomas Grant, “all forceful annexations in the UN era, 
such as the first Gulf War, were dealt with harshly and appropriately by the international 
community to ensure that integrity stood on the sovereignty of nations.  Crimea has been a 
whimper and encouragement for Russia.  The aggression against Ukraine is a potential 
turning point; that international law therefore must respond to as strongly as possible to reject 
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or isolate its effects.”
477
 The implications of inaction reach far beyond Ukraine.  What other 
nations will impose “areas of privileged interests” and what areas of the world will they be 
in?  Inaction by our policy makers validates China in the Spratly Islands and even ISIS has 
gained legitimacy in the eyes of a sizable demographic of observers and political participants 
given its ability to build a state, defeat all of its adversaries to date, and ride out American 
special-operations and air strikes with no decrease in its capabilities.  It sets a dangerous 
precedence that other belligerent nations or nonpolitical entities will attempt to take 
advantage of for their own purposes.  
The United States should have led the charge immediately to put SWIFT sanctions on 
Russia to remove them from digital connection to the international bank exchange the week 
they invaded Crimea with their little green men.  It would have been a backbreaker for the 
Russian financial sector that showed we meant business from the beginning.  We should be 
using our combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic muscle to make 
Russia’s experience in Ukraine a nightmare.   We should have given Ukraine anti-tank 
weapons like javelins the moment Russian armor crossed the Ukrainian border.  Russian 
dissident and former chess world champion Gary Kasparov agrees, saying, “Ukraine should 
be provided with anti-tank missiles and other defensive arms at very least.”
478
  We should 
have given them night vision goggles, surplus tactical vehicles from OIF and OEF, 
bulletproof vests, and anything else they could have used to turn the tide against Russian 
forces there.  These are forces we do not have to worry about becoming radicalized or 
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turning against us.  The vast majority even of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in 
Ukraine want nothing to do with their territory being brought under Russian influence.  One 
Ukrainian commander notes, “half of the Azov Battalion speaks Russian, but they’d all die 
and kill for Ukraine!”
479
 
The Ukrainians want nothing more than their own freedom and right to self-
determination.  They are fighting hard with scant resources and inadequate defense spending 
and rely on donations from their own citizens to continue the fight against the separatists.  
The Ukrainians have the willpower, and if we gave them the means, they could have sent 
more Russians back in a volume of coffins that could not have been hidden from public view.   
If we responded this way in the first place, Russian red-teaming exercises (which they do 
very well) would have likely deemed it to have been a predictable counterpunch on our 
behalf and, by extension, not worth the cost and risks associated with their aggressive 
actions.  If we made the situation so unbearable on the ground for the Russian military, and 
combined it with a diplomatic coaxing to give him an easy way out, this war that currently 
appears set to last for decades as a frozen conflict could have been on its way to ending.  It 
would have given Putin and the Kremlin their own dose of hard coercion and soft diplomacy. 
The United States dropped the ball but is not the only party that shoulders blame.  
According to U.S. billionaire George Soros, who has been passionately working to ease the 
plight of Ukraine, “it is high time that members of the European Union wake up and behave 
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as countries indirectly at war.”
480
  It is Europe that should get the brunt of this blame for not 
responding to a crisis in their backyard with even marginally adequate force.  It is a 
community of nations that has shown no backbone whatsoever in the crisis and is more 
interested in trimming defense budgets and begging the United States for help than stepping 
up and taking care of business on their own while hiding under the guise that postmodern 
Europe is uninterested in confrontation, but commerce.  United States and other NATO 
countries’ spending has been very lopsided since the turn of the century.
481
  Currently, the 
European Union has sanctioned 151 individuals and 37 companies.
482
  They have also 
removed Russia from the G-8 organization.  British policy makers have been proactive and 
proposed making banking records of senior Russian politicians public, which the British 
currently have classified as a state secret. (Karen Dawisha’s book: Putin’s  Kleptocracy; Who 
Owns Russia? gives a detailed account of this issue.)  German Chancellor Angela Merkel has 
also done a comprehensive job on the diplomatic side of the house, and she seems to have a 
clear idea of what the big picture is.  Merkel stats “it is not only about Ukraine.  It is about 
Georgia.  It is about Moldova.  If it continues like this, one has to wonder about Serbia and 
other countries in the Western Balkans.  Who would have thought that twenty-five years after 
the fall of the Berlin wall, after the end of the Cold War and the end of the world’s separation 
into two blocks, something like this could happen in the middle of Europe?   Old ways of 
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thinking of spheres of influence which spurn international law must not be accepted.”
483
  So 
for European countries, it is not a problem of not recognizing the threat, or even failure to 
act.  It is an issue of failure to act with enough force to deter Putin and the Kremlin, and it 
could result in a collapsed Ukrainian state if Europe fails to act with more fire and passion, in 
close coordination with a more assertive United States, to a Ukraine that is begging for aid. 
Unfortunately, there are few indications that these sanctions or other punitive 
measures have altered the Kremlin’s grand-strategic posture in any notable way.  The only 
countries that have any interest in actively helping Ukraine are those with a sense of history 
that are also worried that they might be next: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
According to NATO estimates, the latter three could be invaded by Russia in four to seven 
hours even with the new NATO rapid reaction force, which would be nothing more than a 
mere tripwire.
484
  They are currently the only nations in NATO meeting the recommended 
two percent of GDP spending on defense, while other nations of NATO have been making 
significant cuts in defense.  Poland in particular plans to spend $42 billion over the next 
decade on modernizing its military force.
485
  Each Baltic nation has respectively spent $1.2 
billion apiece.  Lithuania recently passed a law instituting conscription, and civilian militias 
have been drilling in Latvia and Estonia on a more regular basis.
486
  This urgency amongst 
the Baltic States is warranted because it has the demographic capacity to provide another 
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hybrid warfare insurgency.  More than one million ethnic Russians live in the Baltics, and 
Russia will likely use them to their advantage when looking to create controlled instability 
there.  Recently on the air of pro-Kremlin media station RuBaltic, a Russian foreign ministry 
official said, “We are carrying out a line so that Russian compatriots regardless of where they 
live are guaranteed all rights and freedoms and have the same opportunity to preserve the 
culture and traditions of their historical motherland.”
487
  It is thus easy to see the rationale for 
an increase in defensive measures in all three Baltic nations. 
We should be working with our NATO allies, and especially our Eastern European 
ones, to establish a significant base on Poland’s eastern border as a strong deterrent to 
Kremlin belligerence (a NATO base in the Baltics would be dangerously inviting another 
hybrid warfare attempt by Russia, which has already threatened to use destabilizing actions if 
such a base is attempted).  It is a base that Poland is very much in support of, which is more 
than can be said of many of the United States’ current bases abroad.  Increasing a naval 
presence in Constanta, Romania as a presence to counter Russia in the Black Sea would also 
be strategically wise.  NATO and the United States should also begin seriously entertaining 
the missile defense shield.  The 5,000-man NATO rapid response force authorized by 
General Jens Stolenberg is a start, but a much more sincere effort should be made than what 
European policy makers have put forth.  While Ukraine and Georgia have attempted to move 
toward EU and NATO membership, European nations have scoffed at the idea out of the fear 
of angering Russia.  We are already seeing breaking in the lines in Europe as far as 
continuing the sanctions against Russia goes, with France leading the charge to end them.   
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This feeds right into what Putin and his men in the Kremlin are trying to establish: a 
divide-and-conquer campaign that keeps all parties on edge and encourages internal 
squabbling.  As previously mentioned he has little respect for Europe and sees it as being in 
decline.  According to Merkel, “Putin believes that we are decadent, we are gay, and we are 
women with beards.”
488
  According to Rajan Menon, “The expansion of NATO, and 
subsequently the EU, has long been seen by the Russian foreign policy establishment as an 
attempt by United States and European allies to marginalize Russia and diminish its role in 
Europe and other global affairs, and to weaken its economic and political influence.”
489
  This 
is why the Kremlin is so intent to divide the EU and NATO.  Europe should not need a yearly 
reminder that Russia was directly responsible for shooting down a civilian aircraft filled with 
European tourists, nor should it need to be reminded that a sovereign European country was 
invaded in the twenty first century on their watch with minimal repercussions for the 
aggressor.  The Russian campaign, utilizing fog and friction in Europe, will likely bring 
European sanctions resilience crashing down at the end of 2015.  Russia will have gotten 
exactly what it wanted and weathered a storm it predicted all too easily would come to an 
end. 
With all of this in mind, the United States and the EU must hit the Kremlin where it 
hurts: in the eyes of the international community.  So long as this belligerence takes place in 
nations like Ukraine, it is our obligation to put the Russians under heavy diplomatic pressure.  
What better way to hurt their pride than deprive them of a moment where the eyes of the 
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world are on them?  Senators like John McCain have already proposed such an idea.
490
  The 
symbolism of depriving Moscow of the World Cup in 2018 would be devastating to Putin 
and his ego, and would teach him a very firm lesson that the international community will 
not tolerate bad behavior.  The United States, albeit unintentionally, has done just that by 
launching a corruption probe into soccer’s governing FIFA body where the first charges were 
filed in May 2015.  The rumors of corruption involved in the Qatar and Russia bids have 
been loud, and the Department of State under Attorney General Loretta Lynch is 
investigating FIFA members, including President Sepp Blatter, for taking bribes in exchange 
for votes for the rights to host the World Cup.
491
   
Many of the grand stadiums designed to host the event have already began 
construction and are on their way to completion, and the same sort of corruption and graft 
that took place during Sochi are suspected of taking place at these venues as well.  Putin fears 
his World Cup is in grave danger as a result, and he has been very vocal about the 
involvement of the United States in its prosecution of FIFA officials.  Some soccer 
conferences like UEFA (European governing soccer body) have called for a boycott on the 
Russia games.  If they can get CONCACAF (North American soccer body) and 
COMENBOL (South American soccer body) to join in the boycott, there will effectively be 
no World Cup.  No one would take a world cup seriously without Brazil, Germany, England, 
Italy, Argentina, and so many other nations not participating in the games.  It would be a 
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sham and a mockery in its own right.  If Russia loses the international stage of the World 
Cup, it would hurt Putin just as much as, if not more than, the sectoral sanctions already 
have.  This investigation is still in progress, and Lynch has already said bluntly “this is not 
the final chapter in our investigation.”
492
  There have been no indictments of Russian 
officials yet, but plea bargaining from some key officials will likely see that change in the 
near future as this investigation unfolds. 
 We have already paid the price for dithering, and Russia has become emboldened to 
continue its campaign of controlled instability in Syria.  Russia has bullied U.S. and allied 
aircraft out of Syrian airspace and established de-facto restricted operation zones (ROZs) 
around the Western population of Syria because they know we will not respond.  Who knows 
where the next zone of conflict will open up where Russia and the United States share mutual 
interests.  Will it be Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Baltic States, or closer to the United States 
in a place like Venezuela or Nicaragua?  Russia now has the courage to continue their 
bullying behavior, but will we be able to remember that it all started when little green men 
raided an airport in Sevastopol, and our policy makers and intelligence community did 
nothing to respond?   
There are probably few NATO generals who sincerely believe that their governments 
would go to war with Russia to protect the Baltic member states at this juncture.  But the old 
Cold War operations plans and other playbooks will have to be dusted off and updated.  A 
strategic plan must be developed as a contingency should Russia attempt Gerasimov’s model 
of hybrid warfare again in a NATO country.  There will need to be a military response, and 





policy makers will need to have the courage and resolve to follow through with their Article 
5 obligations to NATO.  These policy makers must also trust their military and intelligence 
community to act and not hamper either of them with partisan slants and forwarding agendas 
like we saw leading up to the Iraq War and which we are seeing now in Syria.  One shudders 
to think what would be the American response to something as serious as the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, because the stakes are gradually increasing to where American resolve may be firmly 
tested on such a scale again in the near future.  Now that our current strategic culture has a 
blueprint of backing down, there is a significant chance that Putin and the Kremlin will not 
flinch this time, as they have not flinched in any past conflicts. 
The parallels between United Russia and Nazi Germany are remarkable.  We 
generally exaggerate Hitler comparisons because it is the historical worst-case scenario that 
we use when we want to illustrate something terrible, but it is a rare exception that the 
parallel comparisons are legitimate here.  With Putin and the Kremlin, there is a government 
that feels its nation was humiliated and taken advantage of.  From this humiliation, Russia 
must build a Third Rome much like Germany was building their Third Reich.  There is a 
timid Europe that does not want conflict and is too “enlightened” and “sophisticated” to let 
things spiral out of control to war.  Using the infamous quote of former British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain, in Ukraine we have, “a quarrel in a far-away country between 
people of whom we know nothing.”   For modern European politicians, civilized nations 
solve problems diplomatically and that is the only way forward for them.  For a more modern 





  The Crimean peninsula was annexed like Sudetenland to protect the interests 
of ethnic Russians.  Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev recognizes the parallels, stating “any 
talk of protection of Russians living in Kazakhstan reminds one of the times of Hitler who 
also started off with the question of protecting Sudetenland Germans.”
494
  The military 
modernization agenda has been pushed forward at all costs at the expense of all other 
economic priorities.  There has been a comprehensive campaign of propaganda and 
misinformation at home and abroad.  Russians are vengeful and still angry that eastern 
European nations view the Red Army as an invading army that pillaged, raped, and murdered 
its way to Berlin rather than acting like liberators.  There has been rabid racism by ethnic 
Russians toward Caucasians and Central Asians who are targeted and beaten in the streets.  
Russians have decided that they are the chosen people who will be the bastion of 
Eurasianism and “racial purity” in the battle with Muslim and other “impure” peoples.  Putin 
responds to criticism by pointing the finger at Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland 
as instances of a hypocritical United States that should not point the finger at Russia despite a 
shockingly higher rate of violence towards minorities in Russia than in the United States.  
Finally, Putin is willing to take bold risks.  The fact that a nation with this sort of behavior 
can in turn call Ukraine a Fascist Nazi Junta because of a few Pravi Sektor or Azov Brigade 
militia members is preposterous.   
Imperialist nations by default try to justify their actions.  For example, the Spanish 
justified themselves in conquering the Americas by spreading Christianity.  They profess 
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they stopped barbaric practices like cannibalism and encouraged modernization to move to 
Western civilization.  Social Darwinism became a more blunt justification, and these 
pretenses of Russia were just like England, Spain, and France when Russia subjugated the 
Eskimos, Central Asians, Caucasians, Buryats, and others in expanding their empire.  Their 
histories have been marginalized as conquered peoples by ethnic Russian historians.  Russia 
is ethnically one of the most diverse nations in the world, but historically it is dominated by 
the Slavs ever since they drove out the Golden Horde.  Ethnic Russians felt it was their 
burden to spread civilization and ideas like communism because only a great nation like 
theirs could allow smaller nations around them to succeed.  This ethos of greatness is what 
drives Russia to expand its influence by any means necessary.   
Russia is unique, however, in the sense that it is psychologically paranoid of invasion, 
and through history, that could almost be forgiven with how many invaders made their way 
through Russia.  They need that buffer zone of what they perceive to be inferior nations and 
inferior peoples to feel better about their sovereignty and for protection from any future 
invaders.  Yulia Tymoshenko says, “Russian leaders deserve understanding of their 
anguished struggle to overcome generations of Soviet misrule.  They are not, however, being 
handed the sphere of influence that Tsars and commissars have coveted for 300 years.”
495
  
Russia is unique, for good reasons and bad, but if there is one nation that has justification for 
an anxiety disorder from external tormentors, it is Ukraine.  Their big brother has been 
nothing but a big bully for much of their existence, and they also shared in the horrors of 
multiple invasions from east and west.  In short, Ukrainians have had the worst of both 
worlds. 
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Our current trajectory of engaging Russia is not in our national interests.  So long as 
the price it must pay for continuing its policy is acceptable to the Kremlin (and it currently 
is), Putin will continue harassing Ukraine.  Though Putin has accomplished his goal of 
establishing a frozen conflict on the eastern border of Ukraine, his strategic gamble may be in 
danger because he has completely undone any brotherly love that the Ukrainians or Russians 
might have built up over centuries in the span of a few years.  Before his death, Boris 
Nemtsov wrote, “Putin will go down in history as the president who made Ukraine and 
Russia foes.”
496
  A poll indicated in 2011 that 80 percent of Ukrainians had a favorable view 
of Russia.
497
  Currently, that number is down to 35 percent.  Without Crimea as a voting 
bloc, Ukraine will likely never again have a pro-Russian president or Rada.  There is no 
possibility that Ukraine will be on friendly terms again with Russia unless the latter occupies 
it with outright force, and Putin is smart enough to not do that.  Ukrainians have really found 
their patriotic identity while the conflict with Russia has played out.  Without Putin, 
Ukrainian nationalism would likely have never achieved the heights that it has reached today.  
While Crimea is important strategically, Donbas is just as important because so long as Putin 
holds that sliver of land, he will have a say in the fate of Ukraine, and that is a dangerous 
precedent not just for Ukraine, but for Europe as well.  Controlled instability will continue in 
the region and will go through intervals of hot and frozen conflicts whenever Putin feels he 
needs to put pressure on Poroshenko.  For Putin, this is probably the best-case scenario for 
his grand-strategic plan.  He will continue to creep across red lines very slowly to wear down 
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the patience of the United States and Europe.  He will grab his little brother by the neck and 
bully him into submission, and call it tough love.  Kremlin dissident Brzezinski is quoted as 
saying, “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”
498
  Putin will not let go of 
his dream of a Eurasian empire, and he will hang on to Ukraine as long and as hard as he can.   
Putin does this not just for interests in maintaining control of his near abroad, but at 
home as well.  He will hang on to power at any cost.  Putin is prepared to fight his own 
people and spill blood to maintain control, and there would be many more casualties if 
Euromaiden-style protests took place in Moscow.  According to Khodorkovsky, “if Putin is 
shown that there is no possibility of retaining power besides war, then war is possible.”
499
  
This is an unpredictability that Western policy makers and intelligence analysts should not 
lose sight of, especially for a man who feels like his back is against the wall.  Putin has 
warned, “if you push a spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”
500
  Putin’s 
Russia is a variation of Soviet and Tsarist Russia; a Russia that is constantly attempting to be 
the third Rome and at the same time pushing away the fifth column.   He cherry-picks 
through history as he sees fit.  According to Kalb, “Putin picks his way through history to 
find support for his policy, or confirmation of his beliefs, while discarding history that does 
not conform with his world view.”
501
  In spite of this double standard, Kremlin will continue 
to portray Russian existence as under siege by meddling Western powers and pounding the 
drums of nationalistic fervor appealing to them to be strong during times of troubles because 
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it suits his grand strategic objective.  In the man time, most Russians will continue to love 
Putin and rulers like him as loving father-like authoritarian figures.   In the meantime, the 
Kremlin will do its best to prop up the weak “E” element within the DIME equation and ride 
out the economic storm that nearly undid them not too long ago. Tsarist and Soviet Russia 
met their demise by spending themselves into oblivion, and Putin’s Russia could do the 
same.   In conclusion, Sherr sums up what Russia has been, is now, and always will be:  “It 
will never be socialist or capitalist; democratic or totalitarian.  It will be Russian.”
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